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 This qualitative case study explored the impact of Race to the Top’s teacher evaluation 
policies in two case schools. Using Ball, Maguire, and Braun’s (2012) enactment framework as 
my theoretical starting point, I sought to better understand how teachers interacted with policy 
texts during processes of reform. Herein, the data from this study are presented two ways. First, I 
use them to make generalizations about similarities in policy outcomes across both cases. I then 
apply the lens of enactment to explore more deeply my participants’ interpretive activities. To 
complement this framework, I propose the concepts of productive and principled resistance. 
What this second analysis reveals is that the teachers responded to these policies in complex 
ways that sometimes carried unique meanings even when their outcomes looked alike on the 
surface. With this more complex conceptualization laid out, this text ends by presenting these 
educators’ understandings of the historical and political contexts for these policies to implore 














The project that led to this dissertation began as an effort to better understand the impact 
of a particular set of education reforms. Conducting it was nothing short of a tremendous 
professional and personal learning experience. When it commenced, I fully expected that the 
policies that had grounded it would remain my central focus, that my research questions would 
largely go unchanged, and that what would come out of it would be a rather traditional 
dissertation. On all counts I was wrong, or perhaps it is more accurate to say I was naive. I 
lacked a sense of the peregrination that is qualitative research.  
What lay ahead for me was not the straightforward journey I expected. Rather, the next 
few years would confirm what others had already told me—“My questions would change;” “The 
things that I first glossed over would later become vitally important;” and “I would have to be 
fluid in my processes of data-collecting, thinking, reading, and writing.” Though I would 
experience periods of clarity, there were many other times where I would feel as though I was 
doubling back, questioning myself. This could be both frustrating and confusing. But, in 
hindsight, it was also something that I quite enjoyed. 
The only reason I can say this now, however, is because of the networks of support that 
surrounded me throughout this process. I could not have produced this dissertation without my 
fellow graduate-student-friends who served as sounding boards for my ideas and challenged me 
with thought-provoking questions. Nor could I have finished it without my teacher-friends who 
kept me accountable by continually asking when I would ‘just hurry up and finish, so they could 
read my work.’ I am also forever grateful to my current and former students who by asking me 
when they would get to/have to start calling me Dr. provided me with an additional source of 
answerability. This last statement is especially true for those few who allowed me the 
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opportunity to mesh both my professional worlds through our book clubs and their feedback on 
my early writing. 
In addition, I could not have gotten here without the support of my advisor and the help 
of my closest family. I am so thankful to Marilyn Johnson-Parsons for her patience and 
encouragement, both of which have been crucial and consistent ever since I took my first 
masters-level class. Although she did not have to, Marilyn later adopted me as her own student, 
stood by me when I insisted on maintaining my status as a full-time classroom teacher, and gave 
me countless hours of her time even in retirement. Likewise, my mother, Kathy, who is also 
supposed to be retired, supported me throughout this process. She watched my son an untold 
number of mornings, and I am fairly certain she is the only one who voluntarily read all of my 
writing. My husband, TJ, did his best to free up time for me despite his own hectic schedule. 
And, my son, Jackson, whose simple presence in my life has always provided me with daily 
motivation, was incredibly forgiving, especially for a seven-year-old during the middle of the 
summer, which is when I primarily wrote this.  
Finally, none of this would have been doable were it not for the teachers and 
administrators who agreed to take part in this project. As a fellow K-12 educator, I know all too 
well how little free time you have during the school year, so to each of you I extend a sincere 
thank you for your willingness to work with me. The insights I gained from our time together 
went beyond what I expected, and while I did learn something about the impact of the policies I 
mentioned at the outset and could have probably stuck to answering my initial research 
questions, our conversations also brought to light something much more interesting and, I 
believe, equally (maybe even more) important. You turned my attention away from outcomes 
and towards how educators engage with policies. Though the former is where today’s reformers 
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have tended to focus, your stories, which fill this text, are evidence that the latter not only shapes 
an initiative’s true effects but also goes on to give it its lived meanings.  
In short, this text is not the one I envisioned when I first began this process. It is, though, 
the result of much time spent with many brilliant people. Foremost among these were my 
participants, but there were many others who encouraged me along the way. Although I know 
not all of them will read this, I still want to express to each my gratitude. I could not have 
accomplished this without them, and what follows is not just the result of my efforts but a 
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Chapter 1: Prologue to Dissertation Committee and Introduction 
It has taken me a long time to get here. If I have learned one thing all too well along the 
way, it is that continuing as a full-time teacher while trying to finish a dissertation is a difficult 
thing. At times, it felt like an impossible task.  
As I look back, though, I would not have it any other way. Regardless of where I go 
professionally from here, I know that my heart is that of a teacher. Staying connected to the 
classroom while I wrote this may have made things challenging, but it also never let me forget 
why I began study as a PhD student. I did so not just because I was interested in education 
reform but also because I wanted to better understand the relation between reform and the lives 
of teachers.  
One of you once asked me to consider who I wanted to speak to with my research. This 
was, and is still, not an easy question for me to answer. What I can say is that as I thought about 
how to write this particular piece, it felt essential to create space for my participants’ voices. 
More than this, though, it seemed important to try to put those voices into conversation with the 
voices and perspectives that were driving the policy changes they were experiencing. As my data 
showed, these educators were already having this conversation amongst themselves—both 
individually and collectively—as they figured out how to respond to these reforms. If I wanted to 
try to represent their experiences, this needed to be part of how I presented these data. 
It was also important to me to try to maintain some of the complexity of the policy 
process. Figuring out how to even begin to do this was an incredible challenge, especially since 
I, myself, am a pretty linear thinker. I am sure that I drove Marilyn crazy throughout this part of 
the process. We discussed putting my study into a traditional dissertation format, writing three 
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publishable papers, and, eventually, writing it up as one might a dissertation. It was only this last 
option that felt like the right fit for my findings.  
As a result, what follows this prologue is not a traditionally structured dissertation; 
though, it still has all the components that one would find therein. In chapter one, I talk about 
how this study grew from the policy context of Race to the Top. In chapter two, I explain my 
relationship to the research as well as how it narrowed to a more specific focus on teacher 
evaluation policy. Chapters three and four provide literature reviews of what I understand to be 
the two areas of research that have been used to support these policies. Chapter five provides the 
policy context for Illinois and the adoption of these reforms in my two case schools. Chapters six 
and seven present two different ways of understanding my data—one that is surface level and 
concerned with generalizing these policies’ impacts and another that digs deeper into the policy 
process to try to make sense of why my participants responded to these changes as they did. 
Finally, chapter eight returns to the literature. It revisits the context for these policy changes 
using my participants’ understandings of them as its jumping off point. Here I am concerned 
with the history and politics behind present day public school reform. Taking my cue from 
Foucault, I leave things here in hopes that the end of this text might leave open, rather than try to 
definitively close, its conversation.  




In the spring of 2009, just as the American economy was bottoming out in what would 
soon become widely known as The Great Recession, newly inaugurated President Barack Obama 
signed into law an emergency bill called the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). 
The legislation was primarily intended to jumpstart an ailing economy, and although it had 
moved through Congress post-haste, work on it had actually begun a few months earlier, before 
the President took office. During his transition, President Obama had met with Congressional 
Democrats on the Hill to quickly write a bill they hoped would stave off the worst financial 
downturn the Country had faced in nearly a century. Most of its provisions were intended to 
rapidly inject money into the world’s largest economy, but tucked within its over 400 pages and 
$787 billion dollars in stimulus monies was approximately $100 billion for education. This is 
where this chapter begins. 
The vast majority of this $100 billion was slated for immediate distribution. It was mostly 
meant to help states maintain pre-recession education funding levels and avert further job loss 
within the field. Much of it was to be distributed through longstanding education laws, namely 
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), but some would also be block-granted to states through State 
Financial Stabilization Funding (SFSF). All of this was laid out in a March 2009 memorandum 
issued by the U.S. Department of Education (DoE), which promised these funds would be made 
available quickly. The goal was to begin transferring money by the end of that month so states 
could move equally as quickly to pass it along to their schools.  
That said, $4.35 billion of this funding was instead to be set aside for what President 
Obama promised would be an historic moment for education. It was this money that would later 
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spur the policies that inspired the project that led to this dissertation. At the time, however, the 
aforementioned memo simply stated that these funds would be used to drive “substantial gains in 
student achievement” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). Neither it nor the ARRA provided 
much more clarity about how this money was supposed to be handed out or eventually used. 
What the President and the Secretary had planned for these funds would only become apparent 
some months later. After a period of silence on the topic, the pair finally appeared together at a 
press conference in July. By then, over six months had passed since Secretary Duncan’s initial 
cabinet nomination. At this earlier event, the two had promised to overhaul the way the federal 
Department of Education supported school improvement. At this later one they would reveal that 
this extraordinary moment of economic crisis created by The Great Recession had given them a 
rare opportunity to stay true to their word.  
At this briefing, each would stress the link between reforming schools and heading off 
the Nation’s future economic problems, promising a better educational system would ensure 
America’s economic prowess around the world. More importantly, they would announce their 
plan for this $4.35 billion dollars. It would be distributed through an incentive-based program 
that Duncan had dubbed Race to the Top (RttT). 
A Race to Innovate 
In some ways, Race to the Top was unremarkable as a federal initiative. After all, ever 
since the DoE had become its own cabinet-level agency three decades prior, U.S. presidents had 
made a habit of using their honeymoon period with the American public to announce some big 
new plan to improve education. In this sense, President Obama could have simply been said to 
have been following past precedent. However, he and Secretary Duncan had also planned 
something truly uncommon for schools.  
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For starters, Race to the Top was, as the President pointed out that day, “one of the 
largest investments in education reform in American history” (Obama, 2009). In fact, if one were 
to add it all up, the roughly $4.35 billion dollar grant would allow for more discretionary 
spending than the entirety of that which had been given to the Department of Education since its 
inception in 1980. That still was, to use Duncan’s words, a “much smaller pot” than what the 
ARRA had set aside for education (Duncan, 2009). In his follow up remarks, he promised that 
this meant RttT would be able to do more than anything that had come before it to foster 
groundbreaking change within schools. 
Additionally, RttT was uncommon in its approach, and the pair claimed it represented the 
crossing of ‘an important threshold’ in reform (Duncan, 2009). Its money would not simply be 
handed out based on program participation or demographic qualifications, as had historically 
been done by the department. Rather, Duncan planned to let “states and school districts compete 
for it,” which, as both he and the President admitted, meant not all who applied would win 
money (Obama, 2009). According to the Secretary, however, his office had already been a 
“compliance-driven agency” for too long and this had failed to produce results, making it time 
for something different. Introducing competition into how the department doled out funding 
would supposedly “incentivize excellence and spur reform” (Obama, 2009). 
 Finally, lest their audience criticize these decisions, the two also came prepared to 
preemptively defend them. In his speech, Duncan explained why he believed that more money in 
the form of a competitive grant would make a difference. The President, for his part, assured that 
such a competition would not be “based on politics or ideology or the preferences of a particular 
interest group. Instead it [would] be based on a simple principle: whether a state [was] ready to 
do what works” (Obama, 2009). They also gave their word that, apparently unlike in the past, 
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winners would be chosen using “the best evidence available to determine whether a state [could] 
meet a few key benchmarks for reform” (Obama, 2009). As the President put it, “States that out-
perform[ed] the rest would be rewarded,” and while not everyone would be happy with the 
results, “America’s children, America’s economy, and America itself [would] be better for it.” In 
short, what the two argued was that by levying the DoE’s authority in this way, rather than 
through a mandate, they could use the historic ARRA funds to create the possibility of an 
unexpected financial windfall or, to put it another way, the risk of a fiduciary disadvantage. This 
would supposedly entice states and schools into making the tough but necessary decisions 
required to improve while also freeing them up to be more creative in finding solutions that 
worked (Duncan, 2009).  
It was Duncan who had the honor of closing out this press conference, and he did so by 
touting what he said was an early example of Race to the Top’s success. He cited the recent 
commitment by forty-six states to form a consortium to develop common curricular standards as 
evidence of its impact. This was almost assuredly meant to affirm that RttT could do the 
impossible—compel states to work together in a way that America’s decentralized system of 
government more often seemed to discourage. Duncan followed up with a quote from mid-
century singer-songwriter Sam Cooke, referencing one of the musician’s most popular civil 
rights ballads and telling his audience “A change gonna come” (Duncan, 2009). This, then, was 
RttT’s final selling point. While it might not be what some had expected, it was still an attempt 
to address schools’ problems as many had framed them as “the biggest civil rights issue of a 
generation” (Rice, 2017). Duncan’s final words left no doubt. “Today,” he told his audience, 
“that change has begun.”  
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Curiosity and the Merits of a Lofty Promise 
I was nowhere near D.C. when all of this happened. In fact, in early 2009 I was just 
beginning work on my masters and teaching social studies in a public high school. Because of 
this, though, at a time when many people were more likely to be wrapped up in what was 
happening on the healthcare front, I was watching what was going on over at the Department of 
Education. Indeed, I had been doing so with curious fascination ever since the Administration’s 
earliest days.  
When Race to the Top was announced, then, I heard about it quickly. Although I cannot 
say for sure, I imagine my initial response to it was similar to many of those who were there to 
witness it first hand. This is say that while the President’s and the Secretary’s words sounded 
propitious, they also felt a bit lofty. For one thing, the pair was far from the first to claim that 
they could ameliorate schools’ issues. For another, the voluntary nature of the grant raised 
significant questions about states’ and schools’ participation. After all, decades of popular 
political sentiment had held that more, not less, federal oversight was necessary to getting 
schools to makes changes. What Race to the Top proposed sounded, at least on first listen, like it 
would do just the opposite. It would purportedly rely on states to undertake reform of their own 
volition as well as let them come up with their own unique plans.  
What both Duncan and the President no doubt understood, however, was that, lofty or 
not, Race to the Top’s timing and presentation would be most crucial to its success. Both 
enticing participation and bringing about the kinds of reforms that the Administration wanted 
would hinge on convincing states and schools, some with wholly different politics, that it was 
worth it to enter into entirely optional contracts with the DoE. With regards to timing, the 
financial crisis would certainly help in this regard, as would the fact that when RttT was 
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introduced, the ARRA had already been signed into law and had it money designated. In 
addition, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), which was the previous presidential administration’s 
claim to school reform fame, had largely come to be viewed as problematic. By the time the 
President took office there was widespread consensus around the need for its removal or 
replacement. This sentiment connected to presentation. Because NCLB had heightened concerns 
about federal overreach, Duncan was wise to continually stress RttT’s voluntary nature, as doing 
so might assuage any similar concerns.  
All of this, from the economics to the politics to the popular sentiment, would make it 
hard for cash-strapped states and schools to say no to the Department, and in the end, Race to the 
Top’s impact would be far-reaching. Even if it had not been on my radar in 2009, within a few 
short years RttT would have been difficult to ignore. By the time the third and final round of 
statewide competition ended in 2011, the Department had succeeded in setting off a massive 
wave of policy changes that would reshape states’ educational landscapes. In all, forty-six states 
had applied to Race to the Top, and although only eighteen and D.C. were ever awarded prizes, 
many more pushed through legislation in an effort to secure some funds. That following year, the 
Administration’s attention shifted to the district-level where it would sponsor several more 
rounds of competition. Although far fewer entities would be involved in this phase, another 21 
would receive funding. What was most striking throughout all of this was the similarity of the 
policies that states and schools adopted. In fact, their reforms were so alike that it was hard not to 
conclude that what at first seemed lofty was now poised to have an enormous effect. Much of 
this, though, would not become fully apparent to me until sometime later.  
Back in 2009, I was really just curious enough about Race to the Top to keep my eyes on 
it. This would soon change, though, when the school I was working at was labeled ‘failing’ 
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because, anachronistically, NCLB was allowed to coexist alongside RttT until the Obama 
Administration began offering selective relief from it in 2012. This label led to a series of 
immediate and deliberate changes in my school that, while dressed up by some, really seemed to 
be about removing the scarlet letter ‘F’ that had been placed upon us. Up until this point, I had 
generally stayed outside the fray of top-down government mandates, so these changes 
repositioned me to see, feel, and think about school reform more directly in my own career. This 
experience gave me new perspectives and raised new questions about Race to the Top. In other 
words, it combined with my curiosity about its lofty promises to bring me to this project. My 
experiences were hardly atypical, however, as roughly a third of America’s schools had been 
labeled failing by that time.  
What this brings me to is the respective situations in the state and schools where this 
project’s data were collected. That state was Illinois, and the two schools were Lamar Middle 
School and Roosevelt High (pseudonyms).  
From Harsh Realities to Opportunity 
Both Lamar and Roosevelt were located close together near one of Illinois’ mid-sized 
urban areas/college towns. Though they were demographically quite different, each was, for 
reasons I will explain, exactly the kind of place one might have expected to be drawn to the Race 
to the Top. That said, in the early rounds of RttT competition, it was only whole states that were 
eligible to win money, and perhaps few states were as poised to apply as Illinois.  
Illinois. The most obvious reason for this was Illinois’ supposedly poor school 
performance. A full 42% of its schools had failed to make what NCLB termed Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) on state exams that year (CEP, 2010). Under the law, this meant they would 
have been considered failing; though, on its annual report card Illinois tried to downplay this 
10 
 
situation, instead publishing only the total number schools that had received federal Title I 
funding and had also been given this label for two or more consecutive years (Illinois State 
Board of Education, 2009). These schools were said to be in “school improvement status,” which 
was only a slightly more serious classification, but the sleight of hand brought the state’s self-
reported failure rate down to 18.4%.  
The other reason Illinois was a prime candidate to apply to RttT was its financial 
circumstances, which were commonly cited as the worst in the entire country. Not only was 
Illinois deeply in the throws of the Great Recession when RttT was announced, but this slump 
exacerbated an already problematic economic situation in the state. By June, when the National 
economy began to turn around, the state had shed some 414,000 jobs (Merriman & Yin, 2011). 
That month its unemployment rate was 10.4%, up a full four percentage points from the year 
before (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). It would hit it peak in December at 11.3% (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). At each of these points, Illinois was worse off than the 
national average, and it was slower to enter recovery than much of the rest of the country 
(Merriman & Yin, 2011). Moreover, because of longstanding fiscal imbalances, the state ran into 
major problems when its revenue dropped roughly 8% billion that year (Illinois Department of 
Revenue, 2009). The severity of its issues was perhaps made clearest by the state’s growing pile 
of unpaid bills. This backlog, which had hovered at around $1 billion annually since the early 
2000s, reached $3.95 billion in 2009 and $5.95 billion by 2010 (Illinois Institute for Fiscal 
Sustainability, 2010).  
If there was one thing, then, that Illinois seemed desperately in need of it was an extra 
influx of just about any amount of funding, especially one that might improve its schools. So 
even though any Race to the Top funds it won would be a pittance compared to its projected 
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$11.5 billion dollar budgetary gap that fiscal year, Illinois was one of the first states to announce 
it would apply. To be successful in its bid for funds, however, Illinois would also need to show it 
had significant support from its local schools. They would have to sign what RttT termed 
Memoranda of Understanding, or MOUs, which were binding agreements that would mark their 
commitment to implement the state’s reforms on an early timeline. In exchange, they would get a 
direct infusion of Race to the Top cash while those not signing on would still have to put into 
place whatever the state adopted but without any additional money.  
Lamar Middle School. Unsurprisingly, Illinois’ first round application included a list of 
368 schools and school districts that had agreed to sign on to these MOUs (Illinois State Board 
of Education, n.d.). On this list was Lamar school district, which was home to one of my case 
schools. Given that Lamar’s situation was both similar to and had been made worse by that of the 
state, its presence here was equally unsurprising.  
Lamar was a “failing” school in a unique situation. Although its student performance in 
most areas and at most grade levels was comparable to state averages on standardized exams, 
Lamar was especially diverse and significantly more likely than the state as a whole to have 
students who were low-income, mobile, and minority. Lamar’s proximity to a major university 
as well as a thriving refugee assistance program meant its mix of students was uncommon. More 
specifically, Lamar Middle School was home to just over 800 students in 2009, and of those 59% 
were non-white, 66.2% were low-income, and 7% had been identified as limited English 
proficiency (Illinois State Board of Education, 2009b). Because of this diversity Lamar had to 
report multiple subgroups for NCLB, which made meeting its AYP requirements more 
challenging. As a result, by the time Race to the Top was announced Lamar has been labeled a 
failing school five consecutive times. According to the law, if Lamar wanted to continue to be 
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eligible for federal funds, this meant it would have to create and implement a “significant change 
to its school governance” (No Child Left Behind, 2009). In other words, it was beginning an 
undoubtedly costly process of NCLB mandated restructuring.  
This situation was almost assuredly exacerbated by the broader economic climate around 
the school, as it faced not one but two financial challenges. First, the town in which Lamar was 
located was not doing well. To be sure, the area that surrounded it was a bit better off than the 
state overall, but it had still struggled with high unemployment since the Great Recession (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009b). This, in turn, meant less spending and lower property values, 
both of which cut into major sources of revenue for Lamar’s schools. Second, the state’s bill 
backlog had also had a notable effect on the district and created a grim situation. In fact, when 
the district’s independent officers conducted their annual audit the following year, Illinois 
schools were still feeling the effects of this. The auditors felt it necessary to include the 
following statement:       
The current economic environment presents school districts with unprecedented 
circumstances and challenges, which in some cases have resulted in large declines in the 
fair value of investments and other assets, declines in governmental support, grant 
revenue and tax revenue, constraints on liquidity and difficulty obtaining financing. 
(BKD, LLC., 2010, Note 16) 
 
As the auditors explained, this would continue to “have an adverse impact on the District's future 
operating.” In light of all this, then, it was almost predictable that Lamar would agree to be an 
early adopter of Race to the Top. 
Roosevelt High School. Roosevelt High, on the other hand, would not be on the MOU 
list in 2009. Nor would it pursue an agreement the following two years when Illinois had to 
apply to RttT for the second and then again third time. Overall, its district was in a much better 
position than Lamar to not do so, especially at the start of the program.  
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In 2009 Roosevelt was meeting AYP and the town it was in had a marginally better 
economic situation than the surrounding area. That said, the district was not without its issues. 
These were mostly related to its finances, however, and did not hit hard until the following year. 
It was in 2010 that a major weakness in the district’s funding structure became apparent. 
Compared to Lamar, Roosevelt was much more dependent on general state aid, which made it 
more susceptible to the financial whims of the state. The reason for this was that Roosevelt 
served a much more homogenous and financially-better-off student population, which meant that 
it could not access as much federal funding as Lamar could (Illinois State Board of Education, 
2009c). This was the logical result of the fact that many federal programs were specifically 
tailored to support the Nation’s most disadvantaged students, but it also meant that if and when 
the state’s financial situation suddenly exploded, as it did that year, Roosevelt would be in a 
prime position to be disproportionately affected.  
Indeed, archived budget audits from this time reveal just how much of an impact the 
state’s financial woes had on Roosevelt. While it ended the 2009 fiscal year with “recognition” 
status from the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), by the following year it had dropped 
two levels to “early warning” (Illinois State board of Education, 2018a). When the state’s 
delayed payments were factored in, however, Roosevelt moved back up to the ISBE’s second 
highest rating (Illinois State Board of Education, 2018b). Although the unpaid bills were not the 
only thing that was affecting the district’s budget, it was clear that they had exacerbated the 
recession’s impact.  
Still, Roosevelt School District, and by association Roosevelt High, never did end up 
signing an MOU. They found other ways to weather the financial downturn. So while Roosevelt 
would still have to eventually implement Illinois’ Race to the Top reforms, it would do so much 
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later than Lamar and on a much different timeline. This made it useful to juxtapose with my first 
case school and is largely why Roosevelt became part of this project.  
What I did in these two places is laid out in more detail in Appendix A, but to provide 
some brief context here, I spent the 2014-2015 school year collecting the data that is used in this 
dissertation. I recruited 12 teachers and administrators to participate in multiple open-ended 
interviews that took place periodically throughout the year. In these interviews, my participants 
talked with me about how their respective districts’ had developed their new RttT-mandated 
teacher evaluation tools, any participation they had had in that process, and how they had been 
thinking about and/or affected by these policies. In addition to this, I collected public and private 
documents to analyze and attended and observed a few workshops and meetings where staff 
were working on problem solving around these policies. All of this allowed me to get a sense of 
how these policies were enacted (Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012) in these spaces. 
The Constant Churn . . .  
Having laid this all out, I want to conclude this introduction by putting this text in its 
present context. It is being constructed nearly eight years later and just shortly after Secretary 
Duncan and President Obama have transitioned out of office. They have since been replaced by 
newcomers who have brought with them their own agendas and begun the policy cycle anew. 
Admittedly, this means that whether and for how long Race to the Top—insofar as its logic and 
favored strategies are concerned—will continue to influence education policy is unknown. This 
never-ending cycle is both a blessing and a curse of the American political system, as it means 
the terrain is always shifting and the air is always filled with the interminable cacophony of 
dissonant policy conversations. This makes our polity resistant, but it also creates difficult 
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headwinds, as before one reform can take hold, new leaders come to power, often sound the 
alarm, and promise new directions for change. 
Given that such a regime change is currently underway, it seems important to recognize 
that the present policy moment feels quite different from 2009’s. As I write this, the economy is 
booming, and the Department of Education has been much less vocal than before President 
Obama’s exit. Race to the Top has seemingly receded from public conversation. In spite of these 
things, however, it is also true that for those of us working in schools not much is that different. 
The new Administration’s DoE may be much less visible than before, yet the current Secretary, 
Betsy DeVos, has expressed commitment to many of the same ideas and ideals embraced by her 
recent predecessors (U.S. Department of Education, 2017). Despite fundamental differences in 
their political affiliations, for example, all believe that school choice is a prerequisite for 
improving education. More importantly here, although she has made returning control to local 
schools a stated priority of her office, there has also been little indication to date that the reforms 
that states adopted as part of Race to the Top will be undone. In fact, in many places just the 
opposite has happened, as the policy changes spurred on by RttT have only recently become 
fully binding for districts and schools.  
All of this would make it appear that, at least in the short term, RttT will remain relevant, 
and I suppose this is useful in making this text seem the same. Even if it seemed as though things 
were rapidly changing at the federal or state level, however, this dissertation would still be 
pertinent. I say this because despite the fact that it grew out of my interest in Race to the Top and 
a very specific set of policy changes, what the pages that follow explore is really something 




. . . And Why it is Worth Attending to  
What I mean by this is really two things. The first is that this dissertation explores policy 
implementation in schools at a moment in time when education reform has come to reflect a 
rather particular way of thinking. Over the last several decades the reformers that have gained 
influence with politicians and policymakers have maintained that the solutions to schools’ issues 
cannot be found within the public sphere. Instead, they argue, school improvement requires a 
more business-oriented approach to the provision of educational services. These individuals have 
advocated, successfully, not just for the economism of education but public goods more broadly. 
Within education they have lobbied for policies grounded in key tenets of economic 
neoliberalism such as outcomes-based accountability, greater choice, and the use of monetary 
incentives. Although I leave discussion of this until the end of the text in an effort to leave 
readers with something to (re)consider in light of my findings, the influence of this group was 
not lost on many of this study’s participants and continues, albeit with much less apparent public 
fuss, to this day.    
The second is that that although this dissertation is about the impact of a handful of Race 
to the Top policies, it is also a dissertation about the importance of what happens as policies 
move through schools. More specifically, this text is about the complex and contextualized 
nature of educators’ policy work, and it is, hopefully, a testament to the richness that can be 
uncovered through consideration of it. If this seems obvious, keep in mind that over the last 
several decades reformers have steadily shifted their focus away from process and towards 
outcome-oriented ways of thinking about school improvement. This has meant that the work 
teachers do in bringing policy into practice has received less and less attention, as policymakers 
have instead bought into and themselves curated the notion that reform can be made to be a 
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simple and straightforward process, particularly one whose effects can be measured 
quantitatively using standardized tests. The data from this project, however, do not support this 
conclusion.  
Rather, what the pages herein speak to is the need to understand school reform as 
anything but simple or straightforward and to take into account the entirety of what happens 
during the policy process or, at the very least, to find a balance between the aforementioned 
outcomes-oriented approaches to policy analysis and more holistic ones. As I will show, to not 
do so—that is, to try instead to understand attempts at school change solely through their 
measurable outcomes—may be misleading. I put this first because it is our current tendency in 
evaluating education policy, but it is just as much the case that one can focus too much on the 
details and miss the bigger picture. This choice of focus is a bit like the dichotomy Isaiah Berlin 
(1953) sets up when he writes that there are two kinds of thinkers—those who are hedgehogs and 
those who are foxes. According to Berlin, the hedgehog sees the world through the lens of a 
single grand idea while the fox believes it has too many nuances and contradictions to be reduced 
to this (Tetlock, 2005). Surely, though, together they would have the greatest knowledge. The 
same could be said about those interested in improving schools. 
In effect, then, this text is an argument for a more complex conceptualization of the 
policy process, the view of the hedgehog and the fox. What it evidences is that without this, it 
can be difficult to get a clear sense of the merits of reform. Likewise, without a deep 
consideration of the work that educators’ do in bringing policy into practice, it can be easy to 
misunderstand their actions. Of course, what happened in these schools was at least somewhat 
particular to them, and this text provides case-based takeaways about Race to the Top and the 
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RttT policies that became its central focus. That said, this larger argument is not tied to any 
particular policy moment or reform. Yet, its broader takeaway still holds.   
Of Hedgehogs and Foxes 
Finally, with this in mind, what I have tried to do on the pages that follow is attend to 
both these ways of thinking.  
Like the hedgehog, I begin this text with a grand focus. After setting up the policy 
journeys in these two schools, I look for consistency across their contexts. I show how their 
outcomes followed similar patterns and that these were unsurprising, given what is commonly 
taken to be known about what happens when new top-down policies are pushed on schools. 
More specifically, I provide evidence that these educators did not report making substantive 
changes to their teaching practices. Instead, what they did describe were mostly bureaucratic 
differences mixed with some attempts at gaming. In other words, these teachers’ responses 
served to meet the requirements of state laws, but they were what scholars most often 
pejoratively refer to as resistant. Because of this, I conclude, these reforms did not bring about 
the promised changes.  
As a fox, I then revisit these same data. This time my goal is less to draw a single 
conclusion about the way the world works than to dig into how these reforms, whose results 
often appeared alike on the surface, actually developed quite differently in each of these two 
schools. What I find is that for my participants realizing this narrow slice of RttT was a messy 
and ongoing process that was inseparable from the environmental and psychosocial 
circumstances that defined their professional lives. Moreover, it took place not in isolation but as 
part of the previously noted constant policy churn, which meant that as these teachers engaged 
with these policies, they did so awash in a sea of both fresh and residual policy demands.  
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The first conclusion that I draw from this is that these contextual factors impacted how 
these educators read and responded to Race to the Top. They guided their decisions about how 
its mandates got picked up and worked on. This led these policies and their meanings to be 
reshaped many times as they made their way through these schools. Thus, one thing that this 
second perspective makes abundantly clear is that reform in these cases was never just a matter 
of connecting a set of policy texts to a set of desired practices. There was also much that 
happened in between. Ozga (1999) refers to this policy activity as that which “l[ies] outside the 
formal machinery of official policy making,” and as I said, when I began this project I found that 
it had been increasingly ignored in assessments of reform. After finishing this study, I agree with 
Leander and Osborne (2008) who contend that it is here one can find the most significant stories 
of school change.  
The second conclusion I make is that resistance still mattered at this level of analysis. 
Rather than seeming obstinate as it did before, though, it more often appeared to be the result of 
thoughtful objections that these educators had to either RttT or its reforms. It was connected to 
moments of disruption where my participants struggled with the deep-rooted logics of the 
policies they were being asked to implement (Foucault, 1966, 1980b). The shape it took reflected 
the nuanced ways they sought to resolve these issues. I term this resistance principled and/or 
productive and argue that it is necessary to distinguish it from its more recalcitrant type. My 
position here is informed by what only became discernible when the data from this project were 
considered through these two perspectives side-by-side, which was that although its outcomes 
often appeared alike on the surface, this resistance did not always serve to undermine these 
policies or (as is frequently assumed to be its purpose) to make these teachers’ lives easier. 
Instead, it was interminably complex, and more often a consequence of them holding themselves 
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to a higher standard than state law. From the principal who boldly stated that he “did not value” 
and therefore would not implement a specific policy to the foreign language teacher who 
knowingly planned for a lower evaluation score just to stay true to her pedagogy, these 
educators’ principled and/or productive activities were often much less problematic than they 
first appeared. They were also far from universally undesirable.  
Taken together, the sum of these perspectives reveals that while RttT’s supporters often 
made claims about their ability to objectively evaluate its reforms by their outcomes, its 
policymaking in these two cases was never so simple. The processes and interactions that 
occurred as RttT’s policy texts were turned into actions by my participants mattered greatly in 
shaping what came of them. Moreover, whether this policy work occurred collectively or at an 
individual level, it was fraught with contentions because although their authors frequently 
professed neutrality, these policy texts said something about who these teachers were and how 
they should be that was inseparable from beliefs, ideologies, and values. My participants were 
largely aware of this, and their desire to resolve such conflicts drove their responses to these 
policies, though, this motivation was not always apparent on the surface.  
This leads me to the two broader takeaways from this project. First, as it makes clear, we 
must resist the urge to exclusively study school change as hedgehogs. While outcomes are 
important, they do not tell the whole story. By adding to our current repertoire to analyze  how 
policies move through schools, as I have tried to do, we may be better able to think more deeply 
and accurately about both their problems and possibilities. The second is that we would be wise 
to recognize that reform is never neutral because there is potential in doing so. As Ball (2013) 
says, policy mandates exist as part of an effort to determine control over schools and school 
actors, and as such reform is, itself, something that is in a state of a perpetual, and at times 
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precarious, agonism (Ball, 2013; see also Colaguori, 2012; Foucault, 1980). It is only by 
examining the nature of this conflict, it roots, and its politics, all of which were visible in the 




Chapter 2: From RttT to Teacher Effectiveness to Teacher Evaluation 
In this chapter, I want to explain how this project moved from its initial broad focus on 
Race to the Top to its final one, which became narrower and centered on the RttT policies that 
dealt with teacher evaluation. For a country that regularly outlays over $3.5 trillion per year in 
government spending, a $4.35 billion grant may not seem like much. But, with its wide scope 
and heavy-handed design, RttT had the potential to have a considerable impact. It raised more 
questions than could possibly be tackled in any one study, so narrowing my focus was in part a 
necessity. That said, it was also the result of my sense that this particular strand of Race to the 
Top had garnered much more support than empirical data had warranted. In essence, I was pulled 
in this direction in large part because there was a consensus amongst reformers around teacher 
evaluation that just seemed perplexing.  
“As Long as I Can Just Close My Door and Teach” 
 Before I get to this, however, I want to take a moment to say a bit more about myself and 
how I came to this work. This will both help to situate me to the issues it centered on and provide 
a first hand account that affirms as well as rebuffs one of the main theories reformers would 
advance in support of the policies this project became focused on.  
To do so, I want to share a brief story that recounts an exchange I had with another 
teacher the very first week of my very first year of teaching. What makes this story worth sharing 
is not its novelty; rather, I believe many educators could, and indeed I have heard them, say 
something similar. In fact, this is exactly what makes it pertinent—it is about an encounter that 
initially surprised me but that I would eventually come to see as exceptionally ordinary. Over 
time, its many iterations sparked a curiosity and raised the questions that this project sought to 
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answer. In the end, I would come to understand it quite differently, but for now I will try to share 
it as I first saw it. After all, this exchange resulted in the first piece of collegial advice I received.  
As some background, I took my first teaching job in 2004. That summer, I was hired to 
fill a leave of absence for a high school social studies teacher in the district where I had been 
student teaching. Although much of that year is now a blur, I have several quite vivid memories 
from it. I remember, for example, how nervous I was the first day of school, a surprise evaluation 
the principal once did, and the student who, unbeknownst to me, wrote a letter to the district on 
my behalf when I applied for a permanent position. I also remember the following conversation, 
which was brief and may not seem like much, but for reasons I’ll try to make clear is apropos to 
this dissertation. 
 In short, I was talking casually with another teacher. This was on what I recall was our 
first in-service day of the year, so there were no students around. I believe it was late morning, 
and this individual and I were chatting about how I was getting settled in and what I should 
typically expect on such days, which were supposed to be for teacher training. Our conversation 
soon took a natural turn into a discussion about the specific content of a presentation we had just 
heard. This was an annual one about our district’s yearly professional development plan, and in it 
we had been told about some changes we would be expected to make to our curriculum and 
teaching practice. I must have looked incredibly overwhelmed by all of this, which for all 
practical purposes I was since I was still working out what both of these things even meant for 
me, because the next thing I knew this teacher was offering up her advice. 
 Essentially, her suggestion was that I should ignore whatever I had just heard. I could tell 
it was meant to calm me, but my initial reaction was to be perplexed by what this teacher said. 
She said that in her opinion much of what was told on these days was either uninformed, 
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impractical, or both. Because of this, she advised me to disregard it and just go on with whatever 
I had been doing. She said I could and should just “close my door and teach.” I remember 
thinking that this sounded somewhat malicious (Were these initiatives not meant to help? And 
why would a teacher intentionally ignore directives from their superior?). I politely listened but 
chalked her up to likely being a curmudgeonly teacher. When I left, I made a mental note to not 
be similarly disposed.  
 This exchange probably lasted fifteen minutes in its entirety. But, it has always stuck with 
me, and explains a great deal about why I became interested in this project. More accurately, it 
explains my interest in teachers’ interactions with reform. Throughout my career I have come 
across some version of this refrain about closing one’s door and teaching an inordinate number 
of times. In fact, even though I told myself I would not repeat it, I have since expressed similar 
sentiments more than once myself. Lest I give the wrong impression, as I write this I am 
preparing to attend a professional conference of my own volition. To be clear, I am committed to 
professional learning and I accept the right of administrative authorities to try to influence what 
classroom teachers do. I simply found the frequency with which I heard this expression 
fascinating, and I came to see this closed classroom door as something both literal and 
metaphorical. It was something teachers did as well as a representation of the complex 
relationship they appeared to have with school change. I was curious about this, and it eventually 
sent me back to graduate school.  
What I later found was that there was plenty of interest in school change and an 
abundance of contemporary work on the measurable outcomes of education reform policies. Yet, 
I could not locate many analyses that seemed to adequately capture the meaning and 
consequences of the “closed door.” Though I could easily find commentary from politicians and 
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political advocacy groups about the difficulties of getting teachers to adopt policies as intended, 
there was even less that deeply explored how they engaged with such policies during periods of 
reform. 
All of this brings me back to Race to the Top, which seemed like it would provide me 
with an opportunity to explore these issues. At this point, however, I had a new problem. I knew 
I was interested in how educators were implementing RttT, but each of its four pillars for reform 
had some connection to this, and all were interesting. Given that the one about teacher 
effectiveness had teaching practices as its objective, it seemed most likely to connect to my 
“closed classroom door.” Furthermore, many of the specific policy changes that were subset 
within this strand seemed to be about forcing this door open, that is, making it more difficult for 
teachers to not comply with reform. For these reasons, I felt I could make some headway here, so 
I began reading about teacher effectiveness more specifically.  
That said, there was also the other reason that I settled on this focus. As I mentioned at 
the outset of this chapter, teacher effectiveness reform, or more precisely the teacher evaluation 
policies that were part of this reform, appeared to have more support than was warranted. In the 
next section I address this issue along with what it meant for whether  these policies would be 
adopted.  
A Reform on which Everyone Agreed 
Essentially, what I quickly realized as I learned more about Race to the Top was that 
there was fierce debate about almost all of it, that is, with the notable exception of teacher 
evaluation. While the grant had its supporters, I came across multiple complaints about nearly 
every facet of the program. There were those who did not like how it was funded, those who 
disputed the value of its approach, and those who were concerned over the power it gave to the 
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Department of Education. There were also those who questioned the merits of its specific 
policies, and it seems worth noting that in this latter group were many scholars who, from my 
reading, were still trying to work out unanimity over the initiatives in the grant. Quite frankly, 
while the Obama Administration promoted RttT as based on “what works,” there appeared to be 
little on which anyone outside the White House had agreed.  
In fact, I came across so much disagreement during this time that this was exactly what 
made teacher effectiveness reform and more specifically its teacher evaluation component stand 
out. At least amongst policymakers and the public it was the one thing where the conversation 
was in stark contrast to this discord. In what would otherwise become a rarity during President 
Obama’s tenure, those at both ends of the political spectrum seemed to agree that teacher quality 
was a major issue across the Nation and it could be remedied with RttT’s specific brand of 
reform.  
It is worth saying a bit more about this, so to clarify, I do not mean to imply that teacher 
effectiveness and teacher evaluation had never been identified as areas of concern prior to this 
time. To be sure, one can find scholarly literature on these topics that dates back decades, and 
national political attention to them seems to have been around for about as long. Indeed, in the 
early 1980s, not long after it was commissioned as an independent entity, the Department of 
Education released a now infamous report entitled “A Nation at Risk” (ANAR) that, among 
other things, implored citizens to be more concerned about low teacher quality (National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). A few years later and in response to this 
publication the newly founded Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy released its own 
report, “A Nation Prepared,” in which it proposed tackling this same problem through the 
professionalization of the field along with more and better education for prospective teachers, 
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incentives tied to school-wide performance, and higher teacher salaries (Carnegie Forum on 
Education and the Economy, 1986). A decade and a half after this, when Congress’ reauthorized 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965) through No Child Left Behind (2002), it 
mandated that any state accepting federal Title I funds set standards for and ensure that all its 
teachers were “highly qualified.” In some ways, RttT could be thought of as an extension of this 
progression. However, while these earlier initiatives had all generally revolved around shoring 
up barriers to entry into the field, RttT took a notably different approach. Whereas “A Nation at 
Risk” and “A Nation Prepared” had stressed investing in the input end of the human capital 
process, RttT was much more focused on the outputs. 
Even this, though, was still not a completely new idea. As I will discuss in chapter three, 
the proposition that the teaching field could best be improved through measuring and 
incentivizing the outputs teachers produced had also been around for quite some time. However, 
this was different. Even RttT’s direct predecessor, NCLB, had only gone so far as linking federal 
money to school-wide data; RttT promoted policies that shifted this accountability onto 
individual teachers. Not all of these policies enjoyed the kind of consensus that had taken me by 
surprise. Some initiatives, like performance pay, were fairly controversial with the public, but 
this did not appear to be the case with the subset of teacher effectiveness reforms that dealt with 
evaluating teachers.  
Here there was marked bipartisan agreement, which was unusual given the otherwise 
tense political climate of the mid-aughts. At the national level, for example, the National 
Governors’ Association hosted a “policy academy” dedicated to helping states develop new 
models for teacher evaluation and compensation based on what it said was broad interest from 
state leaders (Curran, 2011). And, in Illinois, more applicably, Senate Bill 7, which established 
28 
 
the state’s new teacher evaluation guidelines, passed with overwhelming bipartisan support as 
Public Act 96-0861. While this was surprising in and of itself, it was even more remarkable 
given that there was little scholarly agreement about these new evaluation policies. What RttT 
specifically pushed for was for states to create more “rigorous” qualitative evaluation 
frameworks and to incorporate student growth into how teachers were measured (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2009b). This would supposedly allow schools to track teachers’ 
impacts on student learning and enable them to make better diagnostic decisions regarding 
hiring, firing, compensation, and teacher placement. In time, it was argued, it would also provide 
signaling to the teacher labor market that would improve the quality of its labor pool (Dee & 
Wycoff, 2013; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). Again, I will get into all this more in the next chapter, 
but for now what I want to emphasize is that I could not reconcile the excitement around these 
policies with what was anywhere in the research.  
RttT’s brand of teacher effectiveness was no more defensible than any of its other 
components, and although reformers claimed that its evaluation policies would improve student 
outcomes, in truth there was alarming little published research to this effect. Moreover, where it 
did exist, this scholarship was filled with conflicting results (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; 
Braun, Chudowsky & Koenig, 2010; Kane & Staiger, 2008). This was especially true when it 
came to the Grant’s growth component where a disturbingly large number of peer-reviewed 
studies called into question the ability of even the most sophisticated models to do what 
reformers said they could, which was isolate the impact of a single teacher from within the vast 
conglomerate of factors that affected student performance (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012; 
Baker et al., 2010; Darling-Hammond, 2013; Harris, 2011; Newton et al., 2010). In fact, by 2015 
these issues, in particular, had generated so much concern that the Nation’s largest professional 
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educational organization, the AERA, had issued a formal statement cautioning against the use of 
certain types of growth measures for high-stakes purposes and imploring those who supported 
their incorporation into evaluations to consider carefully their scientific and technical limitations 
(AERA Council, 2015). Considering this memo only addressed what were commonly referred to 
as “true VAMs,” or Value Added Measures, which were statistically sophisticated and pricey to 
implement, it did not inspire faith in the academic community more broadly.  
In spite of all this, teacher evaluation reform became one of, if not the most widely 
influential parts of Race to the Top. While each of the Grant’s other components eventually 
stalled, the teacher effectiveness strand moved ahead through adoption at the state level. By 
2015, when I was in the final phases of conceptualizing this project, some 45 state legislatures 
and their school boards had approved at least one new evaluation mandate in accordance with 
RttT (Doherty & Jacobs, 2015). Strikingly, they reflected relatively similar statutory choices. An 
astoundingly large swath of the country had not only quickly pushed through the above-
mentioned revisions to their existing qualitative frameworks but also introduced requirements for 
quantitative growth components. With respect to the former, the most popular qualitative choice 
was something called the Danielson Framework for Teaching while for quantitative measures, 
many school districts opted for what was known as simple growth (Doherty & Jacobs, 2015). In 
addition, many states also adopted reforms addressing teacher tenure; though, the impact here 
was somewhat less notable (Doherty & Jacobs, 2015). Needless to say, I was intrigued by all 
this. Sizeable changes were taking place around evaluation, but there was a dearth of evidence to 




As I said at the start of this chapter, my intent over these last several pages was to lay out 
not only why I became interested in Race to the Top but also why this project came to be focused 
on its teacher effectiveness component and, more specifically, on teacher evaluation. Although it 
was my personal experiences that piqued my curiosity about how teachers engaged with reform, 
it was the inconsistencies with how policymakers and the public viewed this one subset of the 
grant that drew me to these policies. While on the one level it made sense that if armed with the 
right data, teachers might be able to leverage diagnostic information to improve and that if 
similar evaluation policies were connected to increased output in the private sector, they might 
incentivize productivity in education, on the other, there just was not enough empirical 
agreement around these ideas to justify the DoE’s push. Because of this, the impact of RttT’s 
brand of teacher evaluation reform seemed at best uncertain.  
At the very least, this was an aspect of RttT that needed better understanding, and 
because it both targeted and had to be directly implemented by teachers, I wanted to think more 
specifically about the role that teachers played in the policy process. Consistent with popular 
sentiment in many reform circles at the time, and indeed today, RttT’s stance with respect to this 
was that this role most plainly served to undermine policy implementation. In other words, when 
reformers, including the President and his Education Secretary, talked about RttT, they 
frequently referred to something akin to teachers’ “closed classroom door” and then positioned 
RttT as a workaround to it. This was unsurprising given that it was also how teachers’ 
engagement with new policies was frequently characterized in the school change literature—as 
something problematic and troubling. Here, too, my reading of this literature, alongside my own 
experiences, led me to question if anything was being missed by this increasingly popular 
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argument that educators were not only obstacles to school improvement but could also be made 
to be predictable and manipulable targets of it (in this case through higher-stakes teacher 
evaluations). Of course, these arguments had been built up over time, but the rather flat and one-




Chapter 3: In Search of Evidence for a Strange Consensus 
 If there is a single question worth asking at this point, it is probably what did the relevant 
literature say about teacher evaluation at the time Race to the Top was announced. This is what I 
want to begin to address here. To do so, I ask two other, slightly more specific questions: What 
was the evidence that changes to evaluation policy were really needed by 2009? And, what made 
the policies promoted by RttT seem so promising?  
To answer these questions, I take the next two chapters to review the research in two 
distinct, but perhaps interrelated, areas of study. The first, which is addressed in this chapter, 
deals with school change and the connections between policy and teacher practice. The second, 
which I discuss next, is composed of research related to teacher evaluation and teacher quality 
more specifically. Developments in both of these areas, especially over the last several decades, 
clearly played a role in shaping the evaluation policies that came out of RttT. That said, it would 
be going too far to say that, at the time the Grant was announced, either of these lines of work 
provided a solid rationale for the precise mandates that Illinois and many other states would 
adopt. Because of this, I also try to use these chapters to make apparent the gaps that still exist in 
these areas of scholarship. Together, all of this should set the stage for the specific policies 
implemented by my two case schools and give some sense of their expected results.  
The Disconnect Between Policy and Practice 
In this chapter, I look at what has been the longstanding understanding that there is a 
disconnect between policy and teacher practice. To put this another way, in order to make clear 
why RttT’s teacher evaluation reforms took the shape they did (i.e., top-down, high-stakes, and 
focused on individual teachers), I take the next several pages to outline how researchers 
interested in school change have tended to characterized teachers’ relationship with reform. 
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What I show is that by 2009 there was a sense of consistency across this literature such that 
reformers could have read it as supportive of the policies they embedded in RttT. More 
specifically, this research reveals that as scholars have tried to identify the mechanisms that lead 
to school change, or more accurately that have made school change so difficult, they have found 
teachers play a key role, but this role has most often been characterized as that of adversary. In 
other words, according to the picture painted by this literature, teachers have typically acted as 
impediments to school improvement, causing policies to fail either because they work to 
undermine reform or ignore it entirely.  
Policy to practice before NCLB. To understand these findings, it is useful to divide 
them into two main groups—those that came from research done before NCLB and after. Across 
both, there is an almost stubborn consistency of what goes on in America's schools and 
classrooms (Cuban, 2013). But, while more recent work has shown that certain kinds of policies 
do impact what teachers do, earlier studies often portrayed teaching as a relatively stable 
endeavor (Cohen, 1988). In interpreting this consistency, scholars from this earlier period offered 
up several explanations. This first was that organizational factors insulated teachers from 
pressures to change. The second was that a lack or resources prevented teachers from making 
changes even when they wanted to.  
With regards to the first, organization, Cohen and Spillane (1992) found in their 
comparative analysis of the world’s schools that the U.S. political system in particular was 
designed to frustrate central power. This, they said, created the conditions where there was 
bound to be a disconnect between the intent of a policy and its effects on the Nation’s roughly 
110,000 individual schools. Essentially, what Cohen and Spillane suggested was that because the 
U.S. had set up a federal system in a context of wanting to limit federal power, it had effectively 
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made it difficult for National policy to be used to influence what happened at the local level. To 
put this in the context of education, since school policies would potentially have to travel from 
Congress through the Department of Education to the states and their DoEs and then on to local 
school boards before actually entering into schools, teachers were insulated by layers of 
bureaucracy. This made them relatively immune to external pressures, so they could ignore or 
minimally adopt outside policies (Cohen, 1988; Cohen & Spillane, 1992).  
With regards to the second explanation, that policies failed to influence teacher practice 
as intended because of resource issues, teachers still had the autonomy to reject federal 
mandates, but in this case they tended to do so less because they simply did not want to and more 
because they either lacked or felt they lacked the capacity for change (Cohen & Spillane, 1992). 
More specifically, what Cohen and Spillane argued here was that educators’ decisions about how 
to respond to policies were determined by their work environment, which was characterized by 
things like heavy workloads and low pay. Perhaps interestingly, Spillane (1999) would later go 
on to argue that teaching was a dynamic process that is constantly being transformed by outside 
forces. At the same time, he continued to contend that in-school factors like resources, 
professional abilities, and the degree of collaboration/autonomy that teachers experienced 
mediated how they handled policy pressures. This general idea was increasingly supported by 
research in these later years, as more scholarship began finding that top-down policies were 
impossible to outright defy (Moon, Brighton, & Callahan, 2002).  
That said, even in these latter cases, when researchers began finding that reform efforts 
were difficult to ignore, policies were rarely found to have their fully intended effects. 
Importantly, it was not only within education that this issue had become of interest by this time. 
During this same period, the question of why policy changes did not lead to subsequent changes 
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on the frontlines of service provision had become a point of concern across the public sector. 
Michael Lipsky (1983), for example, addressed this by proposing that police officers, social 
workers, teachers, and others who had to interact with citizens at the point of service faced 
unique challenges in their jobs. He argued that such workers often lacked, and because of the 
nature of the demand for public goods likely always would lack, sufficient resources. As what he 
termed street-level bureaucrats, they had to use their autonomy to decide how to apply policy 
quickly and in many unique, individual situations.  
By the late 1990s, two distinct patterns emerged from this first set of studies. One was 
that, due especially to organizational factors, teachers were largely able to resist policies aimed at 
changing their practice. The other was that, though they could still exercise autonomy, teachers 
were generally unable to fully avoid responding to reform. That said, even in this latter case 
researchers still found that policy implementation was often unsatisfactory. That similar 
arguments—e.g., that policy implementation did not go as planned because of the ability of 
actors to avoid or exercise autonomy when carrying out mandates—were being made across the 
public sector during this period likely added to the sense that there was a need to strengthen the 
connection between policy and practice. In this context, it would have seemed rational to try to 
increase the consequences that teachers faced for not carrying out federal mandates, which was 
the direction policymakers were heading by this time. 
From policy to practice since NCLB. To be sure, one way to understand the onset of 
high-stakes accountability under No Child Left Behind, the federal reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, in 2002 is as a direct response to the findings in this 
earlier group of studies. In short, NCLB relied on the power of the purse to implore states to 
implement mandatory standardized testing with the goal of 100% student proficiency. Schools 
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would then have to show Adequate Yearly Progress towards this goal or face a series of 
increasingly punitive sanctions. Part of the logic behind this approach was essentially that by 
tying incentives, albeit negative ones, to federal funding, the Department of Education would be 
able to better break through the layers of bureaucracy that insulated teachers and schools from 
the need to change their practices. And, indeed, while it caused other problems, high-stakes 
accountability was shown to be more impactful.  
In fact, what the studies that came after NCLB and looked at the impact of its high-stakes 
approach made clear was that negative incentives were effective at eliciting educators’ responses 
to top-down federal reforms (Cuban 2013; Schneider, 2011). That said, the findings from this 
second group of studies also made something else clear—the responses that NCLB led to were 
often quite undesirable. Taken as a whole, what they suggested was that educators did have to 
make sometimes significant changes to their practice because of high-stakes policies. However, 
these changes often involved a whole host of activities that researchers broadly classified as 
‘gaming the system’ (Haney, 2006; Nichols & Berliner, 2008; Ravitch, 2010).  
Gaming, in essence, meant that teachers and schools were doing things that helped them 
create the appearance they were meeting AYP without necessarily improving the quality of 
education their students received. Often it included curriculum narrowing that diminished time 
spent on subject areas that were not on state tests; it also frequently involved the replacement of 
instructional time with time spent engaged in test prep, by which I mean time spent learning how 
to strategically answer multiple-choice questions (Haney, 2006; Hursh, 2007; Hursh, 2008; 
Ravitch, 2010; Sloan, 2006). By one estimate 62% of a nationally representative sample of 
schools reported curriculum narrowing of this sort (McMurrer, 2007). As another teacher 
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explained, high-stakes accountability meant taking out “the thirty-dollar [higher-order thinking] 
questions because they [would] not be on [state tests]” (Boardman & Woodruff, 2004, p. 551).  
In addition, this research also showed that such practices did not always occur universally 
throughout schools. They were much more likely to occur in settings with low-performing 
students (Haney, 2006; Hursh, 2007; Sleeter & Stillman, 2005). Because these students were also 
more likely to be poor and minority, high-stakes accountability also seemed to have racial and 
socioeconomic dimensions (Darling-Hammond, 2004). Additionally, researchers noted a 
tendency for schools to focus on the “bubble kids”—those who were closest to meeting a high 
stakes threshold—at the expense of others (Neal & Schanzenbac, 2010). Although this raised 
performance scores it also created legitimate concerns that high-stakes policies were limiting 
students’ access to challenging and transformative curriculum (Cuban, 2013; Darder, 2012; 
Freire, 1970; Sleeter & Stillman, 2005).  
Worse yet, studies also found evidence of outright cheating. Amerein-Beardsley, 
Berliner, and Rideau (2010), for example, concluded from survey, interview, and focus group 
data that cheating was likely much more widespread than had earlier been believed. More than 
50% of the teachers in their study said they knew someone who cheated, and 50% admitted to 
engaging in such practices themselves. As these researchers put it, “these figures certainly [were] 
not trivial” (p. 24). 
Finally, these post-NCLB studies concluded that high-stakes accountability had changed 
teachers’ work in other ways; however, these also could not be conclusively linked to 
improvements in instruction. Bartlett (2004), for example, coded the time a group of teachers 
spent on various tasks after high-stakes policies had been implemented in their school. What she 
found was that post-NCLB teachers’ workloads had expanded, with much of this additional time 
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going towards attending meetings or completing other bureaucratic tasks. Others have since 
corroborated this and, in assessing what teachers have been able to do with these data, have 
questioned whether such changes have aided or detracted from teachers’ efforts to improve their 
practice (Valli & Buese, 2007). They have, however, been associated with increased reporting of 
teacher stress. Research has also suggested an association between increased workloads and 
higher attrition (Bartlett, 2004; Valli & Buese, 2007). Of course, for those who went into this 
high-stakes policy era thinking that the major problem facing schools was organizational, these 
findings may not have seemed entirely bad. That is, for those who believed schools needed to be 
remade to look more like the private sector, a focus on data, outcomes, and mechanisms that 
encouraged voluntary departure from the field were necessary components for school 
improvement.  
That said, by the time President Obama came into office in 2009, many of these problems 
were already broadly apparent, and it was easy to find politicians and reformers who, because of 
its negative impact, were demanding either the abandonment of, or changes to, NCLB. Many 
calls for the reform of reform, though, were surprisingly not what one might expect, and since 
research had shown both that high-stakes policies were more effective at eliciting a response and 
that the form it had taken under NCLB had had unintended consequences, these calls followed an 
odd, but maybe predictable, trajectory. The assumption, as NCLB neared its next reauthorization, 
was not that high-stakes policies had been damaging to education but that they were necessary 
and the real problem was policymakers just had not gotten the incentives right. To expatiate, if 
educators could not ignore the law, but they could undermine it, then the problem, according to 
reformers, must have been that by NCLB still left too much room to maneuver. By focusing on 
schools rather than teachers and proficiency rather than whether all students were growing, these 
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individuals began to claim, NCLB had the wrong focal points (Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010) 
These takeaways would be salient as the Obama Administration looked to develop its own 
education agenda. It was a different area of study, however, that would inform some of its 
solutions to these problems. 
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Chapter 4: In Search of Evidence  
Two Proposals for Improving Teacher Evaluation 
Eventually, what caught on within reform circles was the idea that both the issues arising 
from NCLB policies might be tackled through changing how schools conducted teacher 
evaluations. This was not coincidental. Evaluation had long been another area of interest for 
researchers and had also seen some recent and potentially exciting developments.  
Until right about this time, though, it also appeared to be a divided field that had two 
distinct sets of interests. On the one hand, there were those who had been focused on developing 
evaluation tools to give educators better diagnostic feedback that they could use to improve their 
practice. On the other, there was an increasingly influential group that had grown keen on the 
ideas that evaluation tools could reliably measure a teacher’s impact on student learning and that 
if you tied these to high-stakes incentives through hiring/firing, tenure, and even compensation 
policies, you could change the shape of the teacher labor force. The latter was most often pinned 
as a fix for NCLB, but the work in both these areas would inform the evaluation policies 
promoted by Race to the Top, and I discuss both in this chapter.  
I begin by tracing the developments in this second area first. It has really only been 
relatively recent advancements that have led to support for the incorporation of quantitative 
measurement tools into teacher evaluation. Yet efforts to develop such tools actually date back 
decades. In fact, Eric Hanushek (2007), whose work on identifying measures of teacher quality 
was seminal here, has pointed to the Coleman Report (1966) as critical to inspiring this 
endeavor. After this, I turn to the start of a conversation about the problems with and need to 
improve more traditional, qualitative, forms of teacher evaluation that, insofar as it directly 
related to what would end up in RttT, began in the 1980s. This subset of work helps explain how 
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the Danielson Model became such a popular component of what states adopted. Finally, towards 
the end of this chapter, I tie both of these threads together.   
Teacher Evaluation as a Measurement Tool 
 While at present it might seem obvious that teacher evaluations could and/or should be 
used to judge individual teachers based on their impact on student learning, it is important to 
note that prior to Race to the Top this was not the case. At least, it was not until RttT that 
proposals to do so got noticeable traction at the federal level. To make sense of why this was and 
why RttT provided the perfect opening for them, it is useful to start unraveling the research 
behind these proposals at the point of a growing interest in the 1970s in something called the 
education production function. 
The education production function. Actually, to understand where the impetus for this 
interest came from, it is helpful to briefly step back a few years earlier to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Although seemingly far removed from the policy changes of 2009 and not connected to 
RttT’s teacher evaluation policies explicitly, there was a single sentence in this law that would, 
in almost a butterfly effect kind of way, set into motion a course of research that would 
eventually inform one-half of the evaluation policies in RttT.  
This sentence, which was tucked deep within the law, directed the U.S. Government to 
conduct an investigation into the presence and causes of unequal opportunities in America’s 
public schools. Exactly two years later, a 737-page report entitled The Equality of Educational 
Opportunity was published. Known colloquially as the Coleman Report (1966), it barely touched 
on the issue of teacher effectiveness (and none of it dealt with evaluation). Its most well known 
finding was that external, e.g., socioeconomic factors, appeared paramount in influencing how 
students performed in schools. But, according to Hanushek (2007), because it directed attention 
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to the uneven distribution of student performance and attempted to explain this, it also began a 
conversation about the critical relationship between educational inputs and outputs. As a 
consequence, he also said, it suggested that by identifying areas where school inputs were being 
applied inefficiently student achievement might be improved (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006).  
Thus, though it was not exactly its intent, the Coleman Report invited the development of 
what would come to be called an education production function. This model, which was based 
on thinking from the discipline of economics, relied on a concept called ‘value-added’ to 
evaluate how various combinations of inputs affected school outcomes differently. Because it 
would become so fundamental to RttT’s evaluation plan, it is worth briefly explaining what this 
means. Simply put, in any general context value-added refers to the difference between the value 
of a set of outputs and the costs of the inputs used to produce them. Towards this end, whenever 
equal output is anticipated and the costs of production are roughly the same, inputs that yield 
higher output are said to have a greater value-added. In economics the concept serves as a way to 
examine the effects of various inputs and as a method of identifying a firm’s inefficiencies 
(Braun, Chudowsky & Koenig, 2010, Collins, 2012). In education, it means something similar. 
Value-added refers to the value that an input adds or detracts from expected school outcomes, 
where such outcomes are typically defined as student achievement as measured by standardized 
tests. Value-added measures (VAMs) can be employed in an attempt to quantify the effect that 
any input of interest has on student attainment, and again, though this was not exactly its intent, 
the Coleman Report initiated researchers’ desire to use them to determine which school-level 
inputs were most valuable (Braun, Chudowsky, & Koenig, 2010).  
Central to this work was Eric Hanushek, who, while noting the influence of external 
factors on student achievement, also began to contend shortly after the release of the Coleman 
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Report (1966) that it suggested teachers made a significant difference. Hanushek (1971, 1979) 
found not only that teachers mattered but also that their quality varied considerably. Some 
teachers appeared to add value to their students’ learning while others detracted from it. 
Moreover, he would later claim, their impact appeared cumulative as students progressed 
through school (Hanushek; 2011). Hanushek soon became interested in building a model that 
could reliably identify high value-added teachers. Theoretically, if this could be done, it could be 
leveraged to improve school outcomes (Dee & Wycoff, 2013; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). But, 
doing so proved to be quite challenging. 
The biggest challenge that Hanushek faced in this work was the most basic—he struggled 
to isolate teacher characteristics that could be used to predict student success and were thus 
associated with teacher quality (Collins, 2012). Along the way, he argued that one of the things 
he was sure about was that there was little correlation between traditional measures of teacher 
quality such as credentials and years of experience (Hanushek, 1970). And, he would continue to 
do so as others joined his research (Hanushek, 2007; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). From this work 
Hanushek concluded that schools were filled with “low quality teachers” who contributed to 
institutional inefficiencies (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). Hanushek also argued that there was 
little reason to believe that schools would move towards more efficient operations on their own, 
especially since they did not face typical consumer pressures (Hanushek, 1981; 1996). As a 
result, he said, more attention should be given to developing direct performance incentives. A 
tool that could accurately isolate and measure teacher performance, however, remained elusive. 
The arrival of Value-Added Models. Finally, in the early 1990s, a statistician at the 
University of Tennessee’s Institute of Agricultural Science, Dr. William Sanders, came forward 
with what he alleged was a solution. Sanders claimed that he had developed a value-added model 
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that could reliably measure a teacher’s contribution to student growth. This model, which, 
incidentally, was based on work he had done measuring growth in farm animals, was supposed 
to be able to parse out teacher effects from amongst the countless factors that influence student 
learning (Sanders & Rivers, 1996; Wright, Sanders, & Horn, 1997). In addition, Sanders and his 
colleagues maintained that their research also showed that teachers were the most important 
school-controlled source of variation in student achievement and that his value-added model 
could quantify this impact (Sanders & Horn, 1998). For those working on the education 
production function, Sanders’ model was an epiphany.   
Soon others came forward to support both the notion that teachers did make a difference 
and the claim that value-added modeling effectively captured variations in teachers’ abilities 
(Aaronson, Borrow, & Sander, 2007; McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, & Hamilton, 2003; Rivkin, 
Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004). More recently, they have asserted that by using VAMs 
to identify and retain and/or reward high value-added teachers, schools might be able to realize 
other benefits. Using research by Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain (2001), for example, Kennedy, 
Peters, & Thomas (2012) suggested that value-added could help schools close the income-related 
achievement gap in as little as five years. Similarly, others have argued that VAMs could be 
leveraged to increase students’ lifetime earnings as well as strengthen the economy (Chetty, 
Friedman & Rockoff, 2011; Hanushek, 2011).  
Granted, none of these claims was without dispute, but the research around VAMs was 
easily exciting. As it expanded, it coalesced two distinct arguments for how these measures 
might be used to improve school outcomes. The first was that it could “provid[e] incentives for 
teachers to work hard[er]” (Papay, 2012, p. 128). By measuring and rewarding high value-added 
teachers, schools could send signals about which outputs were most valued. In doing so they 
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should direct educators’ attention to these outputs, increasing overall efficiency (Harris, 2011). 
The second was that it could be used to “remove the least effective teachers” (Papay, 2012, p. 
128). Towards this end Hanushek (2011) suggested applying value-added to fire the bottom 10% 
of school staff. Less drastically perhaps, VAM’s supporters maintained that by rewarding high 
performersVAMs could be used to entice in more ambitious employees and encourage poor 
performing teachers to leave the field (Duttweiler, 1988; Lazear, 2000). Of course, a 
precondition for this was that VAMs had to yield objective, standardized, and externally 
defensible information about teacher performance, and they also had to induce teachers to 
respond appropriately (Duttweiller, 1988; Wise et al., 1984). Furthermore, states and schools 
needed to have the capacity to implement such measures and their corresponding incentives, 
which, as it would turn out, would not be easy. Irrespective of this, these developments led 
policymakers to conclude that value-added models could and should be used to hold teachers 
accountable for their student’s year-over-year growth in schools (Murray, Hallinger, & Heck, 
2013) 
In addition to this, there was a second, albeit less widely discussed argument being made 
for VAMs. This was that they could serve diagnostic purposes. Although more practical, this 
view generated much less excitement. Essentially it held that value-added data could be used by 
schools to do things like better target instruction and match teachers and students.  Kennedy, 
Peters, and Thomas (2012), for example, argued that value-added data could be used to identify 
students who are struggling as well as those who have not been challenged appropriately. 
Teachers could also theoretically use this information to predict and monitor student 
performance, differentiate and improve instruction, or identify the most effective pedagogical 
approaches (SAS, 2012). At the school or district level, diagnostic use of value-added data was 
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also suggested to be able to provide valuable information to drive professional growth and build 
organizational capacity (Harris, 2011; Papay, 2012).  
The evidence. The evidence, however, on much of this was, in the first case, disputed, 
and, in the second case, fairly thin. With school improvement, this was likely due, in part, to the 
fact that widespread interest in VAMs was really just gaining ground. In both cases, however, 
implementing value-added required access to standardized testing and statistical analysis that 
was cost prohibitive for many districts. This meant that much of the empirical evidence that 
existed was limited to a few locations around the country that had/were piloting them and 
researchers’ examination of available testing data. What came of this was an incredibly 
contentious scholarly debate.  
This debate centered on two issues. The first was whether VAMs were valid and reliable, 
and as it turned out, this most essential of questions came to seem rather difficult to answer. The 
biggest point of contention with regards to this was whether the models produced unbiased 
estimates i.e., whether they could factor out student-level influences that impact achievement. 
Sanders, for one, had always suggested his model was valid (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; 
Kane & Staiger, 2008).  Yet, others argued that even sophisticated VAMs had significant issues. 
Raising questions about this, for example, were studies that showed that 5thgrade teachers could 
be used to predict 4thgrade students’ score and that teachers’ ratings fluctuate in years when 
teachers they were assigned disproportionate numbers of ELL or special education students 
(Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012; Rothstein, 2010). Moreover Newton et al., 2010 found that 
teachers’ results depended on model specificity, and others found that scores fluctuated, with low 
correlations across measures and especially from year-to-year (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 
2012; Collins, 2012; McCaffrey et al., 2009; Rothstein, 2010). Sometimes the results produced 
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by value-added models vacillated wildly, with teachers moving from the top to the bottom 
quartile or vice versa (Baker et al., 2010; McCaffrey et al., 2008; Newton et al., 2010). What was 
more, even if the measures could account for student demographics, they had no way of 
accounting for the variable influence these characteristics have on issues such as health or 
mobility nor could they control for changes in students’ lives that spanned less than a school year 
(Baker et al., 2010; Collins, 2012).  
In addition to this, the technical assumptions behind value-added modeling appeared to 
be invalidated by decisions made and/or conditions present at the school-level.  For example, 
there was evidence showing that assessment choice affected validity (Ballou, 2009; Briggs & 
Weeks, 2009). This was especially problematic for those teachers who were on the tails of the 
distribution, where scores were most likely to be used for rewards or dismissal (Amrein-
Beardsley & Collins, 2012; Baker et al., 2010; Braun, Chudowsky, & Koenig, 2010). There was 
also the common problem of schools assigning multiple teachers to work with students. At the 
secondary level, especially, where classes were compartmentalized but foundations overlapped 
(math learning, for example, may take place in a science classroom), there was no defensible 
way to proportion out student growth amongst teachers (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, 2012; 
Baker et al., 2010; Papay, 2012). Added to this was that students were often not randomly 
assigned to classrooms (Darling-Hammond, 2013; Harris, 2011; Papay, 2012). Lastly, it 
remained true that teachers might engage in gaming and find artificial ways to boost their scores 
(Papay, 2012; Trafton, 2013).    
The second issue was more speculative. It had to do with whether value-added was even 
practical. Here the problems were more straightforward. First, for a school to implement a VAM, 
it had to have the capacity to do so. Then, it had to be able to use the data it provided to benefit 
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students. Unfortunately, it seemed few states or districts would have the ability to implement true 
VAMs for all teachers. Many lacked models that used the full range of statistical controls or had 
the kinds of tests that were best suited to make judgments (Newton et al, 2010; Papay, 2012). 
Only about 1/3 of teachers worked in subject areas that were currently supported by value-added 
analyses (Papay, 2012). To add to this, districts would need to be able to leverage the 
information from value-added teacher evaluation effectively for decision-making. This meant 
they would not only have to warehouse data but also have personnel trained on how to make 
decisions about how to use it. Teachers, would need to know enough to interpret the measures 
and feel like could identify ways to improve.  All of these things were likely to create additional 
financial costs for schools. 
Essentially because of the ongoing dispute in the literature, it was, at best, unclear if 
value-added was a true advancement, or if what it was measuring was just ‘noise’ (Sass, 2008). 
Moreover, it was just as unclear if states and schools would actually be able to use it in a 
defensible manner. This had some predicting that any widespread implementation of these 
models would be followed by a flood of litigation (Baker, 2012). Irrespective of this, 
policymakers seemingly grew increasingly excited about VAM’s possibilities. 
Traditional Teacher Evaluation as a Diagnostic Tool 
During roughly this same period, research also began to call into question the value of 
traditional teacher evaluation models. According to Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Pease (1983), 
this development was connected to the search for teacher-related predictors of student 
achievement. As they ruled out things like degree level and years of service, researchers also 
criticized existing evaluation systems for their apparent dissociation with educational outputs. 
Within this conversation several critiques emerged.  
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The first was that traditional systems of teacher evaluation were inadequate because they 
were unable to distinguish between teachers, especially with regards to their impact on student 
achievement. Research revealed not only that traditional teacher evaluation models made little 
connection between a teacher’s performance rating and student attainment but also that these 
systems seemingly focused more on whether a teacher could adhere to established rules of 
conduct than demonstrate classroom competency (Darling-Hammond, 2013; Mitchell & 
Kerchner, 1983). Moreover, teacher evaluation appeared to do a relatively poor job of 
distinguishing between teachers more broadly (Darling-Hammond, 2013; Toch & Rothman, 
2008).  Towards this end, the infamous “Widget Effect” report noted that within binary systems 
more than 99% of teachers were rated satisfactory and that even within more dispersed systems 
94% fell within the top two tiers (Weisberg et al., 2009). Though it is worth noting that this study 
was produced by an advocacy group, in a similar vein, Jacob and Lefgren, (2008) found that 
principals struggled to use evaluation tools to differentiate between teachers, especially when 
these teachers exhibited average ability. 
In addition, it was increasingly noted that traditional teacher evaluations models held 
underwhelming practical value. Even teachers, themselves, complained that evaluations were 
mostly useless rituals, and researchers found that evaluation seemingly contributed little to 
personnel decisions (Darling-Hammond, 2013; Toch & Rothman, 2008). In fact, one survey 
found that only 26% of teachers believed their most recent evaluation to be “effective” and 
“useful” while 41% agreed it was “just a formality” (Duffet et al., 2008). What was more, even 
those with divergent views, and by this I mean those doing work on opposite ends of this field, 
soon concurred that existing teacher evaluation had surprisingly little purpose or worth (Darling-
Hammond, 2013; Hanushek 2011). In fact, for some, traditional teacher evaluation came to be 
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seen as something that might actually encourage ineffective teachers to stay in the classroom 
(Braun, Cudowsky, & Koenig, 2010).   
Chapter Summary 
As a result of the findings in both of these areas, there was a growing sense of the need 
for reform. When value-added modeling became an idea with viable technology, all that 
remained was the need for an opening to integrate it into the policy arena. The same could be 
said for efforts to revise traditional teacher evaluation; though, this was yet to gain momentum. 
This opening came through the combination of growing dissatisfaction with NCLB and 
the funding opportunity created by the 2008 financial crisis. Towards this end, value-added came 
to be seen as a potential solution to the perverse incentives created by the 2002 law, and the 
ARRA generated a way for the Department of Education to influence policy without having to 
wait on Congress. More specifically, because value-added used growth rather than proficiency 
and could be applied to individual teachers, it appeared it might be able to solve some of the 
problems NCLB had created (Carey & Manwaring, 2011; Harris, 2011). As a result, despite its 
still unresolved issues, it came to be viewed by many as a way to improve accountability. By this 
time, revising professional practice had also become a more integral part of the policy 
conversation. Much of this had come to be centered on something called the Danielson 
Framework for Teaching. The Danielson Framework had first proposed by Charlotte Danielson 
in 1987, but there was a dearth of scholarly research on it as well (Danielson, 2007). 
Nonetheless, by 2009 it, too, had popular support, and the discussion had turned to how both 
VAMs and something like the Danielson Framework could, together, replace NCLB’s 
problematic accountability system.  
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Chapter 5: A Race to Conform 
On Friday July 24, 2009, The Washington Post published an op-ed written by Arne 
Duncan. It opened with an emphatic message: “To every governor who aspires to be his state's 
"education governor," this is your moment.” In the piece, Duncan went on to say many of the 
same things he would later that day, when he spoke at a press conference with the President to 
formally announce Race to the Top. He promised RttT marked an “once-in-a-lifetime” 
opportunity for the federal government to work with those “states, school districts, nonprofits, 
unions, and businesses” that were willing “to create incentives for far-reaching improvement in 
our nation's schools.”  
 He then got straight to the point. “What are we looking for?” he asked. Then he 
answered, “The President starts from the understanding that maintaining the status quo . . . is 
unacceptable.” To win grant money, he said, states needed to be ready to “reverse the pervasive 
dumbing-down of academic standards and assessments,” to “adopt common, internationally 
benchmarked K-12 standards,” “to close the data gap -- which now handcuffs districts from 
tracking growth in student learning,” to “have strategies for rewarding and retaining more top-
notch teachers,” and “to institute far-reaching reforms” to turn around the lowest-performing 
schools. Neither he nor the President was naive, he added, and he had seen “firsthand that the 
system often served the interests of adults better than it did its students.”  
 This, though, also seemed to be part of why Duncan claimed to be confident that RttT 
would work. He had been an insider as former Superintendent of Chicago Public Schools; he 
supposedly knew NCLB’s weaknesses, and he understood the disconnect between policy and 
practice because he saw how educational institutions bred mediocrity. As the argument went, by 
making states compete for funding, RttT would not only allow, but also force schools, to break 
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through this barrier. To get funding they would have to make tough choices and be innovative. 
The proof, Duncan argued, was in what had already taken place since President Obama took 
office. “Numerous states,” he wrote, had “adopted reforms that would have been almost 
unthinkable a year ago . . . 46 states had signed on to develop a common core of standards,” and 
seven had “lifted restrictions on charter school growth.”  
RttT in Illinois 
Illinois was among these seven, and it had also signed on to Duncan’s aforementioned 
common standards initiative. In fact, it almost seemed as if Illinois knew what writing was on the 
wall for RttT because by July 2009, it had already taken several steps to meet the qualifications 
of the program.  
Illinois’ interest in the RttT, though, was also unsurprising. In addition to being deeply in 
the throws of the Great Recession and in the midst of its own separate financial crisis by 2009, it 
was ranked, at best, middle of the pack in the nation for student performance. 1,553 of it 2,253 
did not make AYP that year, and its graduation rate hovered stubbornly around 87% (ISBE, 
2009). All of this meant Illinois’ state officials moved quickly to take the necessary steps to be 
considered for RttT’s first round of funding.  
While Illinois’ board of education got to work assembling a committee to compose its 
grant, its state legislature took up the remaining legal issues related to the program. Illinois had 
been the first in the Nation to raise its charter school caps, and it followed up quickly with 
several other bills (Parker-Burgard, 2009). The two that were most relevant to the teacher 
evaluation component of RttT were the Illinois Education Reform Act, otherwise known as SB7 
and the Performance Evaluation Reform Act, PERA. While SB7 was geared towards making 
some slight changes to the labor force incentives educators faced, PERA laid out more 
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specifically what the State’s new evaluation guidelines would be. SB7 included provisions that 
established tenure and reduction-in-force procedures linked less to seniority and more clearly to 
the results of teachers’ evaluations. PERA required schools to use four rating categories, to have 
a qualitative component that was aligned with Illinois professional teaching standards, based on 
research and addressed planning, instruction, and classroom management. It also mandated that 
some measure of student growth be included in teachers’ evaluations as a significant factor (at 
least 30% of the final rating). In addition, the law mandated that these evaluations occur at least 
once every two years and include at least two observations. Finally, it set accelerated 
implementation timelines for its lowest performing districts and those who signed onto RttT. 
PERA was even passed by the legislature before Illinois sent its application for RttT, and it was 
signed into law by its governor just two days later, long before Illinois found out whether it had 
been awarded any money from the federal government.  
It is worth taking a moment to pause on this because what happened in Illinois was a big 
part of why RttT was so successful in reshaping state education agendas. Although Duncan 
claimed it was voluntary and would drive ingenuity, in the end it was heavy-handed if not 
coercive. Though states were not required to apply, as in Illinois, existing funding shortages and 
the persistent economic slowdown likely made it difficult to resist the potential funds. Along 
with this, what Duncan sold as innovative, in truth, left little to the imagination. To be eligible, 
states had to address reform in four core areas: enhancing standards and assessments, improving 
the collection and use of data, increasing teacher effectiveness and equity in distribution, and 
turning around struggling schools. Beyond this they could theoretically embark on different 
paths, but the DoE would score their grants using a weighted 500-point rubric that 
unambiguously delineated the Administration's preferred policies. To earn full points, states had 
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to take quite specific (and sometimes controversial) steps, some of which needed to be done 
before they would be considered eligible to apply. Those taken by Illinois, e.g., joining a national 
consortium to develop a common curriculum, removing legal barriers to tying teacher evaluation 
to student growth, and lifting restrictions on provider alternatives such as charter schools, were 
among these. In this way, RttT almost guaranteed that states would adopt certain reforms 
regardless of whether they won funds from the Administration.   
Indeed, on its first try Illinois was not so lucky. It would be one of 40 applicants that 
spring, and only a few were expected to win awards. In total, it had requested $510 million to 
implement reform over a four-year period. 364 of its 869 school districts, representing 74.1% of 
Illinois students, had signed an MOU with the State. And, it had put together a surprising 
coalition of supporters. In fact, in the opening of its application, the RttT committee noted: 
Illinois is well-positioned to capitalize on this opportunity because the State possesses a 
clear overarching vision for improving instruction, has already shown a solid 
commitment to advancing education reform (particularly in the RTTT priority areas), and 
boasts strong and collaborative support for change. So, Illinois does not seek a fresh start 
in this contest, but a chance to accelerate the work that is already underway with much 
needed funding . . .  
 
The list of things it said Illinois had underway was exhaustive. It included the adoption of 
common core, commitment to re-designing assessments to focus on student growth, efforts to 
measure teacher impact on student learning, support for college and career readiness guidelines, 
public-private partnerships in STEM, the continued development of a longitudinal data system, 
commitment to independent research, alternative teacher certification, new evaluations, 
encouragement of pay for performance through parallel application to the Teacher Incentive 
Fund, career ladders, incentives for teachers to work in high-needs schools, tracking of students 
through teacher preparation programs, plans for intervening in or dissolving consistently 
underperforming schools, and a commitment to charter schools. Even with all of this (or perhaps 
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because of the impossibility of doing all this), Illinois was not awarded funds during the first 
round of the program. 
 It did, however, take 5th place. With 423.8 points out of a possible 500, Illinois had made 
it to finalist status. But, reviewers of its application noted that the state had a history of issues 
related to implementing comprehensive data systems and that it was often unclear how these data 
would then be used to make evidence-based decisions moving forward (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2009c) The Illinois State Board of Education took this advice to heart, made the 
necessary changes, and appealed to more schools to sign MOUs. It then submitted its application 
for a second time. Once again, after making it to the finalist round, Illinois was denied an award. 
In fact, it only improved its score by 2.8 points. Finally, the State would win some funding on its 
third try in 2011. But, by then RttT’s pot of money had significantly dwindled. To implement all 
of the changes it had promised, it was given only $42.8 million in grant money.   
Policy Development in My Two Case Schools 
Of the funds Illinois did receive, only half would be distributed to a select number of its 
school districts. The beneficiaries of this cash would have to use it to support 16 different 
initiatives and implement RttT’s reforms more quickly than the rest of the state. Although many 
more had signed MOUs, in the end only 32 agreed to this. Among these “participating Local 
Education Agencies (LEAs),” as they were called, was Lamar but not Roosevelt. This meant that 
although, at the end of the day, both districts would have to implement the same reforms, the 
timeline and process for doing so would look quite different their schools.  
Lamar. Lamar started mulling over the decision to sign on to RttT more formally just a 
few months after Illinois’ third round award was announced. Finally, its district leaders 
submitted a letter of intent to become a participating LEA in early 2012. In this letter, though, 
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   Sarah Director of district and school 
improvement 
Responsible for overseeing all professional 
development within the district; position is 
created using RttT funds 
 
   Kevin Head principal Served on all RttT committees; presented to all 
buildings during policy roll=out 
 




Served on all RttT committees related to 
evaluation; liaison for Lamar union members 
 
   they made clear they were not officially committing to accelerated implementation of the 
program. They would not do that until after this decision could be discussed at a school board 
meeting that spring.  
At this meeting, the district’s assistant superintendent explained his hesitation. At issue 
was the amount of funds the State was offering Lamar, which was expected to be just over 
$100,000. But, according to this official, the actual cost of implementation would likely be at 
least four times as much  (Dickinson, 2012). On the other hand, he said, it appeared likely that 
Lamar would have to adopt these changes anyways, and at a later point it would also have to use 
its own money. On top of this, he posited that an agreement to participate might translate into 
preferential treatment later. After all of this was weighed out, Lamar’s officials decided that the 
potential costs were worth it and finalized their commitment to take part.  
Because Lamar signed on to be a participating LEA, its process of implementing RttT’s 
reforms would begin earlier, but nevertheless move more slowly than Roosevelt’s. As per PERA, 
the district only had 180 calendar days after it officially formed its joint committee to develop a 
plan for how it would reform its current evaluation model and incorporate student growth. The 
district began working on this unofficially almost immediately. By the time I arrived in the fall 
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of 2014 as a researcher, the district had already finished this revision process and was using its 
RttT-inspired evaluation model for stakes.  
Much of what I learned about this development process came from Sarah, who was 
Lamar’s Director of District and School Improvement. It was corroborated by Kevin, Lamar 
Middle School’s principal, and Lisa, an instructional coach at LMS and the district’s union 
president, who, together, had spent time on every one of Lamar’s evaluation development 
committees. Sarah had been an eighth grade teacher in the district prior to being hired to her 
current position. In fact, her job had been created using some of the money from RttT. Her role 
made her responsible for coordinating the district’s various reform and professional development 
activities. She was the primary person responsible for overseeing the implementation of Race to 
the Top.  
Sarah was the one who first explained to me that Lamar had immediately, albeit 
unofficially, convened its committees to start looking into what the district would need to do to 
meets its RttT obligations. In our first interview together, she actually took quite a bit of time 
describing this process. She said that one of the first things they did was sit down and look at the 
State’s actual legislation. Although not everyone agreed with the decision to sign on to RttT 
early, they realized through this process that Lamar was already doing many of the things that 
needed to be done.  
Lamar’s joint committee officially began its work in the fall of 2012. As per the State’s 
requirement, the district needed to have at least as many teachers and union members in the 
group as administrators. Lamar’s officials, however, went out of their way to put together an 
exceptionally diverse team. When Sarah explained to me why this was, she told me that by doing 
she had hoped Lamar would be able to better foresee problems. Anticipating that these 
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evaluation policies would hit different road bumps in different subject areas and different grade 
levels, Sarah put together a group that included a principal from each building and teachers from 
every grade. She also reached out to those who might have unique situations. The joint 
committee included a P.E. teacher, a photography instructor, and representatives from targeted 
areas like special education and bilingual instruction.  
When I asked Kevin in our first interview if the group had experienced any contentious 
moments, he said yes and brought up a discussion led by an art teacher over how she was 
supposed to measure student growth. But, he assured me, this debate was not negative; “There 
was a reason she was on the committee.” This, Kevin told me, was Lamar’s way of member-
checking, and from the conversations I had, it appeared that similar efforts were common as 
Lamar worked on interpreting and rolling out these policies. Most of the joint committee’s work, 
for example, was done in three smaller groups: student growth, professional practice, and 
sequence of dismissal. But, to make sure that they were all in agreement and aligned, these 
groups always reconvened to revise (Sarah). The team also made it a point during their pilot year 
to have regular walk-in lunch sessions where teachers could give feedback that the team then 
discussed at what Sarah referred to as “re-calibration meetings.” 
This collaborative approach also aligned with how Sarah described the committee’s goal 
for their final product, which she said was to create something “meaningful and flexible.” I heard 
these words over and over again from Lamar’s educators, and often with the explanation that 
they did not want the evaluation to be a “gotcha.” In other words, what Lamar tried to do with 
these policy mandates was come up with an evaluation system that was not about ranking 
teachers or letting staff go, but that would support them while not distracting them from their 
work (Sarah). The reason this concerned Sarah, was that “our teachers want to be excellent; they 
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strive for that label,” and she did not want them to get overly concerned with having to prove 
themselves. She, Kevin, and some of the other committee members I interviewed would later 
describe this as the biggest struggle that the district and Lamar Middle School had as it went to 
full implementation. In spite of what the committee might have wanted, Lamar’s teachers could 
not always be convinced these evaluation policies were not meant to create a more judgmental 
environment. 
The idea of meaningful and flexible, however, was clearly carried out in how Lamar’s 
joint committee structured its tools. Rather than create evaluations for comparison, Lamar tried 
to fit what it was already doing to the law (Kevin). This meant the committee decided to use only 
a slightly modified version of the professional practice tool they already had, i.e. one that 
required the submission of more evidence. This was also especially the case when it came to the 
growth component, which Sarah said she “wanted to be no big deal.” With respect to this, Kevin 
told me that their tool was “structured exactly as allowed by the state.” Although this might not 
sound meaningful or flexible, what he meant was that although Lamar had made this component 
30%, which was the minimum allowed, the committee had actually done some things to make it 
less than that. He recalled meetings where the group was “sitting down doing algebra problems 
to try and determine what numbers had to be set in order to get certain scores.” Aware that this 
might have sounded malicious, he added that what the group was really trying to do was 
“alleviate the concerns of some of the teachers.” In addition, he and Sarah both explained that 
Lamar’s teachers had been given a great deal of flexibility in how they chose their assessments 
and set their goals. For example, two teachers teaching the same course might set a growth goal 
together making them dually responsible for all of their students while two others might set 
entirely different goals using different assessments; they could collaborate or not; they could 
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focus on an entire year or a single unit. While Sarah recognized that this made this component of 
the new evaluation harder to monitor and maintain consistency, she believed that by allowing 
options, Lamar could push teachers towards taking more risks and doing something more 
meaningful. 
In recounting his version of this development and rollout process with me, Kevin stressed 
that this idea of using these mandatory top-down reforms to do something meaningful and 
flexible was a key component of their plan. This was the narrative that the joint committee tried 
to reinforce when it presented the finished versions of its evaluation tools to its teachers in the 
spring of 2013. As building principal, Kevin had a lead role in this task, and he explained to me 
that he tried to impress upon his staff that they should not worry too much about any of the 
changes, but especially the addition of student growth. He recalled introducing it to them by 
describing it as something they, meaning both he and he teachers, had not asked for but were 
already doing; really these policy changes were about formalizing things for the State. 
During the next school year, Lamar would pilot all of its changes. Lisa, told me this was a 
“mandatory pilot,” which meant that all teachers were supposed to be participating. But, 
although they would all receive training, she would later learn that many did not do so. This 
would create some challenges during the 2014-2015 school year, when these policies first had a 
real impact on teachers’ evaluation scores. Lisa and Sarah both said to me that there were some 
issues with the aforementioned narrative being delivered consistently. That said, this narrative 
along with the collaborative nature of Lamar’s development process and its evaluation team’s 
consistent effort to maintain a feedback loop with its staff were the defining characteristics of 
Lamar’s teacher evaluation reform development. What took place in Roosevelt over this same 
time period, however, seemed quite different. 
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   Dianne Assistant 
superintendent 
Responsible for overseeing all professional development within 
the district; in charge of evaluation policy tool development; 
retired 
 
   Ben Head principal Involved in pre-joint committee conversations but not actual tool 
development 
 
   Rachelle English teacher 
 
Instructor for district professional development on the new 
evaluation tool but not actual tool development 
   
Roosevelt. It was a bit more challenging to piece together the path that Roosevelt took to 
get to full implementation of these policies. This was in part because many of the individuals 
who had been a part of this process were no longer with the school district. Also, Roosevelt had 
put together a handful of smaller joint committees to do this work, and these were largely 
uncoordinated. In fact, I came across no crossover members of these committees other than 
administrators. I also heard from several teachers that the process by which staff were recruited 
to them was rather opaque. A few individuals I interviewed expressed indignation that they could 
not recall any open effort to recruit interested teachers, and those who were on a committee had 
either specifically asked to take on administrative responsibilities or been individually enlisted 
by an administrator.  
To be clear, not all of the educators I talked to found this problematic. Some expressed a 
sense of appreciation that their district had chosen not to drag out the rollout of these policies by 
involving all staff in their work. This was, however, a feature of Roosevelt’s implementation 
process that made it distinct from Lamar’s. It was a choice that was also about protecting 
teachers’ time from uninvited distractions, but as it played out, it meant that much of what went 
into designing Roosevelt’s evaluation tools was done away from teachers and sometimes 
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administrators. Fewer were involved, and because of this, fewer had a clear sense of what all the 
pieces would look like. But, from what I gathered through talking to my participants, this kind of 
approach to implementing state-mandated reforms was rather typical for Roosevelt. How it 
handled putting together its joint committees was taken by most to be par for the course.  
Roosevelt also seemed to have a more genuinely contentious experience, which I say not 
because I heard about any big arguments but because this was present as an undercurrent in their 
descriptions of how some of its work was conducted. Rachelle, for example, one of Roosevelt’s 
long-time English teachers who had not been part of any development committee but had been 
part of the group that trained Roosevelt’s teachers on its professional practice piece, described 
the sessions as generally reflecting the message:  “Here’s what you need to watch out for.” 
Although this was not her own experience, she said it “felt like it was coming across as like these 
administrators are out to get you. And, so we were presenting the material to make sure you can 
cover yourself in all these areas.” I asked Rachelle why she thought this occurred, and she 
explained that she thought it had something to do with the fact that a very active member of the 
teachers’ union was on the team. She also noted that although the group had invited and 
advocated for administrators to attend this training, none did. Of course, by state law evaluators 
had to go through their own certification process, but according to Rachelle, this created a 
strange dynamic where it seemed as if Roosevelt’s teachers knew more about their evaluation 
tools than some of their building principals did.  
This brings me to another difference between Roosevelt and Lamar, which was in 
whether the adoption of these new policies seemed tied together by an underlying goal. Whereas 
at Lamar, the words “meaningful and flexible” came up over and over again unprompted, at 
Roosevelt, it was much more difficult to get a sense of a unifying narrative about why the district 
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was changing its policies and what had been its vision as it figured out how to do so. Of course, 
this does not mean that these discussions did not happen because they did. But, what had come 
out of them did not seem to have been as clearly passed on to all teachers. As Rachelle said, even 
she was not completely sure why the school was doing this. And, while the official message from 
the professional practice training was that this model captured good teaching, it seems worth 
noting that the materials used for this had not been created by the joint committee, as at Lamar, 
but had been borrowed as is from official Charlotte Danielson training. 
The message about student growth also seemed to be a little different depending on 
whom I spoke to. While Lamar had intentionally done some things to inhibit growth from having 
too much of an effect on its teachers’ overall ratings, Roosevelt had not done so. In fact, at its 
growth meetings there was discussion about how to make growth count more. For example, they 
developed a formula that could combine the two pieces of the evaluation together in ways that 
would distinguish teachers in each rating group, ranking them by high to low scores. There was 
also conversation about requiring teachers at the same grade level or who were teaching the same 
classes to set the same goals so that cross comparisons could be made. Although these things did 
not officially make it into the final version of the district’s evaluation policy, at least in the 
former case, it was unclear whether this had been left out by accident or removed by someone 
unbeknownst to the whole growth committee. With regards to the comparisons across similar 
teaching contexts, it was still supposed to be an unofficial expectation. 
 As all of this was being developed, I learned that the decisions were not always clear to 
Roosevelt’s principals. Since Roosevelt had not accepted RttT money, it had not had to 
implement student growth as early. So, during the year I conducted my interviews, it was only 
doing the professional practice piece for stakes. While there had been plans to pilot the student 
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growth side with a small group of teachers that year, this had not happened. This left the 
principal, Ben, at least, relatively in the dark about what it was going to look like when it had to 
be implemented for stakes the following year, and his feelings were a bit mixed about what its 
purpose should be. Though he expressed concern about the need for evaluations to produce 
information that was “relevant and pertinent to instructors,” he also said “it would be critical if 
you have three or four teaching [a class] . . . [to have] some discussions, not comparisons but 
discussions and collaboration regarding that [the differences in outcomes across different 
teachers giving the same assessment].” Even some of the teachers at Roosevelt who had not been 
a part of these discussions were in favor of using these new tools to make comparisons. 
Courtney, for example, who was another English teacher at Roosevelt, was absolutely in favor of 
this. However, she was not sure she knew enough about Roosevelt’s tools to be confident they 
could produce valid comparable data. That said, most of the other teachers at Roosevelt were 
much more apprehensive about this and did not support these kinds of comparisons.  
Chapter Summary: From Differences Come Similarities 
In the end, despite the contrast in how these school districts approached the development 
their new policies, the tools they actually implemented were not that different. Both wanted to 
find a way to meet what was described to me as “the letter of the law” without having to develop 
something totally new. As much as possible, each also wanted to fit whatever they adopted 
within the existing plans for school improvement. Moreover, the additional resources provided to 
Lamar for being a participating LEA were not substantial enough in the opinion of its district 
leaders to allow for any major change. This meant that in both schools used modified versions of 
the Charlotte Danielson rubric for their professional practice components and Student Growth 
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Chapter 6: Evaluation Reform’s Most Apparent Impacts 
So, did Race to the Top’s teacher evaluation reforms have their desired impact on any of 
these teachers or in either of these schools?  The short answer is no. The longer answer, of 
course, is much more complex.  
In this chapter, however, I try to answer this impact question in the most straightforward 
way. After all, this was what this project was initially intended to do, and, as I said at the outset, 
such analysis is consistent with the kinds of questions that implementation studies frequently ask 
but seldom do at a granular level.  
In doing this, I lay out and provide evidence for the themes that emerged when looking 
across the veneer of this project’s data. To harken back to the metaphor of the hedgehog and the 
fox, I intentionally keep my analysis broad in order to discuss what were the most apparent 
commonalities between these two schools. To be clear, I make no claim that my findings are 
beyond case specific. But, what became obvious during the course of this study was that RttT’s 
teacher evaluation mandate, insofar as it was enacted at Lamar and Roosevelt, failed to achieve 
its intended effects. Rather than providing the educators in these schools with actionable 
feedback and/or incentivizing them to work harder, as the dual strands of the evaluation literature 
that informed them might suggest, its policies had little impact on instructional practices. 
Moreover, what they did have appeared to be mostly bureaucratic, as these reforms still left 
plenty of room for interpretation, or what the literature has traditionally characterized as the 
ability to undermine policies’ intents. Although in the next chapter I will show that these findings 
could be misleading because they missed the nuance of these educators’ policy activity, what this 
chapter is meant to illustrate are the conclusions that were drawn from the major outcomes these 
RttT inspired policies produced. 
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Building/Position Background information/Illuminating Characteristics (principals & teachers only) 
   
Lamar Middle School 
 
Sarah Director of district and school 
improvement 
Former 8th grade teacher 
Responsible for overseeing all professional development 
within the district 
 
   Kevin Head principal 9 years middle school experience (7 as an administrator, 
5 as head principal) 
Served on all RttT committees (most involved with the 
professional practice side) 
Illuminating characteristics: graduate student, hyper-
aware of the neoliberal political context  
 
   Lisa Instructional coach/English 
teacher/department chair 
22 years experience 
Co-teacher, responsible for pre & post observation 
meetings 
Served on all RttT committees related to evaluation 
(growth, professional practice, sequence of dismissal 
Illuminating characteristics: Lamar union president, 
active in and aware of Illinois politics 
 
   Robert 8th grade language arts teacher 27 years experience (26 at middle school) 
Served on the committee for student growth 
Illuminating characteristics: nearing the end of career, 
union representative 
 




Professional development cadre member (planned 
professional development for the building) 
After-school program teacher, student mentor 
Served on union evaluation implementation committee 
Illuminating characteristics: non-tenured, beginning 
masters degree student 
 
Matt Special education teacher 5 years experience (1 year at Lamar) 
Professional development cadre member 
Served on RttT committee for professional practice 
Illuminating characteristics: served in co-teacher role, 












Building/Position Background information/Illuminating Characteristics (principals & teachers only) 
      Roosevelt High School 
 
Ben Head principal 16 years experience in district 
Served on pre-joint committee panel 
Illuminating characteristics: had served in all levels of staffing 
in the building 
 
Rachelle English teacher 7 years experience 
After-school program teacher 
Positive reinforcement committee member 
Served on professional practice training team 
Illuminating characteristics: prioritized family identity, self-
described as unaware of political context 
 
Beth Social studies teacher Non-tenured (4th year) 
Illuminating characteristics: believed that she has “rocked the 
boat” too much in the last year 
 
Nick Social studies 
teacher/department head 
Second career teacher 
Illuminating characteristics: former lawyer with high degree of 
awareness of Illinois politics, corporate involvement in 
education 
 
Adam Industrial technology 
teacher 
4 years experience in district 
Illuminating characteristics: little knowledge of political 
context 
 
Kim Foreign language 
teacher 
Co-chair for a state-wide foreign language professional 
organization 
Illuminating characteristics: strongly identified her subject area 
as posing special challenges for both evaluation tools 
 
Courtney English teacher Illuminating characteristics: had taught in district, left and then 
returned, experienced a high degree of tension with 
administrators that was somewhat unique to her 
 
 
 “We Do Not Think That Would be a Useful Practice” (Kevin & the Rising Star Team, 
Lamar School District) 
 By far, the most frequent finding in my data was that the teachers who participated in this 
project reported making either very little or no change to their classroom practices as a result of 
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their districts’ new evaluations. To frame this in terms of the evaluation components that had 
become mandatory in Illinois because of RttT, at the time I worked with these teachers, they 
described using neither their professional practice feedback nor their student growth data to 
substantially inform instruction. Instead, what they detailed was either non-compliance with 
aspects of these policies and/or compliance that failed to move beyond appearances. This was 
frequently because they professed to lack the knowledge and/or resources to make changes even 
when they wanted to. It was also clear that they felt there was not enough force behind these 
policies to necessitate a more compliant response. 
Non-compliance. With respect to non-compliance, both the teachers and administrators I 
worked with at Lamar and Roosevelt discussed either witnessing or engaging in this regularly. 
While Ben, the head principal at Roosevelt, talked more about seeing a reluctance driven by lack 
of knowledge, Lamar’s principal, Kevin, told me he was dealing with “some excellent veteran 
teachers for whom [the evaluation] just [wasn’t] worth the time.” In general, however, I mostly 
heard about non-compliance from teachers in both schools equally, and several of Lamar’s 
teachers told me they felt comfortable openly discussing their objections with their evaluators, 
which may be why Kevin, at Roosevelt, reported a more stubborn resistance to these reforms.  
To expatiate on this, in his experience, non-compliance at Lamar did not mean a refusal 
to participate in the required process; rather, it involved not making any changes for the purpose 
of or in response to an evaluation and/or putting effort into preparing evidence for evaluation 
meetings. A good example of this was Robert, a thirty-year-veteran English teacher in Kevin’s 
building, who expressed his handling of the new evaluation process quite bluntly. Robert told me 
that at this point in his career he would “take constructive criticism, but the dog and pony show,” 
as he called it, was something he did not think “matter[ed] that much.” He explained that he 
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personally believed he was an excellent educator and that his evaluator had agreed. He recalled 
this individual telling him, “I don’t doubt you are a four [excellent] in this category; I just didn’t 
see it you know.” And, when his evaluator pressed him to submit evidence on his own behalf, 
which was a required part of the evaluation process, Robert said he declined. At the end of the 
year, he reflected on this decision with me, calling it “a deal with the devil.” Robert told me his 
“cynical intuition” had led him to believe evaluation reform was “going to be just another thing 
and then it will go away.” This made him feel fine with not fully participating in the evaluation 
process, as he knew he was going to be rated “good enough,” and get an average score on the 
evaluation system. 
Lisa, Lamar’s teachers’ union president and an instructional coach in the middle school, 
seconded what Kevin reported. Although she was not an evaluator, she had served on all of 
Lamar’s PERA development committees, which made her a sort of resident expert. In addition, 
her aforementioned roles had put her in a unique position where she had both worked with staff 
as they completed their evaluations and been asked to come to their assistance as a union 
representative when dealing with the same. As Lisa told me, she had been struggling with some 
non-compliant teachers who told her they had “just not gotten around to” or “did not understand” 
particular evaluation tasks. When I first met her in the fall, this issue was taking up a good deal 
of her time, and she would be preoccupied with it again when I met with her the following 
spring. In many cases, Lisa was only finding out about this non-compliance after the deadlines to 
complete particular pieces of the evaluation had already passed. She was frustrated by this but 
also somewhat understanding. As she told me: 
Last year we piloted, and it was a mandatory pilot . . . and I can’t tell you the number of 
people that called me [this year], because [the evaluation growth component] was due 
October 1s, but we extended it to the 15th . . . and they called me the day before and said 
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“Can you help me with this?” . . . I’d say “Sure, what did you do last year?” And, they’d 
say, “Oh I didn’t do it.” . . . Well now it counts, but everybody’s plate’s full. 
 
In early December, I saw first hand just what Lisa meant. That month I attended a walk-
in after-school workshop she held with Lamar’s professional development coordinator, Sarah. 
The two had regularly been hosting such sessions throughout the fall, and on this particular day, 
Lisa invited me to sit with her while she worked with an art teacher in the district. From what I 
could tell, this teacher did seem genuinely confused, and Lisa patiently listened to her 
frustrations with the evaluation process before explaining that she would help. What the two set 
out to do was wrap up the documentation for this teacher’s growth component, but what quickly 
became apparent was that she had not done virtually any of it. Although she had given her pre 
and post-assessments, somehow she had made it halfway through the school year without 
submitting anything to her evaluator. Given this situation, what the pair ended up doing was 
working backwards. They determined what cut scores this teacher would have needed to set to be 
ranked “excellent” and then filled out the paperwork accordingly. For Lisa this was about 
helping this teacher get through the evaluation process the first time; nonetheless, it was most 
certainly the opposite of what proponents of incorporating growth into teachers’ evaluations had 
as their intent.  
At Roosevelt, where the growth component was not yet fully in place, I heard more about 
resistance to the school’s Danielson-modeled professional practice rubric. More narrowly, I 
heard either about a refusal to adopt the model’s best practices or non-compliance with the 
changes Roosevelt’s evaluators asked their teachers to make. Laura, for example, a foreign 
language teacher in the school, discussed with me how she took issue with some of the 
instructional techniques that teachers had to use regularly if they wanted to be considered 
excellent. I heard this from others too, including Ben who told me he believed that there was still 
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a place for the more traditional teaching techniques the model discouraged. As he said, “There 
has to be . . . at least at the high school level.” In addition, nearly every teacher in the building 
also shared that at some point they had made the decision not to implement an evaluator’s 
suggestion. For Courtney and Rachelle, two of the English teachers on staff, this meant not 
complying with requests to use more technology and do daily exit slips, respectively. Rachelle, 
however, told me that this was not a decision she would have made a few years back. When I 
asked her what she meant, she responded: 
When my evaluator tells me I should have these daily assessments, I will smile and nod 
and not do them because he is not going to check up on me. And, if he does, I can 
implement something that week and be like “yeah I tried it for a couple of weeks” or 
“yeah I can start doing that.” But, until the pressure is put on me…I think that is how my 
attitude has changed. Like until you sit down and look me in the face and say “you have 
to,” like “I’m expecting you to. I’m gonna follow up on this.” Then I’ll do it. But, until I 
feel that pressure, I’m not gonna do it. I’m just gonna go about my business . . . will they 
pressure me? I don't know. 
 
Compliance without change. Much more typical in my data, though, were instances 
where the teachers who participated in this project completed their required tasks, but for reasons 
other than just straightforward non-compliance, they did not use any of the feedback they 
received. Sometimes this was because they professed to not know what to do with the 
information they got from their evaluations. For others, it was because they said they did not 
have the resources they needed. 
Rachelle exemplified both of these, so it is worth sharing some of what we talked about 
in detail. In addition to her more obstinate non-compliance, she discussed both not knowing how 
to and not being able to make changes based on her evaluations. As she explained to me, she did 
not worry about this, however, because she had a comfort level with her evaluator that she 
believed was unique within Roosevelt High. In fact, much of her discussion about compliance 
without change occurred through retellings of conversations she had had with this individual. 
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When discussing what she had been able to do with data related to the student growth 
component, she said for example:  
What do I do? This is something I said right back to my evaluator that this is all great, but 
I don’t know what to do with it. I use [a data management system], but I don’t do 
anything with that data except go “Oh wow, 70% of students got this question wrong. We 
need to look at that one question.” But I do that without [the assessment]. So, I’m not 
doing anything with my data. I can collect data, but what do you [want me to] do? . . . 
I’ve never been told or trained or shown what to do. 
 
Rachelle also discussed trying to implement one of the suggestions she was given that would 
have put her in the excellent category on her district’s professional practice component. This 
involved having her students make their own writing rubrics, and as she said: 
It was a decent discussion, and I could see where they were going with things, but it was 
taking up a whole class period. I don’t understand how them making a rubric was 
benefiting their academic progress . . . it didn’t seem super important, so I stopped after 
two times. 
 
These responses indicate was that Rachelle was not always opposed to change. Instead, she 
believed a lack of knowledge prevented her from implementing some reforms meaningfully. 
Often, this was coupled with her sense the she lacked resources, which was something she 
referred to tangentially when explaining to her evaluator that she needed more training. Although 
she was not exactly proud of it, Rachelle also saw this resource issue as a problem of time. “I 
hate using that excuse,” she said, “because I feel like teachers always say, I don’t have time; I 
don’t have time. Well, I don't have time.” When I asked her what this meant for how she 
approached the new evaluation, she said she knew she “wasn’t going to get an excellent in every 
single category, so I wasn’t even striving for it. I just wanted proficient.” In this way Rachelle’s 
choices were a trade-off. Without the desire, knowledge, and resources to implement these 
policies fully, she knowingly complied at the level of appearances but did not take her 
implementation much further. 
74 
 
This same kind of surface-level compliance also came up in the other interviews. Though 
I will not go into as much detail, Courtney, whom I mentioned earlier as sometimes choosing 
non-compliance, also expressed compliance without change that she perceived as resulting from 
a knowledge/resource gap. In our first interview, she recalled an exchange with her evaluator in 
which she had asked him to give her feedback on student engagement. Her understanding of 
compliance with these reforms was that they were supposed to make evaluation a two-way 
process. After observing her, his suggestion was that she should gather data via a Google Form 
because it would engage students and give her data for reflection and analysis. She described her 
apprehension to me as follows:  
So one of the things that was suggested in a post-observation meeting was to do a follow-
up survey [using an app]. And, I already have enough trouble getting students to put their 
technology away. To ask them to get it out and then put it away just seems like it 
wouldn’t work very well for me. 
 
She went on: 
If I did a Google Form, that would generate a spreadsheet. You know, I would get 
information; I would look at it; and then I would close it and do nothing with it. I mean it 
could be very useful, but I don’t know how to make it useful. 
 
Unlike Rachelle, Courtney did not share these feelings with her evaluator because, as she tells 
me, she gave up on that idea two years ago. That said, she was not particularly worried about 
taking his suggestions with a grain of salt. Though she knew the new evaluation procedures were 
supposed to be “more objective,” she told me they were “still so subjective,” and she believed 
her evaluators “[knew] that.” She added, “It would be really difficult for them to take somebody 
who used to be excellent and now tell them that they need improvement.” I asked why, and her 
response was “because they just can’t. They would be frauds if they were like lemme tell you 
how you could make this short story more fascinating for your students and some of the richness 
you could push them towards uncovering.” 
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Finally, all of Lamar’s educators also shared their own accounts of compliance without 
change. What tied several of these together was an experience that was unique to Lamar. In 
contrast to Roosevelt, where the growth piece of the evaluation was still being worked out and 
done informally, Lamar’s teachers were implementing it for stakes that year. These teachers—
Robert, Stephanie, and Matt—were all especially verbal about their struggles with this 
requirement and were adamant that it was the least productive part of their new evaluations. 
As part of Lamar’s joint committee, Robert, for example, had helped to develop its new 
tool, so of anyone, he should have been able to navigate it. Yet, a recurring theme in our 
conversations was that he found this part of the new evaluation particularly challenging. 
Although he believed the district’s decision to opt for simple Student Growth Objectives rather 
than a true value-added model was more “fair”, he was wary of using the data from his SGO to 
inform his practice. For Robert, this was partly a knowledge issue and partly because he felt it 
was incompatible with an English classroom. He told me “It just seemed like it would be a 
statistics nightmare,” and, “you know, I’m an English teacher; that’s stuff I don’t like. I didn’t 
get into teaching to do spreadsheets and crunch numbers. I did it because I liked reading and 
talking about literature.” As a result, he told me, he had complied with preparing but not done 
anything with his data. As he said, this was because it “wasn’t really about teaching.”  
 Stephanie and Matt, who taught English and special education at Lamar, also found the 
data that they got from the growth process to be unhelpful. They, too, complied, but Matt 
compared setting his goal to taking “a shot in the dark,” and Stephanie told me she did not really 
know how the assessment she had to use for hers worked or linked to her teaching. Upon 
reflection, both expressed the belief that their procedural compliance had not changed their 
practice. Matt and Stephanie both explained it was difficult to make changes because of the way 
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the information from their assessments was reported. Matt also said he had found it difficult to 
meet with the other teachers who had given it in a timely enough fashion. He felt like this part of 
his evaluation was just something where “You go to the lab and you just cross your fingers and 
hope that you’ve done your duty throughout the school year.” He also said student growth, 
insofar as the evaluation was concerned, was “something you hit hard when it is due and then 
forget about.” Take together, their insights support the notion that these reforms failed to have 
their presupposed effect on teaching.  
Lastly, as one final point of interest about the extent to which Robert, Stephanie, Matt 
and the other teachers at Lamar took the demands of these policy changes seriously, the majority 
of them spoke unprompted about the role that Kevin, the principal, played in influencing their 
thinking. Several shared their belief that the outcomes of the growth goal, especially, did not 
matter much because of Kevin. As Robert said with a laugh in our final interview, “well the story 
is that he didn’t meet it. I’ve never really had an honest conversation with him [about it but] . . . 
You know, I think I am going to ask him.” Regardless of the accuracy of this rumor, Robert got 
the feeling that the growth aspect of the evaluation was not a priority for Kevin. He was not 
wrong, and in fact, Kevin had said exactly this when I first spoke to him. In fact, everyone at 
Lamar seemed to believe this. But, because the district had taken RttT money, it had to at least 
go so far as to comply. 
“It’s Like a Legal Record; Look it Up” (Courtney, Roosevelt High School) 
The above findings lend themselves to a new question: If the educators at Lamar and 
Roosevelt did not go much beyond what was required of them for basic compliance, did this 
mean that these policies did not have a significant impact? The answer to this is that they did—
like the school-based accountability policies before them, these reforms were equally, if not 
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more, difficult to avoid—but this impact was mostly bureaucratic. As Lamar Middle School’s 
principal said, “I honestly don’t think [effectiveness reform] has changed as much what we do as 
a school as it has what we have to complete.” Comments like this showed up throughout my 
data. Here I aggregate them into four categories to facilitate discussion: increased documentation 
of practice, increased documentation of student growth, re-documentation, and growth in 
administrative staffing. 
Increased documentation of practice. For these educators, the most frustrating 
bureaucratic change they said they experienced was the need to provide more documentation of 
their practice. Doing this was a large part of how they complied with evaluation reform, but they 
overwhelmingly perceived it as having little positive impact on their work. This documentation, 
which involved having to submit evidence for each of the 22 subdomains on their schools’ 
professional practice rubrics often felt unnecessary, time consuming, and like it reflected a 
“weird” “prove it” mentality (Courtney, interview 1). It was also quite frequently the first thing 
these educators mentioned when I asked them what impact the new evaluations had had. 
Courtney’s response to this question at the opening of our interview exemplified this 
feeling. She insisted that the new policies did not change the way she was doing things in her 
classroom: 
Other than just keeping better records. . . . Like normally if I wrote a referral, when I 
would get the copy back, and I would just throw it away. But, now I keep those so that I 
have that documentation. So I think it made me better at documenting . . .  
 
Later on she added with a voice full of irritation: 
And, why do I have to keep track of how many IEP meetings I attended when it’s on 
record?  It’s like it’s a legal record . . . look it up. So some of it was just yeah I could 
show you that I went to 80 meetings, but what’s the point?  You know I was there 




She compared this with her husband’s evaluation. He worked at the nearby university. She said 
he had a CV that she was “pretty sure was like 13 or 18 pages” long,” but: 
He doesn’t have to provide proof. I get the sense that if I said I went to this conference, I 
can’t just say it. I would also need to provide that CPDU form or something. Everything 
is like prove it. . . . It just seems weird. 
 
        Nick and Beth, both social studies teachers at Roosevelt, also shared the belief that these 
new policies had mostly meant added documentation. This was frustrating in and of itself, but 
they also found it problematic for another reason. They argued that documentation did not 
necessarily capture a teacher’s true ability. As Beth said, “I can show you the documentation, but 
I can’t show you my reasoning, and [that] is where the professional aspect comes in.” Nick 
expressed his concern with an example of just the opposite. He told me that for him: 
One of the difficult things was evidence about classroom procedures. For me, my 
classroom rule is respect me and what I’m doing and I’ll respect you, and I have written 
[only] one actual discipline referral in my time at Roosevelt. . . . I don’t have those issues. 
 
He went on to clarify that he understood why such documentation was included as part of the 
evaluation, “but if an evaluator came into my room and pops in ten times and never gets a 
referral from me and sees exchange going on in my classroom and sees things happening . . . 
that’s my main complaint.” His frustration was that he did not believe it was necessary for him, 
as a veteran teacher, to have to prove certain aspects of his practice. 
        On the whole, both schools were struggling to find balance around this issue. Because 
under the new State law the professional practice scores were supposed to be evidence based, 
they required some form of documentation from their teachers, but it was not always clear to 
them what kind of evidence they needed to provide or how much. In an effort to ease some of the 
anxiety around this, both the district office at Lamar and Roosevelt’s principal, Ben, had 
provided lists of suggested evidence to their teachers. In both cases, however, this appeared to 
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backfire in the sense that some perceive it as a signal that they should err on the side of over-
documenting. Kevin noted that this phenomenon was especially true for his third and fourth-year 
teachers, who he perceived as going to extra lengths to prove their excellence. And, Courtney put 
this problem this way: 
Also comparatively, I want to know, am I supposed to create a wiki? Is that what you 
want me to do? Or is this pile of folders in Google Drive enough? I need those specifics 
because I can do whatever I need to do. I just want to make sure I’m doing it the right 
way . . . or a right way. But, to show so many examples and say ‘well anything’s 
possible’ is not helpful.   
 
In addition, Lisa told me that documentation was a huge point of pushback for the Lamar 
teachers in the fall: 
Right now, people are really going overboard proving they’re excellent, and they’re 
really complaining that it’s taking up so much of their time. And, I’m trying to advocate 
for them and say no. They’re able to upload evidence, and they’re just going overboard, 
uploading all this evidence . . . I have one principal who’s telling teachers “I want you to 
upload everything, even your seating charts.” And, I’m telling everyone, “No, you’re not 
uploading anything that you already do.” That’s silly. I mean if you already have a 
parent-teacher log, keep it in your computer. Why would you upload it somewhere else? 
It’s just ridiculous. So, that’s what we’re ironing out. 
 
In the spring, she brought up two new issues. First, some principals had added their own 
paperwork. Courtney said, “As I’m learning, principals are still making up their own forms and 
asking teachers to fill out forms . . . that aren’t even real, that don’t even exist.”  Second, she 
shared: 
Just the other day I was meeting with teachers and I said, “Can I ask you why you are 
turning in a binder? I sent you so many emails with union support that said don’t do a 
binder. I’m begging you don’t do a binder.” “Yeah well the principal wants a binder.” Ok 
well . . . go turn in a frickin’ binder then.  
 
In the end, Kevin said, time spent documenting did not have much impact on how his 
teachers ended up being rated. In fact, he told me:  
That can hurt, I think. They’re still really good teachers, but the teachers that I rated 
excellent, it’s because they hit it out of the ballpark in terms of observations.  It had 
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nothing to do with collecting extra evidence and data. It’s when you go in their classroom 
something pretty cool is going on, and that takes time for a teacher to develop into that, 
and not everybody does. 
 
Kevin’s perspective on this was unique because his wife taught in a different building in the 
district. He said he had seen her work on documenting her practice and:  
Knowing what she does and the amount of time she devoted to things that I know how 
little I would look at. Hours and hours on forms that are going to get glanced at. And I’ve 
heard from a lot of sources that’s what a lot of people are doing. And that’s not what we 
want, people stressing about forms.  
 
Increased documentation of student work. These findings led me to the second 
significant bureaucratic change these teachers experienced, which was the increased 
documentation of student work. In addition to feeling as though they had to submit an abundance 
of evidence regarding the more qualitative aspects of their practice, they also indicated they had 
done more “charting” for the purposes of proving they were tracking student growth. For all of 
these teachers, however, this change never really moved beyond being purely bureaucratic nor 
did they perceive it as having done so. Instead, most saw it as a kind of one-off thing they did 
just for the purpose of evaluation. Though several remarked that it had produced ‘good 
conversation,’ none described it as becoming integrated into their instructional work.  
Perhaps the most poignant example here was given by Lisa, who recounted the following 
exchange she had had when working with a team of sixth grade science teachers. She explained: 
The whole group was sixth grade science, and I say, “So what did you guys find out from 
last year’s assessment?” And they’re like “Oh I have no idea; we just threw those away.” 
So then like that was kind of supposed to drive [their] reflective teaching. 
 
But, in her experience, many of Lamar’s teachers did not see it that way. Lisa’s staff was not 
alone in this, and most of the teachers at Roosevelt expressed similar sentiments. Rachelle, for 
example, justified her decision not to implement daily assessments by telling me that she did not 
need this data to help identify which students were struggling or what they were struggling with. 
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Back at Lamar, Robert’s tracking of his growth data also exemplified how this additional 
documentation was mostly bureaucratic. When I asked him about his growth goal, he said: 
I’ve entered it, and I’ve got it on this chart so I can give it to my evaluator. But, it wasn’t 
like this living, breathing document that I refer to all the time when doing my 
instruction.  I do that more informally when we’re doing writing in class, I’m assessing 
their writing and saying you really need to work on this or you need to work on that. So I 
have to say honestly that I don’t know that it’s much more than I have to do this to fulfill 
the requirements of my evaluation. I’m not saying that I’m not assessing student work 
and their writing and their understanding but that, that model [the new evaluation student 
growth model], no. 
 
Stephanie agreed, “I don’t think that it’s changed my instruction in any way.  It makes me 
document it more. I’m definitely charting more, but I don’t think my students last year learned 
any more . . . ”  
At one point even Matt, a math/special education teacher at Lamar who had pointedly 
begun his second interview by backtracking on what he felt was some of his earlier negativity 
and who was overall pretty positive about the new policies, expressed his frustration with the 
overly bureaucratic nature of documenting student growth. This frustration was apparent in the 
terse statements he wrote on his final growth form; however, this was not something I asked him 
about directly. Instead, it was Matt that brought this up, telling me: 
The format of this form . . . we were very frustrated with. We found this incredibly…it 
was very frustrating. I think it actually impaired our conversations. So we talked about 
the data first, and then we went to do this. And we were just frustrated with it; that it was 
a lot of repetitive [stuff]. 
 
He then pointed to the form, which I had pulled out in front of me. He continued, “It won’t let 
you submit without putting something in there. And that’s why some of the boxes are like this,” 
(pointing to where he had typed “see above/below”). In an exasperated voice Matt went on, “Just 
read the boxes below, and then you’ll find out.” I laughed and started to tell him that I could 
sense the annoyance, but he cut me off: 
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. . . that we were feeling frustrated? It took us a long time to fill it out. Guilty as charged. 
That was us. And, I’m curious to hear . . . I’m sure my administrator and my evaluator 
would feel the same way about this form because it’s really hard to sit down and look at 
this thing and then have a discussion about how we think it went or what we’d change 
next time. Those kind of things . . . don’t think that this will encourage natural 
conversations. 
 
I asked Matt if he thought good conversations could happen without all of this paperwork and he 
replied “I think it’s helpful to give the evaluator [his principal] something to look at before you 
sit down with them, [but I] think it can be simplified.” 
 Re-documentation. Additionally, there was a third kind of documentation that these 
participants reported. I term this re-documentation, and it involved the need to revise, reformat, 
or double-up on materials that had already been created by my teachers in order to meet their 
evaluation requirements. Some of this re-documentation was tied to the mixed messages these 
teachers received with respect to what they needed to record and submit to their evaluators, and 
some was related to the fact that both schools were in their first year of contracting with new 
cloud-based evaluation management systems. Some, however, was also the result of additional 
work that these teachers put upon themselves in an effort to come across as excellent. In any 
case, these teachers reported many instances where they found themselves spending significant 
time duplicating, reorganizing, and rearranging.  
 Although all the participants talked about re-documentation, Beth provided probably the 
most assiduous, and painstaking, example. She told me that in her first year she had organized all 
of her evidence by hand, and then once she “had gotten it planned out,” she scanned and copied 
it all and switched it to Google Drive. She “made a folder for each of the domains and 
subdomains so that [she] could just drag and drop [things in there].” When she finished, she was 
told to upload all of her artifacts to the district’s data management site. Upon trying to do so, 
however, she found out the program would only allow her three attachments. She told me this 
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“seemed absurd, given how many artifacts we technically need,” but thankfully her evaluator had 
allowed her to just share her Drive folder with him. She added:  
Next year, when I have an evaluation and am adding to it, maybe [I’ll] take out some of 
the more dated stuff . . . in all honesty maybe [I’ll even make] within the subdomain 
folder another subfolder [with] previous artifacts so you can go back and look, .and then 
here’s some new stuff [in there]. 
 
As it would turn out, her district would abandon this system that year and adopt a new one the 
next, so Beth would end up having to do this process all over again. By her own admission, she 
was “a perfectionist” and brought some of this work upon herself, but when I asked her if she 
found this useful at all, she responded:  
To make the Danielson [professional practice] model useful, I don’t need to document. I 
would love to, instead of documentation, actually spend some time looking at the model 
and comparing it, as a professional, to what I am doing. Because there were certainly 
instances that I realized when I was documenting “Well yeah this can fit in there, but 
that’s not really the best work that I could be doing.” 
 
She continued: 
My evaluation [is] taking precedence over that. That’s yes you can be hired back or not, 
or yes, you can earn tenure or not. So, I know that’s mercenary, and it seems like it’s not 
best practice and it really isn’t. But, that’s gonna take priority. 
 
For Beth, and for many of the other teachers I interviewed, re-documentation got in the way of 
other things—sometimes this was grading; sometimes this was time at home; sometimes this was 
exactly what the evaluation model was supposed to help teachers do—engage in reflective 
practice. 
In our final interview, Lisa told me that she had both witnessed and participated in 
extensive re-documentation. It had become an unwanted priority in her day. At that point, she 
said she was doing less coaching than trying to help teachers clean up their formatting. “That’s 
what I’ve been doing now,” she told me exasperatedly, “is just cleaning up a mess, trying to help 
them get [the evaluation] into some kind of format.” I asked her if this is like what I had 
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witnessed her doing with the art teacher at the workshop back in December. She replied, “That’s 
the kind of mess that a ton of people are in; they bring me their stuff in that kind of a mess.” But, 
Lisa also believed this was part of the learning curve of adopting any new policy. 
There’s so many intricate rules, like we put in last year, you could just throw out two kids 
at random if you wanted, just to give people a better chance at making it. And, then you 
have to compute who was [there] 85% [of the time]. People will just come in to me like 
‘my kids didn’t make it.’ I’m like ‘but you have a set of sixteen and you get to take out 
four, so now let’s see.’ 
 
She predicted that in the future some of this work would go away, and Lamar would be able to 
focus more on the positive aspect of these policies. That said, she and most of the others I 
interviewed, noted that when it came to reform, public schools often seemed to have revolving 
doors. Robert, for example, was less hopeful that this would be any different. He said he had 
always had a portfolio, “but it’s got to be in a different format now.” He compared evaluation to 
a number of other policies that he had witness come and go and come again from the State and 
his district’s central office.  
Perceived administrative growth. Lastly, this leads me to one other noteworthy 
bureaucratic change that the educators in these schools experienced. This was that they felt these 
policies (along with a number of other recent and/or newly-introduced top-down reforms) had 
changed their schools’ and districts’ funding priorities. More specifically, they perceived that one 
of the most significant effects of recent policy changes had been that money had been diverted 
away from their classrooms and (re)allocated to administrative staffing. Whether this was 
accurate or not was beside the point, as perception, alone, that their schools’ bureaucracies had 
grown was enough to influence their own bureaucratic responses.  
Robert, for example, brings up this ‘top-heaviness’ when I asked him at the end of the 
year what he thought someone would notice about the policy changes if they came into his 
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school. First, he tells me he that thinks that, “they would be surprised by the level of teacher 
fatigue and frustration with the growing requirements that we’re asked to do.” This was 
something he had brought up before, but this time he said it was “different than what he felt like 
he had seen in the past.” He added, “Nothing’s really ever cleared away, and let’s focus on this. 
It’s like let’s pile more on.” He felt this problem was unique to education and believed that this 
piling had led to the increase in Lamar’s administrative staff. “Call over there” he implored me, 
“and ask how big their staff is and how many people are employed over there. It’s out of 
balance.” Of course, balance is subjective, but Robert was correct in his assessment insofar as 
Sarah, Lamar’s professional development coordinator, had told me her job had been created with 
RttT money. In fact, she had left a position as a classroom teacher in the district to go work in its 
central office. 
At Roosevelt there was also the sense that resources were not being allocated in the best 
way as a result of these policies. For Beth, whose class sizes had grown to upwards of thirty-five 
students in the last year or so, this was assumed by her to be partially because of the overhead 
costs associated with accountability mandates. The timing of our first interview may have made 
this a particularly sensitive topic for her, as many of her students had been pulled out of her 
academic classes for the last several weeks for various standardized tests. This made planning 
unusually difficult, and from what she could tell “the administration is constantly in there, in the 
library [where testing was being done], which I appreciate. But, how does that help the rest of the 
teachers?” In addition, I heard from several others at Roosevelt about frustrations related to 
resources being allocated to bring in outside consultants rather than being used to support 
internal capacity building. 
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It was also the case, however, that regardless of how it had been spent, these teachers 
believed overall resource allocation was too low. This was both an issue of money and people. 
Lisa noted that one of the reasons the Lamar joint committee had tried from the beginning to 
avoid making any drastic changes was cost. “I mean that’s expensive when you change things 
because you have to print stuff and send it out to people. It’s a waste of time. It’s energy. It’s a 
lot of money. I mean you figure we’ve had to buy 600 of these” she said holding her evaluation 
binder. Nick, Courtney, and many of the others saw this problem more in terms of personpower. 
As Nick put it: 
Look, you’re not going to hear this from very many teachers, but we don’t have enough 
evaluators. You either have to do something with veteran teachers to help them with the 
evaluation tool for the younger teachers in some way, or you have to add administrators 
to do what this is trying to do. I mean I think administrators who teach some, and 
evaluate some, and have some background in curriculum and instruction would be 
good.  It’s unfair to put a guy who’s in charge of grounds, who is in charge of non-
academic personnel, who’s in charge of all these other issues [in charge of evaluation], 
and say, “oh by the way you’re gonna do these ten teachers.”  
 
Nick was wrong in his assumption that he would be the only one who thought this way because I 
did, in fact, hear this from the others to some degree. Whether it was more time, more 
administrators, or more staff so that senior teachers could move into a partially administrative 
role, all felt like, for these changes to evaluation to be implemented meaningfully, there needed 
to be additional resources made available rather than just shifting around people and funds. 
When I asked Lisa, whether this have been done through the RttT funding, she replied 
sarcastically, “Really? The whole $100,000 we got?”  
“I’m Just Gonna Blitzkrieg” (Nick, Roosevelt High School)  
 Finally, my third finding with regards to how these policies failed to have their intended 
impact was that my participants acted strategically both in implementing and responding to them. 
Since they felt overwhelmed by the bureaucratic demands and either believed that they could not 
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or did not want to make changes to their practice, they simultaneously looked for ways to 
minimize the judgment their evaluations could have. As Nick’s quote, which titles this section, 
indicates, these educators were typically aware of what they were doing when they engaged in 
this activity; they realized it compromised the validity of the evaluation process. That said, none 
were exactly apologetic about their actions.  
 Strategic practice. Because RttT, and therefore Illinois State law, required the use of an 
‘evidence-based model’ for evaluating professional practice and mandated that the outcome of 
this process be used to sort teachers within a predetermined categorization, these participants 
engaged strategically with their districts’ evaluation rubrics, using them as a sort of checklist to 
get to a desired rating. Rather than looking holistically across these rubrics to identify areas to 
improve, they tended to view them as menus from which they could pick and choose. This is not 
to say there were no instances where these teachers linked their evaluation to their perceived 
deficits, but even in these cases, they said they learned nothing new. Moreover, this sort of 
critical reflection was far less common in my data and also less likely to translate into action. 
Instead, most took the opposite approach, which meant first choosing the category in which they 
wanted to be placed and then figuring out how they could strategically manage their evidence to 
produce their sought after score. Nick is by far the most striking (and vocal) example of this, so 
what follows focuses largely on him. Every teacher, and administrator, though, did something 
similar to engage strategically with these policies. 
Right at the outset of our initial interview, Nick made his issue with these mandates clear. 
When I asked him to begin by just telling me a bit about his experience with implementing the 
new evaluation, he immediately jumped to his big problem with it. He said, it was “one size fits 
all.” He explained, “I think it would be better if there was one for veteran teachers and one for 
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new teachers. It probably doesn’t do enough for new teachers and probably has too many hoops 
for older teachers.” Then he described his experience with it: 
My experience was [that] I’m doing everything the evaluation asks me to do [anyways]. 
And, I basically inundated my evaluator with more material than he possible could have 
read. I mean I hit him. You know how my lesson plans look . . . I’ve got everything 
planned out; I’ve got all my units done; I’ve have all my objectives; and it’s all in 
electronic format; and I had to have filled his hard drive . . . but what I’ve heard from a 
lot of teachers, and I understand this attitude, is “they don’t want to give excellent ratings, 
so I’m just gonna do the bare minimum to get a proficient and be done with it because it’s 
too many hoops.” I get that, but honestly my attitude was the opposite—I’m just gonna 
blitzkrieg my evaluator with so much stuff that I dare them to find me lacking in any area.  
 
It quickly became clear that Nick knew very well what he was doing. He continued: 
Really, if you do something like that to an evaluator, I don’t know how they have a 
chance.  I mean they’re evaluating all these faculty, you know. And I think it’s gonna 
color their perception of who’s doing what, and I’m sure he didn’t look at a tenth of what 
I sent him.  He couldn’t have . . . I wanted to make it impossible for him to give me 
anything but an excellent. 
 
When I pushed him to say a bit more about this, he replied matter-of-factly, “I know the 
practicalities of it, and I took advantage of those practicalities.” 
Stephanie and Matt also talked about using strategies at Lamar. Stephanie said when she 
looked at the Danielson rubric, she found there were things where she was saying to herself, “I 
know that’s never going to happen.” Because of this, she decided she could be “selective” in 
order to “kind of tip the balance just a little bit.” She explained, “I just know that sometimes I 
think what they are asking is just astronomical. On a whole it’s doable, but you definitely 
couldn’t do everything. Oh my gosh, there’s no way.” Matt discussed his strategy more as he 
reflected, but nonetheless admitted that he, too, had done things differently solely for the purpose 
of the evaluation. What he told me was: 
In the fractions unit we did more; we retaught more than we did in the other 
units.  Typically re-teaching is kind of on me as a special ed. teacher, but for the class, we 




Of course, there was nothing wrong with this, but it did evidence Matt’s consciousness about his 
use of strategy. He later recalled that his experience had been quite different in this regard than 
the one the year before. Then, he had piloted his old school’s new evaluation tools, and in our 
interviews he expressed concern with what he saw as the impact high-stakes had had on how he 
engaged with these policies. 
 Sometimes, though, these teachers strategized with their practice in a way that even they 
understood to be instructionally unsound. Most often, evidence of this surfaced in those areas 
where standardized tests were difficult to administer and performance assessments were more 
common. At both schools, for example, I heard about teachers who had created lessons or 
assessments that were not really what they considered to be developmentally appropriate just so 
they could submit them as evidence for their evaluations. Kevin told me his: 
music teachers [struggled] horribly [with this], and unfortunately it’s resulted with them 
doing things like creating pen and paper tests . . . which isn’t what their classes are about. 
But, that’s what they do because that’s the way it’s [the evaluation’s] structured. 
 
Music instruction was also brought up by Rachelle when she was reflecting on her role as an 
instructor for Roosevelt’s Danielson training. She remembered that the group had received 
feedback from a music teacher who said: 
She had a student, and she’s a non-tenured [teacher], so she was nervous and wanted to 
make sure that she had student-driven something in her classroom. So she makes a 
student get up and lead something for five minutes. And, she basically said, “This is not 
good practice. This is not benefiting that student. This is not benefitting any of our other 
students, but I’m doing it because I feel like I’ve been told to.” 
 
Strategic goal setting. For better or worse, these teachers reported similar strategizing 
when it came to setting their student growth goals. They discussed such things as knowingly 
adjusting the standards they used to grade written assessments and lowering their targets for 
standardized exams in an effort to make sure that they met whatever benchmark they had set. In 
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general, this was a much less benign form of strategizing, which Lisa called a “numbers game.” 
Notably, most of my examples here come from Lamar; since Roosevelt was still developing and 
piloting this piece of the evaluation. Nonetheless, several of Roosevelt’s teachers were thinking 
ahead and discussed how they planned to employ strategic goal setting when full and for-stakes 
implementation came. 
At Lamar, strategizing around growth was also most evident when teachers talked about 
what they had learned from their pilot year and how they had changed their goals once student 
growth began to “count.” Stephanie recalled how her first year, “The SGO was frightening.” She 
said: 
Last year I ended up with an excellent rating and that was really exciting. But, I was right 
at the line, so if the SGO had been incorporated, I would have been proficient. . . . that 
freaked me out a little bit just because I realized that had it been a stakes year I wouldn’t 
have gotten my excellent rating. So this year it made me very conscientious of how I 
wrote it.   
 
I asked her to explain what that meant, and she said this year her team: 
. . . decided to do it for half a year, so we were more in control. We got nervous because 
some of our students at the end of the [previous] year dropped on our writing portion. We 
think part of it was that they got so exhausted that they weren’t necessarily doing their 
best writing . . . so we lowered our standard for our SGO. 
 
She also told me that they decided to give the post-assessment writing prompt ahead of time and 
allow students to use their organizational charts. “We were like why shouldn’t they use their 
scaffolds, why shouldn’t they use everything they have, why shouldn’t we talk about the 
questions ahead of time? That’s what we do really.” But, Stephanie said, these strategic changes 
were also about giving themselves “a little more wiggle room.” 
 Matt shared something relatively similar. He told me his team had chosen a fractions unit 
for its growth goal because it was “convenient” and they knew “fractions were a difficult thing 
for 6th grade students.” As he explained this, he paused briefly to compare the process at Lamar 
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to what he had done at his previous school. He talked through this comparison out loud and drew 
the conclusion that the biggest difference was that the year before he had written a goal that was 
specific to his students’ deficits. He said it had not gone well, and had it been a stakes year he 
would have been marked “needs improvement.” By this time, he almost seemed to be in 
conversation with himself, trying to rationalize his decision. When he turned his words back to 
me, he finished, “So yeah I guess we still looked at what needs the students [had].” There was a 
long pause, then eventually Matt said, “It felt different I guess . . . speaking candidly it felt like 
we were . . . since it [was] a stakes year . . . this year matters [so] we wanted to make sure that 
we wrote a goal that we would succeed in.” 
Lisa encouraged her teachers to write goals in which they felt they were guaranteed to 
succeed. She said early on she had to try to get teachers to lower their goals. She explained that, 
“People were setting them way too high, which of course they were. They’re teachers.” She told 
me, “Nobody ever comes in and says ‘Yeah, I hope 15% of my kids fail.’ I mean we don’t do 
that. That’s just not how we think.” She did something similar at one of the union evaluation 
meetings I attended. At that meeting, she encouraged the group to “write it [their goals] to say at 
two points within the unit, so you don’t have to use the last assessment.” In other words, even if 
a student did poorly on the final assessment, with Lisa’s coaching, a teacher could still meet their 
growth goal as long as they could show that the student had “got it” at some point during the 
course of a unit. 
Finally, to provide one example of how Roosevelt’s teachers were already thinking about 
this, Beth told me she wanted to find some way to measure student skills. But she thought this 
would be too subjective and difficult, so she had settled on most likely using a content-based 
pretest and posttest. Beth said, “As far as I can tell, [that’s] the most objective way.”  She added, 
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she would probably do her growth goal with world geography and said “If I give a pretest to my 
world geography class, I’m gonna have like 10,000% growth.” Though, she knew this would 
reflect well but not measure her true ability: 
It would be pretty darn hard for me not to show growth unless I literally sat on my rear 
end and didn’t even provide them with a map or a list of things to study. Like I could do 
that and [still] show growth and have no impact or activity with the students. I could 
literally say here is a website; go study it. Here’s a list of places to memorize; here are 
some blank maps; here are some completed maps. That’s not a reflection of my teaching. 
 
But, at that point Beth knew growth was coming, and she knew she did not trust the validity of 
the SGO tool, so she also did not see any way around this.    
Framework manipulation. Importantly, the kinds of strategic activity I heard these 
educators talk about and saw for myself was not always individual nor was it undertaken only by 
teachers. There were instances in my data where the administrators and teachers I interviewed 
discussed working together to affect the outcomes of these reforms. In particular, there was one 
major example of this where the Lamar staff engaged in a third kind of strategizing that I 
describe as framework manipulation. This strategizing was unique in that it took place as these 
policies were being translated from broad statutes into concrete school-level practices and 
involved deliberately taking advantage of ambiguities in the law. While it could be used to try to 
ratchet up the stakes of the evaluation (and as I would later learn, there was an attempt at 
Roosevelt to do so), the most notable example of this that came out during the year I was 
collecting my data involved the opposite. At Lamar, framework manipulation was undertaken in 
order to undercut the possibility of individual teachers facing consequences from the changes 
Race to the Top had brought about in State law. 
In short, what I learned was that Lamar’s joint committee had, to use Kevin’s words, 
“deliberately [done] some things in how [it] scored evaluations.” He told me the purpose of this 
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was to minimize the impact the growth component could have on a teacher’s rating, and I heard 
about this particular instance of framework manipulation from everyone I talked to at Lamar, so I 
got the sense that it was talked about openly and well known. It was also clear to me from my 
interviews with the teachers and administrators that had been part of the joint committee that 
there had been broad consensus about the need to leverage the grey areas of the law to weaken 
the potential negative consequences that incorporating student growth into evaluations could 
have for Lamar’s teachers. In fact, Lisa, Kevin, and Sarah all explicitly told me that “on both 
sides, teacher and administrator, none of us were really in favor of it” (Kevin). I also heard 
variations of the following from each of them: “I mean in theory it makes sense, but in practice it 
diminishes a lot of what teachers do” (Kevin).  
 It was Kevin who discussed this framework manipulation most clearly; although, 
everyone who went into depth about this topic in our interviews talked about it in almost exactly 
the same way. Kevin told me: 
Fortunately 70% of the evaluation is what you do with instruction. I would say [that] we 
deliberately did some things in how we scored our evaluations [so that] even though it’s 
technically 70% it is really more . . . That’s how where you set your cut scores and you 
set your rubric scores [matters].  It’s very hard for a teacher . . . if they were to get a 




. . . that’s the game, though, unfortunately. And, I remember in some of the combined 
meetings, we were really sitting down doing algebra problems to try and determine what 
numbers had to be set at in order to get certain scores. And, I don’t want you to interpret 
that as being something malicious, but we were really trying to alleviate the concerns of 
some of the teachers that if their student growth side didn’t go very well, they were going 
to be on a remediation plan.   
 
I also heard from both Kevin and Sarah that Lamar had done some things with setting 
attendance requirements to allow teachers to throw out a few students in order to limit the 
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possibility that a handful of low performers, or students with spotty attendance, could bring 
down a teacher’s overall score. With regards to the latter, Sarah explained that originally the 
framework was set to give teachers a 2% margin around their goal, but by the end of the pilot 
year the committee decided to set this number in relation to the overall student population size. 
She said: 
So if your student population is one to ten, you can’t do that. If it is about a class period, 
like your average class size, you can omit the data for one student. For multiple classes, 
two students and a whole team or grade level and it would go to three students. And, that 
would be the maximum.  
 
According to Lisa, this, too, was done to prevent the growth score from having as much impact 
because “We found out that last year the way we had done it—the formula that we had used—
was hurting people. It was causing them to go from excellent to proficient overall, and nobody 
wanted that because it’s stupid.”  
 Finally, Kevin explained that the group had also included language that if the only thing 
making a teacher at risk for being put on a remediation plan was their growth score, the District 
was not going to put them on a remediation plan. “But” he said, “all of that is within the law, I 
believe . . . at least I hope it is.” All of this was also still on the table to be revisited by the joint 
committee at the end of the year. In our final interview Kevin told me some things had come up 
over the past few months that were making him think about whether some of these manipulations 
had gone too far.  
Outright cheating. Finally, while it was not a major finding, there were a few instances 
of outright cheating in my data. Because this form of strategizing was a significant finding in the 
literature on NCLB and something that RttT was supposed to correct, it is worth discussing. One 
was the incident with Lisa and the art teacher working backwards to finagle a growth goal that 
would result in this teacher getting an “excellent.” The other came as an omission from Robert, 
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one of the English teachers, who told me that he had “adjusted” his grading of his students’ 
writing to make sure that he met his growth goal. As he put it, he did not feel too remorseful 
about this because: 
One of the things I think is kind of silly about this is that we do these essays, and I write 
these numbers down and it’s like who says I didn’t just write numbers down. I mean is he 
[the evaluator] going to sit there and read all those essays. No way.  
 
Because he knew that he had the upper hand: 
It’s like the writing thing too, we had a prompt that we graded ourselves. So it’s like of 
course I’m going to grade the first one down and the second one higher because it looks 
like they grow. It wasn’t really cheating, but you know that’s what’s going on. 
 
Robert also used what he heard from his building principal, Kevin, to explain this strategy: 
What he’s [Kevin] telling people, or at least [what] I’m hearing from other teachers is 
“you shouldn’t be spending that much time on it.”  It’s a third of your evaluation, and 
some teachers were coming in with all this information and he was kind of chiding them, 
“You know, you don’t need to do all this.” So I just kinda did that and simplified it as 
much as I could. 
 
It is worth noting that both of these examples of outright cheating occurred with respect 
to the growth piece of the evaluation. Perhaps one of the reasons I did not hear more about this, 
then, was because Roosevelt had not fully implemented this.  
Chapter Summary 
What kinds of conclusions might be drawn about the impact of teacher evaluation reform 
in these two schools if this text were to end right here? With the level of analysis that was 
applied in this chapter, i.e., with an analysis centered on the visible impacts these policies 
produced, it would be difficult to conclude that RttT’s not-so-subtle nudging of states and 
schools in the direction of high stakes teacher accountability through these policies had much, if 
any, positive effect.  
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The three major findings laid out in this chapter—that teachers made little or no changes 
to their classroom practice, that the changes they did make because of these policies were mostly 
bureaucratic, and that the high-stakes nature of these policies encouraged these teachers to 
engage in strategic responses that amounted to gaming—paint a picture of a policy 
implementation process that was largely unsuccessful. These policy changes did not do much to 
induce the desired changes in teachers’ practice. They did not incentivize them to work harder or 
provide them with valuable information that they could then translate into improvements in their 
teaching. In fact, they appeared to have little productive effects. Moreover, what appears as the 
ability of these teachers to ignore, undermine, or minimize the effects of these policies, might 
also be interpreted to have been made possible by vagueness and/or a lack of consequences in the 
law. These teachers, and indeed these schools, perceived themselves as facing little personal risk 
for noncompliance.  
Thus, if this dissertation were to end right here, what it might become logical to say is 
that for high-stakes teacher accountability to work, more top-down oversight may be required. 
States may need to be more prescriptive in their laws; they may need to mandate a greater 
attention to student growth; and they may need to either attach at their level, or force local school 
districts to attach, greater penalties to these policies. After all, if teachers and schools are still 
able to thwart or manipulate policies to suit their purposes, such prescriptions would make sense. 
As the next chapter will show, though, both these conclusions and the prescriptions that might 
follow from them would be oversimplified and likely misguided. 
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Chapters 7: Policy Enactment & Policy Resistance 
A More Complex Perspective 
 The box simply read “Not a priority or interest.” Still, finding it in a published document 
on the school’s website was surprising. When I brought it up, Kevin laughed. “I can’t believe 
that stuff is public” he said. “I thought someone like Sarah was going to edit that for me.” 
“Anyways,” he continued, “that thing was as bogus as things could get.” Then he laughed some 
more. 
The above exchange happened during my last interview with Kevin, the principal at 
Lamar. He and I were wrapping up, and, as I had completed all my final interviews, I asked him 
what an outsider would likely notice or say about the impact of evaluation reform if they came 
into his building. Kevin, who was always laughing and joking, was in a particularly upbeat mood 
that day. School was winding down for the year, and he was dressed casually in a Lamar logo 
sweatshirt and jeans. He began, as he always did, by answering my question before veering off 
into a long monologue, taking me with him on his train-of-thought as he was thinking. “So, there 
are two very different answers there,” he said. 
The State would say wow this is amazing because the State doesn’t know what the State 
is doing. And they continue to do these . . . so I don’t know if you know this but they 
have apparently hired outside consultants, so this would be like program evaluators that 
come in. . . . And anyways, one went through last year . . . and then they are wanting to 
come in right now. But, I’m not agreeing to it. I just don’t want to do it. They wanted to 
do site visits, but this is the State. They call us for a site visit the last week of school? So, 
I’m like no . . .  
 
And Charlotte [the author of the Danielson evaluation] . . . what would Charlotte 
say?  She would probably say get this student growth crap out of here. It’s kind of not 
that great. I just, I do not think from what I’ve read of Charlotte that one, she really wants 
this to be an evaluation framework, and two, that student growth . . . I feel like without 
putting her on a pedestal at all, because . . . [this] is about trying to take the art of 
teaching and help people see it and what’s really good and what’s not good. That’s the 
point of the framework. And, you know to even use it as an evaluation tool, [making it 
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into] a formal evaluation tool, has probably bastardized it to some extent. But I think 
she’s probably embracing it because it’s making her a ton of money. 
 
Eventually, Kevin came around to mentioning a document, which I had earlier told him I 
found while perusing Lamar’s school website. It was a state-mandated School Improvement Plan 
that he had completed in 2014. It was posted, right there along with the school’s progress report 
about Race to the Top, where anyone who was interested in learning what reforms the school had 
been working on could open up and read. Upon doing so, I found multiple boxes on both of these 
that had been completed with the phrase “not a priority or interest.” There were other numerous 
gems too like, “The Lamar School District does not define itself, its schools, or its students based 
on the results of a single multiple-choice test,” “The building team does not support the evidence 
presented,” “The comparison to the corporate world is viewed as an invalid argument,” and 
“Drilling and recitation are not research-based methods that are appropriate.” Some parts had 
been filled out with not so subtle jabs at the State, especially regarding its funding. Many boxes 
had been cut and pasted from one to the next. Although this last part was unsurprising, the clear 
and biting tone of these documents left me momentarily confounded when I first found them. So, 
when Kevin brought this up, I asked him why he had filled them out that way. As had been the 
case with most of our conversations, what he said next was just as surprising.  
Kevin immediately began critiquing the research the State had used to justify its 
mandates. Often, the forms the school would have to fill out to prove that it was doing something 
would include citations that were supposed to support specific requirements or a question on a 
form. About this Kevin said, “And the research . . . So they would do these statements about 
things . . . that you could click on, and it would give you the research . . . and it was awful!” He 
went on, “It wasn’t real research; it didn’t require a doctoral student to know that it wasn’t good 
quality research. They would quote something out of these really low-level practitioner things, 
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which is fine, but it shouldn’t be driving school improvement.” Kevin seemed to think this 
problem was pervasive because he went from that into a school climate survey that the state had 
also developed as part of its RttT reforms. He said: 
It’s a flawed tool. In terms of . . . there’s not one . . . there’s no safeguard in terms of who 
fills out the survey. I could go on and fill out the survey 1000 times.  There’s nothing 
preventing that from happening. I could fill it out as a student. I could fill it out as a 
teacher. And, I could fill it out as a parent. 1000 times. So right there it’s flawed . . .   
 
It would have been easy to assume that Kevin was just complaining, and to some extent he was. 
But throughout the time I had spent with him, I had come to understand that his words and 
actions were not just about annoyance. When he refused to allow in the State’s outside auditors, 
he was not just turning them away because he did not want to deal with them. When he had 
explained to me how he had worked with Lamar’s joint committee to engineer a growth tool that 
would not have too much impact on his teachers, he was not just subverting the State’s attempt to 
make evaluations high-stakes for individual educators. And, when he filled out state forms with 
phrases like “not a priority or interest,” he was doing so because, as far as Kevin was concerned, 
these five words reflected something deeply meaningful. Although one can wonder whether, 
especially in this last case, he would have been so brazen had he known they would be made 
public on the school website. My sense of him was that he would have written the same 
responses regardless.  
To demonstrate what I mean here, it is useful to let Kevin finish his story. Since it will 
also help set up what I want to do in the rest of this chapter. First, I want to share some of what I 
had learned about him by this time. When I met Kevin, he was working on a doctoral degree 
through an EdD program at the nearby university, and he described himself as someone who was 
interested in politics. The convergence of these things frequently came through in how he talked 
about schools and school policy. In our conversations, he would often cite authors he had read 
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for class, studies he had dug up on his own, and recent political happenings. These things had 
clearly made him dubious about some education reforms. At one point, when explaining what he 
saw as the motivation for RttT and teacher evaluation reform, he told me that he believed there 
was “a contingent of people who want[ed] public schools to fail so [they] can be privatized.” 
Yet, despite all of Kevin’s missives about school reformers and politics, I never thought 
of him as resistant to change or a cynic. He, too, believed that education would benefit from 
some reform; he spoke regularly about racial and economic injustices in schools; and he had 
instituted a few new policies in his building aimed at changing mindsets around these issues; 
these had faced significant pushback from his staff. He also said that he was sure there were 
many advocates of reforms like RttT that had the best interests of students at heart.  But, Kevin 
also had serious issues with the narrative of school failure that these reformers touted and some 
of the remedies they promoted. One of the most striking things about him, though, was that he 
did very little speculating. As he told me these things, time and again in different contexts, he 
almost always provided the evidence that had led him to his stance. This was also the case for 
why he had written “not a priority or interest” on the aforementioned forms.  
To let Kevin finish his story, then, what he shared with me was that, before writing these 
words, he had done something else—his own research.  
I called the University, because they [the State] always like to say it's a research-based 
survey. I asked them [the University] for their citations and where they’ve published this 
research that they’ve done. I got a reply back and it was basically a website where they 
had self-published their own data. 
 
Kevin also did something similar with the groups that he had worked with on drafting these 
forms.  
I mean the whole process . . . because the teachers I had with me, they were rockstar 
teachers. And . . . we were like, “What is this?!?” And, we were all like “Let’s print off 
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the research and let’s read it this time.” And, I mean there was some really, really 
meaningless stuff that they were using and saying this is valid research. 
 
Then he went out on a bit of a limb. He said on one level he was surprised by all of this but on 
another, “I’m sure . . . I don’t know for sure . . . but I’m sure it all went back to one of the big 
educational companies . . . ”  
After sharing this all with me, Kevin continued for a while. He talked about discovering 
“this weird excessive overlap” between all of the mandated components of RttT and some of the 
biggest educational services companies, the excessive pay being given to the State’s new 
Education Czar who, he had recently learned, had run a charter school and been a pro football 
player, and how Illinois found itself located between two states that had recently adopted what he 
thought were wrong-headed education policies. But, Kevin said, this was all okay because for the 
upcoming year he had managed to take an instructional coaching position, which had been 
funded by Race to the Top, and turn it into one that would focus on ‘restorative practices for 
student discipline’ because in his words “our disparity in our student discipline data is consistent 
with what I’ve seen in a lot of national studies unfortunately.” 
To be sure, by the time Kevin finished talking, he was a long way from my initial 
question. But as he understood it, all of this was connected. As I listened to him, I realized how 
much I had missed on my initial reading of these forms. His “not a priority or interest” statement, 
which had at first take come across as blatantly resistant, was a policy response born out of a 
thoughtful and well-read position. It was also his way of speaking back. Kevin had not written 
these words because he did not think that schools needed to change but precisely because he took 
state mandates for change seriously. He took issue with what he understood as reformers’ 
propagation of a narrative of school failure and a set of reform mandates that he saw as invalid 
and intentionally damaging to the essential project of public education. His individual and 
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collective research informed his protest and was a key component of, rather than an aside to, his 
policy response. It was meant to investigate, and in the end challenged, reformers claims. What 
matters here is less whether Kevin was correct in his initial suspicions that they inspired agentic 
activity that in this case was both empowering and productive; although, it might not have 
initially seemed so from the snarky responses on those forms. In place of doing what the State 
asked, Kevin had read its supporting research and then used it to justify ignoring it, at least in 
how he prioritized improvement within his own school. He had even found a way to use some of 
the funding from RttT to support a different initiative. Restorative justice was a long way from 
high-stakes teacher evaluation policies, but it was what he believed was the most needed reform 
within the context of Lamar Middle School. 
Fittingly, this aside—about researching the State’s research, calling the University, the 
politics of education reform that surrounded Illinois, and restorative justice—was the last that 
Kevin shared with me. These were his final thoughts in our final conversation. What they helped 
me realize was that in my desire to understand whether teacher evaluation reform had “worked” 
insofar as it had had its intended impact, I had missed something important. The stories that 
Kevin told me in response to my questions about evaluation reform’s impact were not really 
about how he and his teachers had “implemented” these policies in any straightforward way but 
about the “shifts, alterations, and ruptures” that had occurred as they had attempted to make 
sense of and carry them out within both their individual and collective contexts (Leander & 
Osborne, 2008, p. 44). They were about resistance, but this resistance was rarely simple. It was 
personal and often political, and it was part of a power struggle that Kevin undertook as he 
engaged with these reforms in an effort to maintain control over himself, his school, and the 
direction of his work.  
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As I looked back through my data after this interview, I began to notice it contained 
evidence of many such struggles. In my effort to draw out the similarities across my participants, 
I had glossed over some of this richness that their individual conversations contained. In reading 
these again, I came to understand some of their resistance activity quite differently. Although it 
could still be problematic, in other instances this more typical conceptualization of resistance did 
not seem to fit. What these educators were doing was sometimes more accurately described in 
more positive ways. In these cases, the data I shared in Chapter Six did not always accurately 
capture what had happened in my two case schools. What appeared to be policy failures through 
this more simplified view may have actually been successes and vice versa. Though it will make 
it more difficult to make a singular summative assessment of the impact of these reforms, what I 
want to do in the rest of this chapter, is explore some of these instances. 
Before I can get into this, however, I need to introduce some concepts to help frame it. 
Some of these come from other scholars and some reflect my own thinking. In the next section, I 
define and describe these either as I have come to understand them though my reading or as I 
have begun to conceptualize them myself. I then link them to select examples from my data. My 
goal here is not to address every instance in which they occurred but rather to give clear 
examples that will be useful to build upon later. 
Complicating Resistance 
The existing concepts I draw on come largely from Ball, Maguire and Braun’s (2012) 
text How Schools Do Policy. In it they propose that the policy process is best understood as one 
of enactment.  
Enactment, they argue, differs from thinking about policy as a process of implementation 
in that it attends to the contextual, interpretive, and discursive elements of reform. It has the 
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following premises: first, reform never occurs in isolation but is always undertaken in relation to 
resources, context, and history; second, policy realizations are hardly ever straightforward and 
their outcomes are often difficult to surmise; third, policy-making is something that is done both 
by and to school actors (Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012). Taken together, what these elements 
create is a conceptualization of policy work as something that often involves struggle and is 
meant to produce and preserve particular power relations. This gets a bit complicated, but in 
essence the idea here is that reform is an active process that does not produce neat and objective 
practices but rather messy ones that are laden with meaning. To assist in explaining the actual 
engagement of teachers with policies, these authors go one step further, breaking down the 
interpretive element into two concepts: interpretation and translation.  
What I add to these are the ideas of principled and productive resistance. These additions 
are appropriate here not only because in their text these authors acknowledge that in describing 
the interpretive element they have only outlined its broadest features, leaving much more work to 
be done, but also because  resistance clearly connects to the idea of policy work as struggle. It 
fits nicely with enactment and within its interpretive element. It is also a term for which 
academic thinking (theorizing) seems inadequate.  
Over the next several pages I lay out these concepts. I begin by briefly explaining 
enactment. Then I focus in on its interpretive aspects where the interpretation and translation of 
policies into sets of enacted practices occurs. From here I move on to the idea of policy 
resistance in order to differentiate between how it is most often characterized in the academic 
literature and how I found it useful to think about in relation to my data. Finally, I link these 
ideas to what Ball et al. (2012) describe as policy’s discursive element, which attends to the 
meanings that policies take on through all this policy work.  
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The enactment framework. As a framework for analysis, enactment seeks to capture the 
lived experiences of reform. In contrast to more traditional ways of thinking about the impact that 
policies have on schools, it is not about the results that policy initiatives produce, per say, but 
about what happens as policies move through schools, or how policy into practice gets done 
(Ball et al., 2012).  
Centered on the premises laid out above, enactment supports an understanding of 
policymaking as something that is rarely simple or straightforward and whose outcomes may be 
difficult to surmise. It holds that reform initiatives are encoded into policy texts that must be 
decoded and recoded before they can become practice (Ball et al., 2012). This must happen not 
only because educators have to find ways to carry out mandates within their specific constraints 
but also because, for any number of reasons, policies frequently do not enter into schools fully 
formed  (Ball et al., 2012). The gaps contained within them can enable opportunities for agentic 
activity, as they mean that educators must engage with policies, struggle with them, and bring 
their creativity to bear on their enactment (Beckert, 1999; March, 1978; Priestley et al., 2012; 
Robinson, 2012). The result of this, these authors say, is that even the most well designed 
policies will likely become open to erosion and undercutting. In other words, the practices that 
emerge from them are often hybrids (Ball, 2012; Robinson, 2012).  
Importantly, while a different policy analysis, especially one that is interested only in 
whether a reform has achieved its intended outcomes, might consider such hybridities to be 
failures, enactment urges us to think about how the agentic work that teachers undertake with 
respect to policies might produce unexpected outcomes with their own drawbacks and/or 
benefits. It raises the question of why certain practices are selected while others are discarded 
along the way. In a related vein, it pushes us to consider how educators’ policy work can reshape 
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the meanings of reforms and how, over time, policies can normalize or disrupt particular school 
activities and ways of being.  
In short, enactment aims to bring all of these complexities into view through its focus on 
the jumbled, messy, contested, creative, and [even] mundane interactions” that link policy to 
practice  (Ball et al., 2012, p. 2). As a final note, although I develop its concepts separately here 
for the purpose of clarity, I do not mean to imply that enactment sees policy work as linear. 
Rather, it recognizes that it transpires in a complex web of ongoing, intertwined, and constitutive 
interactions with policy texts. These are always deeply interconnected.  
Context. The contextual element of enactment highlights the external, situated, material, 
and professional contexts that influence school actors. Although policymakers do not normally 
take these into account and instead tend to assume the best possible environments for 
implementation, schools must enact reform within specific circumstances, making context an 
active force, not just a backdrop to policymaking (Ball et al., 2012; Marsh, 1978; Priestley et al., 
2012). As policies travel through schools, they are situated within different political and 
ideological climates and brought into practice in relation to unique combinations of material and 
professional resources. Moreover, they carry with them discursive formations, but they also 
“literally move through different spaces,” which have their own discursive archives- histories of 
other policies, languages, practices, and subjectivities (Ball et al., 2012, p. 41). In other words, 
context has both tangible and intangible elements. These initiate policy processes and activate 
schemas that then guide school actors’ policy work. 
At its broadest level, this contextual element consists of the external milieu from which 
policies are drawn. This involves both the regulatory apparatuses that impose, enforce, and 
support policy as well as the narratives of reform to which schools must respond. According to 
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Ball et al., this makes a great deal of the policy work in schools reactive. Policy enactment is 
often initiated by top-down external pressures, which have the ability to shape organizational 
responses through restricting the latitude of policy interpretation available to schools. Policies 
are also, however, embedded with the beliefs and values that exist within the context that gave 
rise to them. School actors will inevitably have political and emotional responses to these. Thus, 
the external context can create tensions that impact the way teachers read and respond to policies 
and may provide a direct explanation for why schools and individuals adopt or resist certain 
practices. Just as importantly, it may also reveal something of the ideological assumptions that 
underlie a reform. 
As policies move from the external environment into schools, they also come into contact 
with situated contexts that influence policy work. When school actors interpret and translate 
policies, they often do so in relation to unique institutional histories and schools’ relationships 
with local communities (Ball et al., 2012; Sannino, 2010). Schools must also address distinctive 
demographic characteristics and combinations of potentially competing organizational demands. 
These influences become folded into school-level narratives that affect the reading of top-down 
policies (Ball et al., 2012). Such narratives mediate policy’s translation into practice and affect to 
what and to whom school actors attend (Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012; Townley, 1997). The 
choices schools and school actors make during the policy process may also, in part, reflect 
continual efforts to rework these situated narratives. These may be communal or they may put 
classroom teachers at odds with one another and/or administration as they struggle to reconcile 
them with a policy’s demands. 
Finally, the contextual element of enactment holds that policies are also influenced by the 
material and professional environments they encounter. This material context includes the 
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financial and human resources that can be leveraged towards policy realization as well as the 
built environments that literally provide structure for the policy process (Ball et al., 2012). It is 
more than just tangible capital; however, it is also certain patterns of emphasis and de-emphasis 
that are reflected in the allocation of funds, which signal and shape institutional priorities. It is 
important to keep in mind with this that areas of a school are often attended to and resourced 
differently. Such differences, in turn, may impact how policies come into practice, meaning it is 
may be misguided to assume consistency throughout a school or across schools.  
The professional environment, on the other hand, consists of intangible aspects like 
teachers’ in-school beliefs, values, experiences, commitments, and philosophies. It is an element 
of context that is nurtured through various professional linkages e.g., in-school relationships and 
participation in professional organizations (Ball et al., 2012; Bridwell-Mitchell, 2013). These 
may influence policy enactment by shaping the issues that educators deem important, which, in 
turn, may shape how they interpret policies’ (Bridwell-Mitchell, 2013; Priestley et al., 2012). 
Likewise, teachers may have unique collegial networks and shared experiences that extend 
beyond or exist within a school’s walls. These may also play a role in shaping teachers’ 
individual policy responses.  
In summary, the sheer number and combinations of contextual influences described 
above may make any effort to analyze the course of policy seem daunting. But, they should not 
be taken to suggest that it is impossible to begin to unravel their impact. Instead, context 
represents a starting point for an approach to policy analysis that recognizes reform’s 
complexity. Enactment situates context not as something that can be worked around or set aside; 
rather, it is a central factor in the progression of policy processes. Though context is certainly not 
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the only factor that shapes policy realization, attention to it is meant to illuminate some of the 
most salient drivers of schools’ and school actors’ policy work. 
“We call it the Lamar Way” (Lisa). It is difficult to pick just one contextual factor to 
consider here as an example because in reality these cannot be isolated or unraveled from one 
another. But, of all the things that influenced the implementation of teacher evaluation policy, 
one that was particularly notable at Lamar Middle School was something that my participants 
called the “Lamar Way.” I would be doing a disservice to the complexity of this idea if I tried to 
classify it into just one of the aforementioned areas.  More accurately, it was an amalgam for a 
number of overlapping contextual influences that shaped how Lamar educators believed they 
should approach the enactment of top-down mandates for school improvement. It was a 
reference to a very particular culture that the school district had tried to cultivate when it came to 
reform.  
The Lamar Way was also a phrase that was clearly a longstanding part of the district’s 
language. It came up in multiple interviews at the school. When Lisa mentioned it, in response to 
the very first question I asked her at our initial meeting, she told me Lamar “has a history of 
doing everything our way.  We call it the Lamar way. So we prefer to design everything to work 
around us instead of taking something that somebody else already created.” This idea—that 
reform should be made to fit the school rather than the opposite—was also something I heard at 
Roosevelt but in a more general way. For Lamar, however, it had an intentional place in the 
district’s culture and had led to a very deliberate approach to rolling out new policies. Lisa told 
me that the Lamar joint committee “probably spent a half a year just deciding what the law 
meant. Then we all said ‘this is what we think the law wants us to do.  How can we kind of 
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ignore the bad in the law and take what’s good in the law and make it fit with us?’” In response 
to this, I asked her why she thought the district had adopted this approach. She explained: 
We always think we know better than whatever the state wants to tell us, or the feds. We 
feel like the people at the ground level know a lot more about policy and what actually 
works than the people making the laws that have never really been in a classroom. 
 
She added, “We always try to interpret the law so that we are covering our legal responsibilities 
but it’s gonna be best for our kids and our teachers.” This often meant that Lamar did things 
throughout this process to diminish the authority that a policy could have.  
 I was also told the Lamar Way meant that any time a new and potentially consequential 
policy came down from outside of the district, there were other key things that would occur. For 
one, the district made an intentional effort to bring numerous and diverse staff into the 
implementation process. For another, the district typically tried to set a policy implementation 
timeline that would allow it to collected feedback and data before a mandate became en force. In 
addition, care was given to ensure that big policy changes were supported by consistent 
messaging. Taken together, all of this was meant to foster a sense of in-it-togetherness that 
would leave teachers feeling that the administration was “with them” when it came to adopting 
state or federally mandated policies.  
Of course, it would be presumptuous to assume that the “Lamar Way” always described 
the climate of policy change in Lamar Middle School. Indeed, as I was collecting my data, the 
building was also implementing a change in grading policy that I heard a lot about, not because it 
was relevant to evaluation, but because it was creating tension and some animosity. That said, 
this was rarely the way these same individuals talked about the district’s new evaluation policies, 
which, it seemed, went a long ways towards reducing any stress they may have felt about these 
reforms. As one of its newer sixth grade teachers said: 
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I am nervous, but I don’t feel like if I don’t [meet my student growth goal] my career is 
over. I know how flexible my district is. I know how willing our central office is to work 
with us. I know that’s not the case everywhere. I’m not super scared about it. 
 
 In essence, what the Lamar Way reflects is a context for reform within the district that 
brought administrators and classroom staff together in a meaningful way to engage in policy-
making at the local level. It fostered a climate of collaboration and trust that, at least for the 
teachers I interviewed, made them feel listened to, supported, and safe speaking up about 
disagreements. It was also key to fostering agency. This was true for its classroom teachers, like 
Stephanie as well as for its building level administrators, like Kevin whose policy “defiance” 
opened this chapter. As Kevin put it, “That stuff really . . . I think I’m in a district where my 
superintendent allows me to be the principal.”  
 The Interpretive Element. Without implying linearity, the second aspect of policy 
enactment that Ball et al. discuss, and that is useful for more fully considering the impact of 
effectiveness reform on the schools and educators in this study, is it interpretive element. These 
authors frame this part of the policy process as having two main components—interpretation and 
translation, which they describe as the making sense of a policy and the creation of practices to 
meet its requirements, respectively. 
For Ball et al., interpretation is an integral stage of implementing policies. This is, in part, 
because, as I stated earlier, policies typically do not enter into school fully formed. Instead, as 
they correctly claim, reform tends to draw attention to a “problem” and/or delineate the range of 
options available to address it. A mandate may outline a framework to be applied or a goal to be 
achieved; however, it does not normally tell schools all that they must do in order to be 
compliant. As a result there are often significant gaps between policy provisions and policy 
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actions within which educators must decide what they should do (Ball et al., 2012; Beckert, 
1999; Sannino, 2009).  
Of course what happens in these spaces is influenced by context, but within them policy 
texts must be decoded and then recoded. This work is what the interpretive concepts seek to 
capture. The first, interpretation, signifies this decoding of a policy’s meanings and requirements 
while the second, translation, represents the recoding of policy into tangible and intangible 
activities. Both denote key moments in the policy process where initiatives move through school 
actors to become sets of embodied practices. Along the way, they may become infused with 
unique meanings.  
 Interpretation. Interpretation, as described by Ball et al., is the initial reading of a 
policy’s texts.  It involves the building up of narratives around a policy as well as elucidation of 
its requirements. These narratives are derived in part from the established discourses and power 
structures of a reform.  They are also, however, mediated by the previously discussed 
“institutional constraints, knowledge/power processes, and material affordances” within a school 
that shape possibilities for policy engaging with policy (Long, 2008, p. 71).  Consequently, 
interpretation involves more than just identification of a policy’s mandates; it represents 
engagement with policy languages as they exist in communication with the other discourses that 
influence school actors. Through interpretation such actors must struggle not only with a policy’s 
potentially competing material demands but also with how to reconcile any tensions that may 
become apparent between their understandings of their work and its subjectivities (Ball et al, 
2012; Leander & Osborne, 2008; Priestley et al, 2012).  As such interpretation is likely deeply 
connected to how policies acquire enacted meanings.  
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Interpretation is also, however, what Ball et al. describe as an authoritative institutional 
political process. In other words, it is an activity that is formally undertaken by administrative 
actors who, perhaps regardless of their own understandings, employ a strategy of selling policy 
to school staff. This often occurs by constructing it to be embedded within existing 
organizational narratives. Such formal interpretations of policy may seek coherence where little 
exists or gloss over contradictions between policy and existing school practices. Moreover, these 
official interpretations may serve to affect the perceived legitimacy of a reform (Ball et al., 2012; 
Townley, 1997).  Often, such stories are presented in a manner that engages staff in discussions 
around how policy should be made into practice in order to create the perception of, or 
encourage ownership over, policy ideas (Ball et al., 2012). To what extent these formal 
interpretations actually shape teachers’ own perceptions, which as stated previously also filter 
through their unique logics and experiences, is may be less certain.  
Translation. Regardless, interpretation sets the stage for policy translation or the turning 
of ideas into practical actions. Though the two may be better related as a back-and-forth since 
they continue alongside each other. Translation, however, is the more literal element of enacting 
a policy. As Ball et al. describe it, it is a “sort of the third space between policy and practice” 
where policy texts are “recoded” into concepts, orientations, materials, and actions (p. 45).  
During this re-coding, contextual influences and formal interpretations may bear heavily 
on school actors, directing their responses. However individuals are also able to draw on other 
influences during their translation work. Thus, translation is an inventive element of enactment 
that may simultaneously involve both compliance and creativity. As a result, what emerges from 
it may be as reformers intended or it may resemble impure forms and messy hybridities (Ball, 
2012; Robinson, 2012). Some policies will be extraordinarily successful in producing their 
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desired effects, and some will be more efficacious than others in inscribing policy actions with a 
particular set of meanings. Others may be undercut or appreciably changed through school-level 
policy work. In other words, the policy productions that take place during translation have the 
potential to both re-present and reshape policies’ initial principles. From the point of view of 
enacted practices, then, it may be problematic to conceive of reform in action as reflective of a 
single set of outcomes.   
“Who’s the expert? . . . I don't know; someone else” (Courtney). Given that 
interpretation and translation happen repeatedly and in both independent and overlapping ways 
as policies move through schools, if anything it is even more difficult to choose a representative 
example here. Although my participants’ policy responses often looked alike on the surface, 
when the sense-making that had gone into them was considered they routinely came to seem 
quite different. This what much like what happened when I listened to Kevin explain his “not a 
priority statement.” At Roosevelt, Courtney was another equally notable example of this. 
In many ways Courtney was one of my most intriguing participants. She taught English 
and had been employed by Roosevelt previously but had left to go back to school. Five years 
later, she returned. While away, she taught classes at the collegiate level, and she described this 
as having colored her perception of what high school students should be expected to do. What 
this meant was that Courtney had exceptionally high expectations for her students, especially 
when it came to work ethic and responsibility. At times, this had put her at odds with her 
administrative team. Her students often described her as “hard” and someone who “assigned a lot 
of writing.” 
The year I collected data for this project was a difficult for Courtney. As she told me, her 
senior seminar, which she loved, was offset by a particularly challenging group of freshmen. She 
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believed these freshmen had tons of potential but was struggling with classroom management, 
and while this was frustrating to her by itself, she also felt as though she had been desperately 
looking for some kind of “critical feedback” that could help her but had so far come up empty 
handed. As she put it: 
I’m not getting feedback from anybody because this year my students as customers are 
not interested in being in that store, and the parents are either non-communicative or not 
supportive overall, and then my administrators are not very knowledgeable in my subject 
area or interested in what I’m doing day to day.   
 
Moreover, her memories of her earlier time at Roosevelt told her that this was not the way things 
used to be. She was not too interested in the whys of this. She just told me, “There’s no money 
for staff.  There’s no willingness to think creatively.” 
I mention all this not because it pertained to evaluation specifically but because it is an 
important part of how Courtney interpreted the material and professional world she worked in. 
She saw this context differently than some of her Roosevelt peers did. Her prior experience there 
as well as her time away from the school had shaped what she was experiencing now that she 
was back. Later in our interview these interpretations became enmeshed with how she interpreted 
evaluation reform at Roosevelt. She commented: 
I don’t know if this is in every district, but I feel like we don’t have a mission.  I know 
that we must have a mission statement, but I don’t think anyone knows what it is, and I 
certainly don’t think everyone buys into it. Without that anchor, it’s just on to the [next] 
thing.   
 
Then added: 
So it’s [evaluation reform] not coming from a place of what we believe it; this is what we 
do here. It’s coming from a place of tell me what to do.  Who’s going to tell me what to 
do? Who’s the expert? . . . I don't know; someone else; someone who goes around and 
does professional development meetings. 
 
For Courtney this was problematic. It was difficult for her to buy into a policy change that no 
one could seem to convince her was a match for the school. With no sense of a formal narrative 
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from the District and what she expressed to me as no interest in the national one, Courtney 
developed her own interpretation of the reasons for the particular evaluation procedures her 
district had adopted, drawing on her personal contexts. This narrative was one of a building 
where state mandated reform was adopted without much forethought and simply because 
someone said so. 
In contrast to this, Courtney had a very different interpretation of the Danielson Model, 
which, again, was the well-known framework on which her school’s professional practice piece 
was based. What she had to say about this was that she was “excited” because for her it signified 
good practice. She described it as “less of a performance” and explained that she believed “It 
was a more thorough examination” of what she was doing in the classroom. To her, it just 
seemed like it “was looking at the bigger picture.” At one point, she said, “I think it’s more 
authentic.”  
For Courtney, then, there were at least two significant interpretations she had come to on 
her own that influenced how she brought these evaluation policies into practice. At one level, she 
totally believed in the Danielson Framework. At another, she had some doubt about the 
aspirations and capabilities of her evaluator when it came to implementing these reforms. As she 
understood it, Roosevelt lacked the capacity, and more importantly the willingness, to allocate 
the resources necessary to do evaluation right. This was captured well in the following statement: 
I mean to go back to Danielson, yeah piss some people off. Tell them, “you know what, 
when we look at you in these areas, this is not good. This is not what we’re looking for; 
this is not what we want; I can help you”. . . But, I don’t know if they could say that last 
step. I don't know if our administrators could say “I can help you,” and so then they don’t 




This interpretation created a tension between what Courtney thought the evaluation policy 
changes had the potential to do and what she believed they would do in her school. She 
continued: 
Because then the person [teacher] might say, “Well then what should I be doing?” I 
mean, yes, if you hover over the rating [on the digital rubric], it will give you some ideas. 
I can hover over [the excellent rating] and see “oh that’s what four looks like. They 
should have been making their own rubric or I shouldn’t be talking at all because they 
should be self regulating.” But, then that begs the question: how do I get them to a place 
self-regulate?  But there isn’t anyone to answer, comfortably at least. It’s new to them 
too, and that’s why I can be forgiving. But, I can also say “this awesome model; this is 
not what it is supposed to look like.” 
 
These interpretations, in turn, led to policy translations, or responses to reform, that easily 
appeared resistant. I shared some of these in Chapter Six, e.g., her refusal to implement her 
evaluator’s suggestions, especially regarding data collection, but with enactment in mind, it is 
clear that there was much more to them. Believing her evaluators did not have the ability to 
provide her with the feedback she desired, Courtney came to see the formal evaluation process as 
something performative. When it came to the process, she documented more not because she saw 
a use for it but because that was what she thought she needed to do to appease her evaluator. 
Thus, this documentation had no discernable impact on her practice. Likewise, because she took 
the process seriously, she had asked her evaluator to give her suggestions on engagement, but 
then because she did not consider him to be qualified to give her subject area advice, she resisted 
his recommendations. As she put it, “Since then I know some things that I could do differently, 
but I wouldn’t have done them differently even if I knew those before[hand].”  
Courtney’s translation of these policies, then, was complex. Because she considered the 
professional practice piece to be aligned with good teaching, she took its evaluation tool 
seriously. According to her, she spent a good deal of time trying to decipher the Danielson 
Framework and figure out how to make it useful to her teaching. That said, because of how she 
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interpreted her relationship with her administrators, she was adverse to the things they wanted 
her to do. Because of this, her responses to these reforms often came off as resistant.  
The Discursive Element. Finally, Ball et al. argue that as a consequence of educators’ 
interpretive work, policies have the potential to produce something much more complex than just 
a set of projected effects. Embedded in their planned outcomes are assumptions, not just about 
what make up schools’ most appropriate practices but also about the principles they should 
uphold and the functions they should serve. Reform, therefore, intends not just that school actors 
adopt a set of actions but also certain beliefs and values. By working at the level of the 
individual, policies can direct educators’ attention towards certain tasks and/or orient them 
towards certain kinds of professional identities. In doing so, they foreground these 
aforementioned things and, insofar as reforms are adopted in their intended ways, work to 
inscribe them into the very fabric of schools.  
Ball et al. term this aspect of policy making its discursive element. Specifically, their use 
of this term is informed by Foucault. In this case, the idea is not simply a reference to formal 
communication, but to something more like an episteme. For Foucault, discourses mark systems 
of understandings and construct truths about the world (Foucault, 1972). They are, in part, made 
up of language but extended beyond this to include things like practices, beliefs, and values. 
Together, these come to represent a “domain of subconscious knowledge” (Ball, 2013, p. 19; 
Foucault, 1974). They signify a reality and constitute what was meant to be considered the most 
significant or essential objects, persons, and events of a given world (Long, 2008). In other 
words, discourses create the objects of their concern and established conditions of truth with 
regards to these (Ball, 2013). In turn, they produce or preserve particular power relations.  
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Another way to think about this is to say that discourses can serve to constrain or enable 
particular courses of action (Ball, 2013). Though they may do this explicitly, for Foucault and 
these authors, their greater power lies in how, through exclusion, they can define a realm of 
possibilities. They set standards against which their objects can be measured, and also reinforce 
certain knowledges, norms, and subjectivities (Ball, 2013). Discourses say something about 
which groups have the ability to speak knowledgeably about others and which are concomitantly 
rendered silent (Ball, 2013, p. 15). When they have significant authority, they may also set up 
situations in which it is difficult to think outside them. That said, their effects will not always be 
totalizing, and even when it may be difficult to imagine, individuals will likely retain some 
possibility for agentic action. 
Applied to educational policymaking, these ideas draw attention to several important but 
often sidelined things. First, by acknowledging that policies have a discursive element, they 
make it problematic to assume reform is ever neutral. This matters because recognition of this 
reality is prerequisite both to seeing the assumptions embedded in it and to thinking about how it 
might be done differently. Second, by opening up the possibility that educators retain the ability 
to reshape the meanings of reform through their policy work, they affirm that policy processes 
are inherently complex and that although policy activities may support the existing meanings of 
reforms, they may also contribute to enacted practices that suggest much blurrier understandings 
(Long, 2008). This also builds support for those who have rightly argued that, at the level of in-
school policy, more traditional outcomes-based analyses may generate overly cohesive and 
simplified findings.  
Finally, according to Ball et al., this discursive element of reform is reflected most 
obviously in policy narratives and texts, but it cannot be reduced to this. Educators also 
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contribute to it through their interpretation and translation work; therefore, their perceptions and 
the artifacts they produce along the way are important to our understandings of it. In fact, we 
may be able to trace something of its effectiveness through these artifacts. These can give a sense 
of how policies “shape the way individuals construct themselves as subjects” (Ball et al., 2012; 
Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 4; Stickney, 2012). If policies succeed in their discursive aims, data 
from the policy process may make apparent that educators have assimilated to them. These data, 
though, may also reveal where breaks occurred, or where teachers struggled with official policy 
narratives and/or district and building-level interpretations of policy texts and, in the process, 
ascribed to them new meanings based on their understandings. 
“We know you did not try” (Stephanie). To highlight this discursive element, I actually 
want to share two examples, one where a teacher at Lamar Middle School appeared to have 
somewhat unwittingly internalized the authority of these evaluation policies and another where a 
teacher had effectively done just the opposite.  
The first story revolves around Stephanie, one of Lamar’s sixth grade teachers. Stephanie 
was young, energetic, and described herself as “flexible” when it came to implementing top-
down reform. What this meant was that even when she did not totally buy-in to a policy, she was 
willing to implement its requirements because she felt she could do so without compromising the 
core of her teaching and teacher identity. This was essentially how she believed she had dealt 
with RttT’s growth component. As she said, it could get “kind of punitive,” but she did not think 
that it had changed her instruction in any way. She insisted, “I don’t think my students last year 
learned any more because I was doing the student growth objective, [and] . . . I don’t think it’s 
changed me as a teacher.”  
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When we talked about how she had actually completed this part of her evaluation with 
her students, however, Stephanie had some revealing things to say. While one of the assessments 
she used for her SGO was a writing task, the other was a widely popular standardized exam 
called the Discovery Education Assessment (DEA). This was an online test that her students took 
several times a year, and according to Stephanie, it provided her with limited data and was not 
the best measure of her teaching. Despite this, she seemed to have accepted its judgment or at 
least its ability to produced judgment. She recalled that the day of testing was “very, very 
potent.” Stephanie said she was “checking” to see how students were doing and that she had 
done something she never had before, which was pull students aside to talk to them as they 
finished. Specifically, she told me about having a “mini celebration” with one student who did 
better than expected and about reprimanding two who had blown off the test. To the latter she 
said she explained, “We know you did not try. Can you please go back in and put forth a bit of 
effort? You know you are affecting us; you are affecting yourselves. That hurts our evaluation.” 
When one of these students pushed back by saying Stephanie knew she was not dumb, Stephanie 
replied, “I know your not, but that makes you seem not very intelligent, that you showed below 
average growth. That makes it look like you aren’t learning. That makes you look dumb.” 
(Stephanie’s paraphrasing).  
What this story shows is that even though Stephanie did not see herself as someone who 
had fully bought into, especially the student growth part of, these policies, she had been changed 
by them. Her interactions with her students, at least with respect to the DEA, were different. She 
both praised and reprimanded them for their performance on a test that she did not entirely see as 
linked to her teaching. As she did so, she was very open about the fact that this was partially 
motivated by the reality that her evaluation would be affected by their scores. Her mention that 
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the exam felt “very potent” also indicates these changes provoked a physical reaction. As much 
as she said she was not stressed by the evaluation overall, she was stressed on that given day. 
Whether she wanted them to or not, then, these policies had assumed some authority over her.  
The second example revolves around Robert, a 27-year veteran of education and an 
eighth grade teacher at Lamar. Though he clearly loved his students and teaching, Robert often 
spoke with exasperation. As he said, he had been in education a long time and was used to seeing 
“15 new initiatives” pop up each year. For Robert, RttT and teacher evaluation were simply the 
most recent reforms in a never-ending policy churn. He told me he did not want to sound cynical, 
but it was hard not to be when for his “entire career, education had apparently been in a [state of] 
crisis.” First, he said, “It was A Nation at Risk. Then it was No Child Left Behind. Now it’s this 
[RttT].” Robert also said he felt like what when on between teachers and students was “kind of 
lost on the people who were behind these initiatives.” He saw much of this as an attempt to insert 
a “business model” into education and thought this approach was largely inappropriate. In 
addition, he told me more than once that the impact of these policies was generally little more 
than added bureaucracy. All of this made him feel like being an excellent teacher was becoming 
more and more impossible. As he put it, he had “made a deal with the Devil” long ago and 
decided he was going to put his family first, which he said meant that at as teacher he could only 
be “good enough.” 
When it came to evaluation reform, Robert’s responses were informed by this experience. 
After nearly 30 years of teaching, he had developed a firm sense of what he perceived to be an 
intentional effort by reformers to advance a narrative of crisis, which he believed to be mostly 
false. He saw this narrative reflected in Race to the Top, and this made him skeptical of its 
mandated changes to evaluation policy. He had also interpreted it as an effort to deflect attention 
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from broader socio-economic issues. Of course reformers never talked about it in this way, but 
this was already so ingrained in Robert’s own interpretations about these policies that they did 
not seem to have the same kind of discursive effect as they did on Stephanie. This was evident 
through the differences in how he described his experiences with the DEA. 
Unlike Stephanie, Robert hardly seemed to care about the test. He said he used it as part 
of his growth goal because his instructional coach offered to pull the information for him and set 
it up. As he recalled, “She literally gave that to me. And, I think 94% of my kids showed growth, 
so it was great.” I commented that it sounded like his students did pretty well on the exam, and 
he responded, “Well, you know it looks good, but I assess growth in different ways.” I asked 
Robert what he meant, to which he said: 
I look at writing, you know, did their writing getting better after a year. And, the 
conversations that we have. It’s more informal. But I’ve been doing this for 31 years, and 
that’s the way I’m used to doing it. This is more I want to see the numbers, and that’s 
kind of alien to me. 
 
This was also how Robert said he assessed his teaching. He referred to this as “more 
organically.” He added: 
When I look at the DEA . . . on the DEA test itself they get this gigantic chunk of text 
taken out of context. . . . so I don’t know that it’s that accurate. And, I know that I’ve 
seen kids go in there and be done in 5 minutes. It’s like, well wait a minute, why am I 
looking at this? . . . They just kind of quit. I’m not sure what kind of data we’re getting 
out of that other than that we’re testing too much. 
 
His final thought: “Honestly, I don’t know that it’s much more than I do this to fulfill the 
requirements of my evaluation.” 
 Set alongside one another, Robert and Stephanie’s experiences provide a nice contrast. 
They highlight the reality that the same policy can play out differently even within a school. Of 
course, none of this would have been readily apparent looking on the surface. Both Robert and 
Stephanie complied with these policies insofar as their responses were visible. But, beneath this 
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(or behind closed classroom doors), and at the level of the discursive, they were affected quite 
differently by these reforms.  
Framing Resistance Differently 
 Keeping these concepts in mind, there is one more thing I would like to suggest here. 
This is that if the enactment framework demonstrates that the policy process is, in fact, much 
more complex than implementation studies often make it seem, and I believe that it does, then 
we would benefit from continuing to develop it. Specifically, as Ball et al. call for in their text, it 
would be useful to mete out interpretation and translation a bit more. Towards this end, I want to 
conclude this chapter by proposing some different ways to think about the concept of resistance. 
As one possible and clearly common outcome of reform, resistance is what often emerges from 
interpretive processes. Indeed, as Chapter Six showed, it was a frequent response amongst my 
participants. But, as I discussed earlier, it is not typically presented as having much complexity.  
The data from this study, though, suggest that resistance is complex and that it occurs 
both as school actors interpret and translate policies. In fact, throughout this chapter, I have 
already presented evidence of it transpiring in both these ways. Robert, for example, whose 
experience I just discussed, resisted the narrative of school failure and the “wisdom” of corporate 
reformers during his interpretive work, as he tried to figure out how to best navigate these 
policies. With Kevin, this resistance first presented itself as skepticism during his initial 
interpretive work, but it also became part of what he was doing both when he gathered with his 
colleagues to read the research that the State was using to support its mandates and when he 
made calls to the university. Finally, with Courtney resistance was visible not so much in her 
interpretations of these policies themselves, about which she felt fairly supportive. Rather it 
manifest in her translations as a result of tensions she feels with her administrative team. 
125 
 
Thus, with plenty of examples of resistance already laid out throughout this text, what I 
want to focus on over these next several pages is not so much these different interpretive and 
translative instances of resistance but some ways to think about resistance, itself, more deeply. 
Although there were times in my data where resistance appeared without much explanation and 
was just as problematic as the literature often suggests, there were many more where there was 
much more to the story. More precisely, there were multiple examples of resistance in my data 
that stemmed not from a teacher simply not wanting to do something but from his or her deeply 
held beliefs. There were also instances where it did not produce its generally expected negative 
and/or subversive effects but instead led to something useful and, in a few cases, made these 
teachers’ work-lives even harder. I call these kinds of resistance principled and productive. 
Sometimes they occurred separately; sometimes they were intertwined. To be sure, as I explain 
and provide data to support them, I do not intend to imply that all resistance can be categorized 
this way nor that this is an exhaustive typology. Instead, I lay them out both as a beginning 
response to Ball et al.’s call to continue their work on enactment and a way to add one more 
layer of complexity to my analysis of the teacher evaluation policies at the center of this study.   
 “Charlotte never designed this to be an evaluation model” (Lisa). The first more 
specific coding of resistance I would like to suggest is what I will term principled. I see this kind 
of resistance as one that can be both interpretive and/or translative and as one that may often be 
linked with productive outcomes. Principled resistance does not occur because a school actor 
simply does not want to or does not feel like implementing a policy but because of some sort of 
deep-seated belief or value that is connected to their identity. It may be the result of moral, 
ethical, or ideological objections and is part of educators’ individual and/or collective efforts to 
retain control over themselves and their teaching in the face of mandated policy. It may, indeed, 
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have the effect of undermining reform, but it is less obstinate than a product of an inability to 
reconcile policy narratives with personal ones. In this sense, although resistance fits into the 
interpretive element of policy, it should also be thought of as connected to the discursive 
struggle.  
Without a doubt, every educator who participated in this project provided me with some 
instance of principled resistance to these policies. For some, this was quite personal. As I 
explained earlier in this chapter, for example, Robert expressed resistance to what he felt like 
was an unrealistic and reformer-imposed definition of an excellent teacher that he saw as 
incompatible with his other, more family-oriented identities. Rachelle, one of Roosevelt’s 
English teachers, articulated something similar. In both cases, these individuals foregrounded the 
non-teaching relationships in their lives, which led them to try to minimize the impact these 
policies could have. They did not disregard them entirely, but instead resisted them to the extent 
that they limited their ability to cross work-home boundaries. For others, like Nick, resistance 
was grounded in a firm belief about what signified a well-managed classroom and appropriate 
pedagogy. Though the resistance he demonstrates through “blitzkrieging” his evaluator, as I 
shared in Chapter Six, was strategic (by inundating his evaluator with so much evidence of his 
teaching he was able to make himself less visible and, as a result, less susceptible to being told to 
change), it was no less rooted in principled understandings.  
The most notable and intriguing instance of principled resistance, though, was one that 
appeared separately but in nearly every interview I conducted. It was both interpretive and 
translative, and it signified firm resistance to the discursive effects of these policies. Without any 
prompting from me, almost every teacher and administrator that participated in this project 
reminded me at least once in their own words that ‘Charlotte did not intend for the Danielson 
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Framework to be an evaluation tool.’ Robert added that by doing so RttT had “probably 
bastardized it to some extent.” Lisa had a similar perspective, telling me “It was [for] teacher 
growth.  So, we bastardized something that was created for good.” Kevin said he thought 
“Charlotte” would be surprised at how poorly the State had done with implementing it and 
“would probably say get this student growth crap out of here.” Nick spun it as an “effort to make 
a better evaluation tool...to lead [teachers] in the right direction” that had been co-opted by 
“corporate influences.” This notion that “Charlotte” would have had a very different vision for 
these reforms even came up in the Lamar union meeting I attended and the training sessions 
Rachelle led.  
At first, I did not think much of this, but as I read through my data time and again, I 
became struck by how pervasive this understanding was. Somehow these teachers 
understandings of teacher evaluation reform, and, when they were aware of it, RttT and the 
broader education reform climate were all tied to this one generalization that the Danielson 
Framework was not meant to be an evaluation tool. It was never perfectly clear where this came 
from. At Lamar it might have filtered down through the district and building level policy 
narratives Kevin promoted. It was also being passed through the State teachers’ unions. And, it 
was certainly the emphasis of the PowerPoint presentation Rachelle had used. In any event, these 
educators had latched onto it, they believed it to be factual, and they kept it ready-at-hand to use 
in defense of their feelings about and responses to these reforms. 
 It also seemed like a strange quirk at first that many of these educators spoke of 
“Charlotte” as if she was a close acquaintance. As far as I could tell, none of them had ever met 
her, but they were on a first name basis nonetheless. I later came to believe that this, too, was 
significant and a sign of principled resistance. While these teachers typically referred to those 
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behind these policy changes using broad generalizations e.g. as “politicians,” “state officials,” or 
‘corporate reformers,” their reference to Charlotte was almost always personal. In fact, I only 
came across one time when one of my participants spoke negatively about her, which was when 
Kevin said she had probably embraced these reforms to some extent because they were probably 
making her a lot of money. Outside of this, it was almost as if referring to her on a first name 
basis was a way of positioning her as with them, as opposed to one of these other outsiders. They 
liked her framework and agreed that teachers could use it to improve but resisted how it had 
become a tool of reformers with had little experience in education. This resistance translated into 
how they talked about these reforms; it was quite literally embedded in their vocabulary; and it 
also marked a sign of their discursive struggle. 
“When I go home, I’m not coming back for a game” (Courtney). The second kind of 
resistance I want to name is productive. I see this as something that may frequently appear 
alongside or as part of the principled resistance I just described, but also contend that it should be 
thought of as something different. Its marker is that it produces a benefit despite the fact that it 
reflects interpretive activity that goes against official reform narratives and/or the kinds of 
changes that policymakers are trying to bring about in schools.  
It seems logical to suppose that productive resistance may occur less frequently that other 
types. After all, it is undoubtedly the case that not all principled resistance will be productive, 
and the reverse is also true. But, it also seems likely that it occurs more regularly than more 
traditional policy analyses have recognized.  In fact, just within this comparative case study there 
were multiple examples of it. Here, though, I share just one poignant one from each school. 
The first comes from Courtney and relates back to her resistance to her administrator’s 
suggestions. As I explained earlier, this stemmed, in large part, from deep-seated and quite 
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personal perceptions she had about her district’s leadership. Though there was still an element of 
principle to most of the policy responses she described, this particular one seemed somewhat 
motivated by personal acrimonies. 
In short, after deciding both that the Danielson model could improve her teaching and 
also that her evaluator could not, Courtney made up her mind to get creative. Although she had a 
list of some district-suggested activities that would have made her “excellent,” she did not want 
to do a number of these because she considered them superficial. Her solution was to challenge 
herself to come up things that her evaluator would have to give her excellent for but that had 
nothing to do with his suggestions. 
The most productive example of this came through domain four of the Danielson 
framework, which had to do with professional responsibilities. As part of this domain, teachers 
were supposed to provide evidence that they were demonstrating professionalism, growing and 
developing professionally, and participating in a professional community. To meet these targets, 
the district had suggested that teachers provide evidence they attended sporting events, school 
plays, or other extracurriculars to show they supported students. But, for Courtney such gestures 
could easily be meaningless, and she said at her summer training she had walked away with the 
message that she had to “Know what she wanted to put the time into working on.” Based on this 
she had decided, “You know what, when I go home, I’m not coming back for a game.  I’m not 
coming back for a play.” Instead, Courtney decided to fulfill this domain by starting up a staff 
book study. She purposely chose a book about classroom management, which was where she had 
found her administrator’s advice so lacking. She then invited the principal and any other teacher 
in the building who wanted to participate to join her in weekly discussion sessions. Both he and a 
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number of other staff members took her up on this, and in this way Courtney’s resistance added 
productively to the school community.  
The second example I want to share was also productive at the school-level. However, 
while Courtney’s productive resistance grew from the bottom up, this one began as a collective 
effort that, by playing out how Lamar officials had hoped, became productive at the level of the 
individual. It revolves around the work that Lamar’s joint committee did to undermine the 
potential consequences of the student growth goal, which I explained in Chapter Six. For the 
sake of expanding on it here, however, I will briefly summarize again what the committee did. 
Essentially, the joint committee decided that they did not want the new growth component of 
teachers’ evaluations to be complicated, time-consuming or stress provoking, so it messed with 
the formulas it set up to minimize the impact that this component of the evaluation could have. 
The committee also set loose guidelines for the kind of assessments teachers could use and the 
goals they had to set. All of this diminished the ability of Lamar’s administrative staff to make 
any comparisons across teachers. The group also made sure teachers knew, not so much that the 
formula had been manipulated, but that they did not need to be worried about ramifications from 
these policies. During the rollout this was emphasized. Likewise, from what the Lamar Middle 
School teachers told me, Kevin was consistently reiterating this with his staff. From the 
conversations I had with them, it seemed they had heard him loud and clear.  
Of course, none of the framework manipulation just described was productive on its own. 
Indeed, at first it appeared to be just the opposite. But, what Lamar’s director of school 
improvement and its other officials were hoping was that by diminishing the power of the 
student growth component they could ease their teachers’ minds enough to free them up to take 
some risks with it.  Over the course of the school year, it became evident that this paid off. 
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While few of the Lamar teachers described doing anything too out-of-the-box, the 
majority realized upon reflection that the lenient parameters the district had set with respect to 
growth had afforded them the opportunity to be productive. They did not always recognize this 
as the year was progressing, but by our final conversations perceived the district’s approach as 
having enabled them to move in a positive direction. Specifically, several believed that this 
leniency had had the unexpected benefit of leading to more collaboration. Stephanie, for 
example, had set a growth goal with her sixth grade team that made them responsible for each 
other’s students. While she said this initially put more pressure on her, in hindsight she could 
also see that it had led to more collaborative teaching and planning. Similarly, Matt, the Lamar 
special education teacher, said he decided to work with a math teacher and a department chair to 
write a growth goal for a fractions unit. Because the goal was so focused and confined to a short 
timeframe, the group used it as an opportunity to try some new strategies for intervention. Matt 
felt like this was a worthwhile venture; though, he also said they had not repeated the process 
since. Finally, even Lisa, the instructional coach, joined in on the collaboration. Although she did 
not have to, she signed on to several of her teachers’ goals. She told me that she used this as an 
opportunity to getting them talking more regularly about expectations for students’ writing and 
that over the course of the year she had experienced an increase in the number of teachers 
wanting to grade collaboratively. Lisa considered this a win, even though she continued to resist 
the need for the growth component, which she also saw as a misguided effort by policymakers to 
implement corporate-styled reform. Of course, not everyone’s experience worked out so 
perfectly.  
Perhaps ironically, it was Kevin who, by the end of the year, was the least happy with 
how this had all played out. Although initially he was pleased with the loose guidelines the 
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committee had set, by the end of the year he was less certain that this had been the best decision. 
He told me, as he was finalizing his evaluation reports, he kept coming across teachers that he 
thought were “pretty average” who would end up with excellent ratings. In fact, he called this the 
“biggest issue” he had faced that year. He said, “nearly everyone scored excellent on their 
growth goals, and as a result there were a lot of teachers who [he] would not have anticipated or 
necessarily wanted to be rated excellent” who were once the points from the growth component 
were added it. This created an uncomfortable power dynamic. Although Kevin certainly did not 
want the evaluation process to be punitive, he unexpectedly found himself with less control. This 
did not negate the productive things that were happening, but it did give him pause. He planned 
to bring it up to the joint committee when it met at the end of the year. 
It All Comes Back to Kevin (Chapter Summary) 
 It is not incidental that this chapter begins and ends with Kevin. Not only was he the most 
dynamic of my participants, but the thoughtfulness and clarity with which he addressed my 
questions, along with his tendency to speak circuitously, meant my conversations with him were 
fascinating and filled with richness. Because he often took me, as a listener, along with him as he 
worked through his thoughts, he made it possible for me to understand some of the most 
important interpretive work that he had done as he enacted these policies. He shared with me not 
just this but the good and bad, the practical issues he had had with these reforms, and where he 
had struggled to resist them and their narratives along the way. In short, without his openness, I 
likely would have continued with the original direction of this project and missed some of the 
complexities that brought about these policies’ impacts. 
 It is for this same reason that this chapter comes back to Kevin. Although what I have 
tried to do here is apply and then build on the concept of enactment to paint a more vibrant 
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picture of what went on as evaluation policy was implemented in my two case schools, I am also 
aware that I have barely scratched the surface. The examples I chose to share herein were meant 
to be exemplary and to provide some balance between Lamar and Roosevelt. They are 
representative of what occurred in these schools but do not capture every teacher’s experience. In 
addition, they are temporal. As Kevin’s aforementioned reflections show, reform is not a finite 
occurrence that happens only once. Rather, it is continual and often involves a struggle for power 
and positioning.   
Thus, what Kevin reminds perhaps better than anyone else is that policy processes cannot 
truly be understood as linear or static. While it is possible to make generalizations about what 
comes out of them, any conclusion of this type is bound to gloss over truly significant variations 
in how each school and, indeed, each teacher responds to mandates for reform. Although this 
may not be satisfying to anyone looking for a definitive answer about whether a policy has 
worked, it is, without a doubt, the reality of school change. 
 This, then, brings me back to the same question I posed at the end of the last chapter. If 
this text were to end here, what should be made of these two cases of evaluation reform? Would 
it still be logical to conclude that the policy nudging the Obama Administration did through RttT 
largely failed in these two schools? Maybe; but this also seems less certain. 
 At the very least, any answer to this question must be messy. While these policies did not 
really have their intended effects, the reality was that even when their results looked alike on the 
surface, their policy processes played out quite differently in each of these places. For one thing, 
contexts were important, and these varied considerably not just between each school but also 
often between individual teachers. Moreover, these differences affected not just capacity but also 
these teachers’ understandings of and willingness to implement reform. In addition to this, these 
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policies were not just taken wholesale and then put into practice. They were made up of general 
directives that the districts these schools were in had to figure out how to turn into district-level 
policies. This process had to be repeated again at the school-level and in the classrooms of 
individual teachers. All of this led to variations in their outcomes, but even this description is too 
simple. In each of these spaces, these policies had to be interpreted, or made sense of, and then 
translated to actual existing practices. During this work, which ultimately produced what became 
visible as these policies’ outcomes, reform sometimes became liminal. As educators tried to 
make sense of what they were being asked to do, they had to bring policy narratives into 
conversation with their own understandings regarding public education. This created the 
potential for policy meanings to change. Indeed, these shifting meanings sometimes led to 
practices that looked resistant, or manipulative, on the surface but actually led to quite productive 
practices that, although unexpected, made it difficult to say that nothing positive came out of 
these reforms. 
 Finally, this chapter brought into view the sense-making and meaning-making that must 
go on as abstract policies are turned into concrete practices. In doing so, it affirmed that policies 
have discursive effects. They carry with them narratives about and construct expectations for 
whomever or whatever are their objects. This means that neither reform, policies, nor policy 
work can be neutral, and it raises a new set of questions. If reform cannot be neutral, then what 
were the politics and ideologies that brought these policies about? What did these educators see 
as its narrative(s)? Was there any cohesiveness to this, and does this help explain their resistance 
to these reforms?  
As it turns out, there were some strong similarities in how my participants who did so 
connected these policies to broader narratives. What they saw as their histories and politics was 
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something quite different from the two scholarly strands of supposedly steady progress towards 
consensus that I went through earlier. These narratives deserve attention, first and foremost, 
because they drove these teachers interpretive work.  They also, though, have been the subjects 
of rich sets of scholarly work of their own. These literatures are not the ones that policymakers 
and reformers with influence like to talk about because to do so would be to admit that policies 
are not neutral but rather reflect choices about what to define and/or prioritize as society’s most 
important problems and their most appropriate solutions. This, though, is precisely why, before 
this dissertation comes to a close, these aforementioned questions must be dealt with. 
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Chapter 8: The Politics of Reform 
The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is and is 
knowing thyself as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you 
an infinity of traces without leaving an inventory…therefore it is imperative at the outset 
to compile such an inventory (Gramsci, as cited in Said, 1978). 
 
I spent a great deal of time thinking about this final chapter and what it should say. I 
know this text has taken a circuitous route. I was deliberate about this as it was important to me 
not to make something as complex as reform seem simple or straightforward. I suppose as its 
author, I could have reserved these last few pages for my comments; for whether I thought these 
policies had worked and for my suggestions going forward. In the end, this was not what I 
decided to do.  
Instead, it seemed more important to let my participants have the last word. For me to do 
so in their place felt too definitive, and if this project had made anything clear it was that the 
policy process was not that. Since the beginning (and probably because I remained a classroom 
teacher throughout this research), letting my educators’ voices be heard has been a priority. After 
listening to them, it was clear they had responded to these policies in thoughtful ways. Their 
actions reflected their own stories—their narratives and the narratives they read into these 
policies, and these were where it seemed most appropriate to leave this puzzle, which I do not 
claim to be finished but rather hope can contribute to a conversation.  
With this in mind, I begin this chapter with a selection of quotes from these individuals 
that capture some of their struggles to make sense of these policies. These quotes address the 
questions posed at the end of the last chapter about what they perceived as the driving forces 
behind Race to the Top and teacher evaluation reform. What they draw out are two themes. First, 
for these educators these policies were not neutral but were connected to a, misguided at best and 
malicious at worst, historically traceable narrative of school failure. Second, they reflected 
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growing corporate influence over American public education. To follow these quotes, I fill in 
around these concerns. Beginning with the starting point they provide, I track this narrative of 
school failure and its connection to federal education policy. I then address the charge that 
corporations and corporate thinking are now driving the reform of schools. All of this is done 
with the intent of creating more space for these teachers’ voices. 
Selected Quotes 
It comes off of the narrative of school failure, which has been alive and well since 
Reagan and a Nation at Risk.  There is a contingent of people who want public schools to 
fail so it can be privatized. And that may not be malicious; it may be very altruistic, that 
they really do think that the private sector school system would work better. . . . And I 
say that it started with Nation at Risk, but it really came in under No Child Left Behind, 
under the guise of accountability. . . .it’s a middle ground where the people who want to 
tear apart public schools, can come on the same page as the people who want to help 
schools (Kevin, Interview 1) 
 
When I first started teaching it was Nation at Risk; then it was No Child Left Behind; 
now it’s this.  So for my entire career apparently education has been in a crisis. What?! 
Why is that?!  I mean America is one of the greatest countries in the world. (Robert, 
Interview 1) 
 
I never used to follow the legislature, and now I’m following all these house bills and 
learning so much about how somebody’s stupid idea becomes a bill . . . all this stuff that I 
never even knew what it meant before, and all this stuff that’s led me to see, god, this is a 
giant business. (Lisa, Interview 2) 
 
I think we have this idea at the political level that corporate America has a better idea of 
what education should be about than educators. And, so we allow the textbook makers, 
the computer makers, and the Chromebook makers to set policy that is financially 
beneficial to them in a way that isn’t always beneficial to our students. That’s what I 
mean by corporate involvement. I mean the test making industry is just that; it’s an 
industry. And they have priorities that aren’t always in line with what’s best for students. 
. . . [and] It’s been that way for a long time. . . . I think that we have this strange 
dichotomy in this country where teachers are one of the most respected professions but 
when we talk about improving education we don’t look to teachers. We look to Bill 
Gates. Well Bill Gates doesn’t know anything about education. He knows zero. . . . I 
mean when you look at everything Bill Gates has done, at least 50% of it has been a 




Did you see that Bruce Rauner’s [Illinois Governor] new education czar makes 250,000 
dollars a year and her educational experience is that she ran a charter school company?! 
The czar, which is a non-constitutional position. (Kevin, Interview 2) 
 
We’re dealing with people here. You don’t have the same experiments that make people 
react the same way every time, and this seems to be more of a, kind of business model 
way of looking at things. But, I’m obviously biased. (Robert, Interview 2) 
 
The Narrative of School Failure 
There are countless ways one could trace a path to the current state of federal education 
policy. After all, the history of the present that this path would seek to uncover has been shaped 
by everything from a Great Recession to a Russian satellite to a lone researcher with a 
fascination for the seemingly bovine. Whether it would end the same without any one of these is 
impossible to say. Race to the Top and its teacher evaluation policies were not the result of a 
single event or an isolated incidence of cause and effect; rather, they were the culmination of 
many such things, whose tentacles pervade much of what we do in schools today.  
Despite this, the thread starts with none of these. Instead takes its cue from my 
participants jumping off point. As a result, it begins roughly a half century ago with a report 
about a nation full of failing children.  
A Nation at (perpetual) Risk. Although officially entitled A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative for Educational Reform (1983), this report was actually not much of one at all. In 
fact, its authors described it as an open letter to the American people and, then extant, President 
Ronald Reagan. This might make it seem like a strange point of departure to provide the 
historical policy context for the reforms that were central to this text, but if there was a stage that 
needed to be set to enable RttT and its policies to take hold, A Nation at Risk (ANAR) was it.  
Of course, as the history that follows here will show, it was not so much the policy 
content of A Nation at Risk that became important. In the decades to come, most of this would 
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fall by the wayside, and instead, it would be the report’s rhetoric that would have the most 
lasting impact. ANAR would reintroduce and refine a narrative of an educational system in a 
state of crisis, and this narrative would eventually come to support an increasingly ideological 
regime of reform. Both came to exist in perpetuity.  
What comes next is a sort of hindsight retelling of the politics that connect ANAR to RttT 
and its policies. It begins in 1981 in order to fill in some of the background to the report. This 
was the year when the commission that would write A Nation at Risk commenced. It also saw the 
inauguration of former California governor, B-movie actor, and Republican Ronald Reagan to 
the highest office in the land. Reagan had campaigned on a platform of reducing the size and 
scope of government and handily beaten his Democratic opponent, incumbent Jimmy Carter, the 
previous November. His election marked the beginning of a shift in the nexus of power away 
from the New Deal Liberalism and progressivism that had dominated Washington D.C. politics 
for nearly fifty years towards an undeniably reactionary form of economic liberalism (Smith, 
1984).  
Reagan’s election was especially relevant to the Department of Education, which was 
only in its second year when he took over and was one of his first government-shrinking targets. 
While out on the campaign trail, Reagan had routinely cited the DoE as one of the most 
egregious examples of federal overreach and promised its complete elimination (“Education 
Dept. Won’t be Abolished,” 1985). Upon moving in, his White House team had attempted to 
follow through on this, until Reagan, himself, made a fateful decision that would ultimately 
facilitate the release of ANAR and make the agency stronger than before (Stockman, 1986). This 
decision had to do with staffing. 
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The legacy of Terrel Bell. In a curious move, the President nominated former high 
school teacher and college professor, Terrel Bell, to head the Department of Education. While 
experienced, Bell was an odd choice for a supposedly anti-government president because as the 
U.S. Commissioner of Education under Presidents Nixon and Ford he had established a “fairly 
consistent record of support for a federal role in education” (Yardley, 1998, para. 3). 
Nonetheless, Bell took the job, and from that moment on the future of the department 
would become a continual point of disagreement within the White House. Conflict would be 
inevitable. In his memoir, Bell describes immediately going head-to-head with Reagan’s 
Counselor to the President, Edwin Meese, in a battle that would carry on until he resigned (Bell, 
1988). At one point, Bell even took to carrying around a photo of Reagan handing out pens after 
signing an expansive educational appropriations bill to pull out whenever anyone in the 
administration would suggest slashing his budget (Bell, 1988; Stockman, 1986). Of course, most 
of this infighting took place behind closed doors and often without the President’s knowledge, 
but A Nation at Risk would become a very public part of this ongoing clash (Stockman, 1986).  
By August of 1981, Bell and Meese were locked in a stalemate. While Meese still wanted 
the Department gone, the Secretary’s own experiences led him to believe there was much the 
federal government could do towards school improvement (Bell, 1988). Finding himself at a 
dead end, Bell decided to route Meese. At the end of that month, he used his autonomy to create 
the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE). The NCEE was basically a study 
group with little authority, but Bell put together a formidable panel. The eighteen individuals he 
appointed were diverse in both experience and politics. At the table sat multiple university 
presidents, teachers, principals, subject area specialists, school board members, a governor, the 
retired chairman of Bell Telephone, and a Nobel laureate. Over a period of two years, the group 
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read and heard a compendium of testimony. They then prepared their final report. This was “A 
Nation at Risk.” 
A Nation at Risk (1983) painted a dire picture of America’s public education system. 
Among its most notable findings was “that on 19 academic tests American students were never 
first or second and, in comparison with other industrialized nations, were last seven times” (p. 
16). The problem, it concluded, was that there were “disturbing inadequacies” in the educational 
process (p. 26). The curricula had been “homogenized, diluted, and diffused,” expectations had 
decayed, and the Nation’s teachers were troublingly weak and inadequately prepared (p. 26). As 
a result of this, U.S. students spent comparatively less time engaged in quality academic activity 
than their international peers. According to the report, this was especially bad given the growing 
global demand for highly skilled workers (p. 18). But, its authors assured, there was still time for 
the U.S. to maintain its “slim competitive edge” (p. 15). That was, if it implemented an extensive 
catalog of recommendations.  
It is worth detailing these recommendations briefly both because it will give a sense of 
where the reform movement that connected “A Nation at Risk” to Race to the Top started and 
because it is where contemporary reformers have strayed. Among the NCEE’s (1983) laundry 
list of suggestions were the following (broadly summarized): First, with respect to content, states 
would have to increase the rigor of their graduation requirements and schools would have to shift 
their focus to the New Basics. This meant more time dedicated to the core subjects—English, 
math, science, and the social studies—as well as computer science and foreign language. Second, 
states and universities would also need to increase their expectations with regards to internal 
content and skill mastery in each of these subjects. Ideally, this would include adopting grade-
level indicators of academic achievement and a nationwide system of standardized testing. Next, 
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the time spent on academics needed to be increased. More homework needed to be given, states 
and schools needed to consider implementing both a longer school day and year, and 
administrative burdens on teachers needed to be reduced to add additional time for teaching. In 
addition, states needed to address issues of teacher quality. University preparation programs had 
to become more rigorous and they needed to create better incentives to draw high performing 
candidates into the field. To achieve this, districts and schools were encouraged to implement 
longer contracts, career ladders, and “professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and 
performance-based” pay. Finally, to ensure that these goals were met, the last set of 
recommendations had to do with the federal government. It would have to support and protect 
the nation’s gifted and disadvantaged and also start collecting data about student performance to 
use along with its power of the purse to leverage change. 
It is also worth noting, however, the one thing ANAR did not do, which was lay blame 
for the nation’s academic shortcomings squarely at the doorstep of teachers. In fact, its authors 
refrained from even assigning schools sole responsibility for education’s shortcomings. Instead, 
the NCEE (1983) observed that, “…upon reflection, [its conclusions were] hardly surprising, 
given the multitude of often conflicting demands [that were] placed on [the] Nation's schools” (p. 
14). It chided the public for its role, pointing out that educators could not be the only ones held 
liable when they were “routinely called on to provide solutions to personal, social, and political 
problems that the home and other institutions either [would] not or [could not]” (p. 14). And, it 
went on to implore Americans to “understand that these demands…often exact[ed] an 
educational cost” and realize that while school reform should logically center on schools, 
teachers, and the curriculum, the American citizenry would also need to fulfill its end of 
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education’s “double responsibility” (p. 14). In essence, ANAR gave the charge for reform to the 
entirety of the nation’s populace not just those working in its schools.  
Really, though, none of this was much remembered. That privilege would go to the 
opening section of the report, which is worth quoting at length because its rhetoric is striking in a 
way no amount of paraphrasing can capture. It began: 
Our Nation is at risk. Our once unchallenged preeminence in commerce, industry, 
science, and technological innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout the 
world. This report is concerned with only one of the many causes and dimensions of the 
problem, but it is the one that undergirds American prosperity, security, and civility. We 
report to the American people that while we can take justifiable pride in what our schools 
and colleges have historically accomplished and contributed to the United States and the 
well-being of its people, the educational foundations of our society are presently being 
eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a 
people. What was unimaginable a generation ago has begun to occur--others are 
matching and surpassing our educational attainments (National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, 1983, p. 13). 
 
And continued: 
If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre 
educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. 
As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves. We have even squandered the 
gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge. Moreover, we 
have dismantled essential support systems, which helped make those gains possible. We 
have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament 
(p. 13). 
 
In hindsight, however, it was more the political jockeying that occurred after the report 
was finished than these words, however alarming, that ensured that this opening passage would 
become so notable. Whether intentional or not, though I suspect given Bell’s track record of 
conflict with the Administration it was, ANAR’s opening passage played right into President 
Reagan’s 1980 campaign narrative.  
Namely, ANAR connected the risks of poor school performance to two issues that had 
resonated with his voters—America’s perceived weak international standing in the context of the 
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Cold War and the decade of stagflation it had just endured along with its ensuing economic 
downturn. The language of the report was hawkish. Its authors were chiding America for 
becoming too comfortable during the foreign policy détente that had marked the previous decade 
and allowing this to spill over as a domestic ‘disarmament.’ It was a fitting analogy given the 
abandonment of de-escalation and resumption of anti-communist militarism by President 
Reagan. By linking this rhetoric to a call for more federal oversight in education, the NCEE 
board effectively backed the Administration into a corner.  
Moreover, the committee did so at a time when the Reagan team was gearing up for re-
election. This made the release of the report even more of a quandary for Reagan’s advisors. 
While the substance of the report ran counter to the President’s promises not only to reduce the 
size of government but also to eliminate the DoE, its opening paragraphs made perfect fodder for 
canvassing. In fact, the paper produced this exact dispute within the President’s inner circle. On 
one side, Bell’s adversary, Meese, encouraged the President to reject the report as a contradiction 
of the fundamental tenet of his agenda; on the other Chief of Staff Jim Baker pushed for Reagan 
to use the report to his advantage (Ansary, 2007). In the end, the President chose the latter.  
Reagan even went so far as to invite the members of the NCEE to the White House for a 
small ceremony, which would make his intentions clear. One of those in attendance that day was 
Harvard University Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics, Gerald Holton, who later recalled having 
the strange sense after hearing the President speak that he had not actually read the report. He 
recalled that Reagan thanked the group “for endorsing school prayer, vouchers, and the 
elimination of the Department of Education”—none of which were even mentioned in ANAR 
(Ansary, 2007, para. 13). In fact, by the time he left the affair, Dr. Holton was unsure that anyone 
in the administration had actually given it a full reading. It was at that moment that it became 
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clear to him, as it later would to Secretary Bell, that what little interest the President had in A 
Nation at Risk was motivated mostly by the desire for political gain (Fiske, 1983). As he said, 
“We’ve been had” (Fiske, 1983, para. 46). 
As it turned out ANAR was perfect for politicking—it was specific enough to stir up 
national fervor but generic enough so as to not demand a specific response. Because of this, its 
biggest impact would come not from any direct and/or immediate altering of federal policy but 
rather through the way its narrative of a nation in crisis would capture the national attention. 
What I mean here is that not only did A Nation at Risk reignite American interest in educational 
issues, but it also elevated such issues within political talk. Politicians and members of the media 
alike jumped on the opportunity presented by ANAR’s undeniably attention-grabbing language 
as the Country headed into the 1984 elections. In fact, members of both parties took advantage of 
the opportunity to use the report to denounce the President. On the left, Reagan’s challenger, 
Walter F. Mondale, began calling for an $11 billion increase in federal spending to address the 
impending school crisis (Fiske, 1983). On the right, critics like New Jersey Governor Thomas 
Kean called on the President to be stronger on traditionally conservative education proposals like 
merit pay (Fiske, 1983). A naive Bell hoped all this attention meant the real possibility that some 
of the committee’s recommendations would be adopted, but after winning re-election, the 
President seemingly lost interest (Bell, 1988).  
This lack of movement on the national policy front did not mean, however, that ANAR 
had no lasting impact. In fact, quite the opposite was true. A Nation at Risk was critical to the 
chronology of school reform. It was a marker that signaled what were to be taken as the most 
pressing issues facing public education. Moreover, its crisis narrative undoubtedly assisted in 
cauterizing the notion that American schools were failing, which brought about the increased 
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engagement of policymakers in this arena. By decade’s end, all of this meant the conversation 
around reform had changed. President Reagan, for example, who just a few short years before 
had been relatively uninterested in promoting any sort of federal-level education policy, began to 
use his bully pulpit to make the case for it (Fiske, 1983). Soon after, many governors began to 
call for reform within their own states (Kennedy, 1991).  
Of course, this involvement quickly became political, meaning it was neither natural nor 
objective. Reagan, as a case-in-point, took the opportunity to promote his anti-government 
agenda, making the term ‘failure’ synonymous with government-run schools. During a 1984 
speech at the annual CPAC dinner he even went so far as to assert that reform would happen 
more effectively with smaller government. As he said, “America’s schools don’t need new 
spending on programs; they need tougher standards, more homework, [and] merit pay. . . .” 
(Reagan, 1984). By 1986 the National Governors Association had seconded these strategies, 
recommending that states also monitor schools through ‘report cards’ then declare bankrupt and 
take over any that failed to ‘make the grade’ (Alexander, 1986). Out of all of this, the two most 
immediately impactful proposals were that the federal government should leverage its authority 
to push for standards as well as more accountability. Along with the narrative of an education 
system in a state of crisis, it was these ideas that would carry on into the next decade.  
Standards and accountability. While none of these teachers talked about what 
happened in the 1990s, it is worth including at least some summary of the changes taking place 
within federal education reform during this period, as it will illuminate why they all connected 
ANAR to NCLB. By this time, a new reform mantra had begun to take hold. Although there 
would not be much in the way of significant policy developments during this decade, it did 
witness two other important changes. First, during the nineties, the federal government would 
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increasingly turn to those outside of the education profession for advice on how to move forward 
with reform. Second, as the standards and accountability movement gained popularity, it would 
run into some problems that would push the call for tougher and more unified standards into the 
background, leaving policymakers all the more enamored with accountability. 
Most of this took place through the aftermath of the “Goals 2000: Education America 
Act” (1994). Although this act would be signed into law in 1994 under President Bill Clinton, it 
would be President Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, who organized the meeting that 
inspired it, and who he invited was telling. In 1989, he brought together 49 governors and 
numerous prominent business leaders for what was termed the Charlottesville National 
Education Summit. Notably, other than the few who had been recruited to host the event, the 
meeting involved no educators (New York State Education Department, 2006). Moreover, 
although Goals 2000 was broad in its intent, its central focus was on normalizing students’ 
educational experiences and achievement. Towards this end, it reinforced the push for standards 
and accountability. 
Later that same year Congress also re-authorized its long-standing education funding bill, 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965), which would further this call. The ESEA 
dictated that any state receiving its funds develop standards by the 1997-98 school year with 
assessments to follow by the turn of the century. It also introduced the notion of ‘adequate yearly 
progress’ (Rudalevige, 2003). The ESEA reauthorization, however, largely lacked consequences, 
which left the Clinton Administration to decide if, how, and when it would enforce these 
guidelines, and it largely avoided this task (Rudalevige, 2003). In fact, the Administration never 




To be fair, though, one half of the reform push in Goals 2000 and the ESEA 
reauthorization began to unravel almost immediately. By the time the first deadline hit, the 
movement for common national standards had already become so toxic that politicians avoided it 
at all costs (Ravitch, 2010). In short, it fell apart in the midst of a fierce debate over a proposed 
set of national history standards. In October, Lynne Cheney, the former chairperson of the 
National Endowment for the Humanities, which had overseen their writing, published a biting 
critique of them in an Op Ed in The Wall Street Journal. She argued that the standards were both 
“unacceptable and the epitome of left-wing political correctness” then issued a call to arms 
(Ravitch, 2010, p. 17). Soon, the controversy devolved into a vitriolic argument that even drew 
the attention of divisive radio commentator, Rush Limbaugh, who took to literally tearing apart 
history textbooks on air (Nash et al., 2000).  
The fiasco destroyed any chance for civil conversation around the standards issue and 
instead prompted a fight over how much influence those in D.C. should have over local schools. 
In its wake, the standards half of the standards and accountability movement receded away. After 
this accountability remained the only workable thread for reform (Ravitch, 2010).  
The shifting politics of accountability. That partisanship was able to so precipitously 
undercut the standards movement of the 1990s may seem unsurprising, especially given the 
extraordinary level of political divisiveness plaguing the U.S. in the present. Even after this 
debacle, however, many still believed it was possible for the federal government to leverage its 
influence to improve schools. While the fight over the history standards had convinced many that 
Washington could not ensure students were studying the same things, they held onto the idea that 
it could at least ensure they were learning. In effect, the lesson reformers took from this debacle 
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was that if the federal government was to successfully influence schools, its dollars needed to be 
tied more explicitly to gains in student performance (Rudalevige, 2003).  
Heading into the new century, the federal government appeared ready to embrace this 
role of arbiter. In 1999, for example, the Democratic Leadership Council’s Progressive Policy 
Institute (PPI) released a white paper in which it argued that to rectify the ESEA’s status as a 
program without consequences, its 50-plus categorical grants needed to be reduced to five 
performance-based ones, covering program, language proficiency, innovation, school choice, and 
teacher quality (Rotherham, 1999). The PPI was aligned with the left’s economically liberal and 
politically centrist ‘New Democratic’ wing, which positioned it more closely to some 
Conservatives. This was a noteworthy shifting of political alliances. That said, bridging the gap 
on education would be challenging. With the next ESEA reauthorization quickly approaching, 
many Republicans were championing an idea that democrats opposed, simplifying its funding 
into block grants. Soon the reauthorization bill became bogged down and was not reauthorized 
on time for the first time in history.  
It was at this moment that presidential hopeful George W. Bush sauntered onto the 
national political stage. As the son of a former president and acting Texas governor, Bush was 
not exactly a newcomer; however, the upcoming election represented his first run at the office. 
On the campaign trail, Bush had pitched himself as someone who could work across the aisle 
and, as he liked to say, a “compassionate conservative.” When discussing the state of American 
education, he frequently referred to the “soft bigotry of low expectations” (Bush, 1999). 
Although his conservative values were reflected in his support for school choice and local 
autonomy, he also found himself in the uncomfortable position of being at odds with his own 
party over his belief that the federal government had an important role to play in keeping schools 
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accountable (Rosenbaum, 2000). He cited such accountability as the source of purported 
improvements in school outcomes within his own state (Ravitch, 2010). Though his claims have 
since been disputed, they made for good politics, and despite losing the popular vote that fall, 
Bush won a narrow electoral victory. When the Supreme Court ruled per curiam in Bush v. Gore 
(2000) to stop a Florida recount, it handed him the presidency, and Bush would have an 
opportunity to make good on his campaign promises. 
Shortly before he moved across the country, Bush invited leaders from both the 
Republican Party and the New Democrats to Texas to discuss the subject of education. It was an 
indication of just how bipartisan accountability politics had become. Within just a few days of 
taking office in January 2001, he presented the result of this meeting—a 25-page blueprint for 
reform that relied heavily on the use of federal purse strings to improve school performance 
(New York State Education Department, 2006). Thus, when the 107th Congress got to work at 
the start of 2001, it already had before it a potential replacement for the stalled ESEA. This draft 
recommended something similar to the categorical grants that had defined earlier versions of the 
law, but to be eligible states had to agree to test students once in high school and annually in 
grades 3-8. They would also have to disaggregate these data by subgroup and set annual 
benchmarks for performance with the goal of 100% proficiency by 2014 and participate in the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) as a cross-state exam that was intended to 
check for reliability. In addition to the above, the new ESEA blueprint also proposed a system of 
incentives, albeit primarily negative ones, that were intended to motivate states and schools to 
follow through on their commitments.  
These so-called “motivators” would kick in for any school that was unable to show 
sufficient progress for more than two consecutive years and became more stringent as additional 
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time passed. Schools that fell into this category would be labeled “failing” and immediately have 
to give students the option of transferring to another school. By the fifth year they would be 
involved in a number of remedial processes, including having to replace its curriculum and staff. 
If these also failed, in their sixth year such schools could be closed and re-chartered, potentially 
as a private entity. The blueprint “borrowed liberally” from several competing proposals made 
towards the end of the Clinton years (Rudalevige, 2003). One congressional aide to the 
Democratic Party even told The Washington Post that the incoming president had essentially 
plagiarized his plan (Rudalevige, 2003). But, what some considered plagiarism was well 
received by its assigned congressional committee (Rudalevige, 2003).   
For President Bush this was, no doubt, welcome news. After all, if the fate of the most 
recent attempt at re-authorization had made anything clear, it was that partisanship superseded all 
else in Washington. Fortunately, alliance politics had so far been something to which the 
President was committed. Though, evidence indicates that in this case it was carried out rather 
shrewdly. In an effort to push the bill through committee, the Bush administration dealt closely 
with Republicans and a targeted group of New Democrats (Rudalevige, 2003). The notable 
Senator Ted Kennedy, for whom education reform had long been a bailiwick was intentionally 
left out of discussions. This tactic worked, and soon Kennedy himself was offering concessions 
from the left in order to associate his name with the law (Rudalevige, 2003). 
The final sticking point for the legislation, then, was the debate over how to define AYP. 
In an ominous foretelling, state governors began to lobby the White House to weaken the 100% 
proficiency requirements. They expressed concern that too many schools would be labeled as 
failing and that this could be counterproductive, expensive, and embarrassing (Rudalevige, 
2003). Not everyone agreed with these charges, but they had clear utility. Surprisingly, after 
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months of tough negotiations, the Bush administration grew unexpectedly sympathetic and 
agreed to average schools’ scores over a three-year period and weigh the attainment of the lowest 
achieving students more heavily.  
The House and Senate versions of the bill then moved to their respective floors for 
debate. In the Senate, with help from key Democrats, a proposal to defer testing requirements 
until funding was tripled was defeated as was a small voucher pilot program that eleven 
Republicans voted against. In the House, one key to the bill’s passage was the support of 
Republican John Boehner, the new chairman of the House Education and the Workforce 
committee and an unlikely convert to accountability given his previous calls to eliminate the 
federal education department. Displaying the sense of pragmatism that would become his calling 
card (and eventual undoing), Boehner encouraged his party to give on the issue of school 
vouchers in hopes that a bipartisan legislative success could put the issue of the President’s 
disputed electoral victory to rest. In the end, the bill passed the senate with a resounding 91-8 
vote and left the house largely intact, before heading to conference committee. During an 
otherwise coveted recess in the summer of 2001, the committee met almost daily to try to 
hammer out an agreement. 
When he spoke at the legislation’s signing in January 2002, Bush took the time to explain 
the principles that had guided this reauthorization. He assured his audience that the new statute, 
which had been given the title No Child Left Behind (NCLB), was not about the federal 
government wanting to micromanage schools (Bush, 2002). Rather, he explained, it was about 
using federal leverage to ensure that all students were proficient or better in math and reading by 
2014. To accomplish this, the President went on, the Department of Education would be making 
a sharp turn in the direction of accountability. It was not so much that legislators had just 
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stumbled onto the concept, however, accountability had emerged across several decades and in 
spite of ideological differences. It was, as my participants had claimed, very much connected to 
the narrative of a school system in crisis, and by the start of the 21st century this narrative had 
become fully embedded in how both sides of the political spectrum thought and talked about 
schools. It was part of an episteme that was nearly impossible to be against, and  nearly twenty 
years after it showed up as one part of ANAR, it had become the primary driver of federal 
education policy (Foucault, 1966, 1980b).  
From NCLB to RttT. Although they did not talk about this interim time period, its 
importance was not lost on my participants. Those that saw ANAR as connected to NCLB also 
recognized that the latter represented something different. They perceived its calls for 100% 
proficiency to be, at once, laudable and farcical. Eventually, even the law’s supporters would say 
the same.  
Early evidence that something would go amiss actually came from Texas. By the early 
2000s, researchers were warning that the purported success of George W. Bush’s accountability 
regime was a mirage. They maintained that the so-called ‘Texas miracle,’ in which test score 
increases showed that accountability was leading to improvement within the state, had factors 
besides student achievement as their cause. Several studies revealed that the gains were not 
reflected on other widely accepted measures of academic performance (Haney, 2006; Klein et 
al., 2000). They also argued that high-stakes testing had had other concerning, if not wholly 
detrimental, effects (Haney, 2006; Klein et al., 2000). Of course, these warnings would turn out 
to be prophetic. As was already discussed, NCLB also led to a number of undesirable outcomes 
caused by its perverse incentives. These included teaching to the test, curriculum narrowing, 
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educational triage, and even outright cheating (Bartels, 2012; Booher-Jennings, 2005; Dietel, 
2011; McNeil et. al., 2008; Nichols & Berliner, 2008; O’Day, 2002; Rex & Nelson, 2004).  
As a result, NCLB set up a system in which failure was eventually guaranteed. By 
attaching negative consequences, it also set up the perfect conditions for Campbell’s Law to 
operate. As Campbell argued, the more a quantitative indicator is used for social decision-
making, the more subject it would be to corruption and to distorting the social processes it was 
intended to monitor (Campbell, 1976). In an effort to stave off these penalties, even states and 
schools took steps that might not have otherwise seemed rational. State legislatures and boards of 
education found a variety of way to manipulate their proficiency benchmarks. They wrote vague 
standards and/or lax definitions for proficiency, and they back-loaded the gains schools needed 
to make to meet AYP, requiring less improvement up front for steep increases later on.  
By the time the No Child Left Behind reauthorization expired in 2007, then, the law had 
run into a problem. Over one-third of schools across the country were labeled as failing that year, 
yet NCLB was not having its supposedly intended impact. In fact, rather than narrowing the 
achievement gap, it seemed NCLB may have exacerbated unequal opportunities (Hursh, 2007). 
Though the goal of 100% proficiency had always been unreasonable, it had been difficult to be 
against. But, as the number of failing schools began to increase exponentially, more and more 
legislators did exactly that.  
Among the law’s detractors that year was the first-term junior Senator from Illinois and 
then presidential candidate Barack Obama. While out on the campaign trail he, too, warned of 
impending economic doom if U.S. schools continued their purportedly unabated decline. He 
used the narrative of an educational system in a state of crisis to his advantage but also spoke 
about the law and promised he could fix its problems. His broader message of hope and change 
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would win him a resounding victory in November, and as the beginning of this text explained, 
due largely to ongoing economic troubles, he would almost immediately have this chance.  
To aid him in revamping NCLB, the president-elect chose Arne Duncan, the acting CEO 
of the Chicago Public Schools. For some, Duncan was a surprising pick for Secretary of 
Education, but given all that had taken place in education policy over the last several decades, he 
should not have been that unexpected. Although the crisis narrative solidified by ANAR was still 
very much alive under NCLB, most of its proposed remedies had been forgotten. In the interim, 
policy makers had turned to those outside of education for advice on reform with the result that 
the burden of correcting for education inequities had been shifted from legislators onto teachers 
and schools. In place of standards, they were now mainly concerned with accountability. And, in 
place of inputs, they had shifted their focus to outputs. What Duncan brought was a similar way 
of thinking.  
After Duncan’s installation, he and the President proposed reforms that would effectively 
be more of the same. Race to the Top, which would be this creation, relied on similar high-stakes 
accountability proposals as its predecessor. If anything, it moved even more in the direction of 
outcomes-based policies. Across its pillars, it advocated for ideas that had been on the fringes of 
ANAR: more choice, greater competition and the use of high-stakes incentives. Most relevant 
here, though, were its teacher evaluation reforms, which were part and parcel of this trend, and, 
as has already been discussed, called for continued accountability with a shift in focus onto and 
harsher penalties for individual teachers. This, then, was the historical context to which these 
educators connected these policies.  
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Neoliberalism, Economism, and Corporate Involvement in Reform 
However, the “education in a state of crisis” narrative was not the only one that my 
participants found troublesome in their policy work. They also were invariably concerned about 
what they saw as the growing corporate influence in education, which they understood as a 
driving force behind these evaluation policy reforms. In fact, this came up often enough that it is 
necessary to delve into in this final chapter too. 
Indeed, one does not have to look too hard to find evidence of why they felt this way. To 
return to where I just left off, President Obama, as an otherwise progressive Democrat, had 
appointed a Secretary of Education who often described his role as if he were overseeing an 
investment. When he was in charge of CPS, Duncan had once called himself “a portfolio 
manager” whose task was to “improve the portfolio” of the district’s 600 schools (Giroux & 
Saltman, 2008). By 2009, this was surprising only in that it momentarily revealed how taken-for-
granted the corporatizing viewpoint had become in education.  
To try to provide some insight into why these teachers found this unsettling, I want to 
briefly expand on several things they brought up with me at multiple points: neoliberalism and 
the economizing of educational practices. 
The neoliberal ideology. While only Kevin specifically used the term neoliberal, it was 
referenced by others in more general ways by others, especially when they talked about the effect 
of NCLB and what several of them perceived as the connection between high-stakes 
accountability policies and privatization.  
As a term with a long history, neoliberalism actually traces to 18th century liberal 
economic theory. It is based on somewhat narrow reading of economist Adam Smith (Hursh, 
2008). Smith (1776) argued in Wealth of Nations, his most well-known book, that society 
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benefited most when individuals pursued their own self-interest because an ‘invisible hand’ acted 
to decrease costs and increase quality. Though he theorized that the state would necessarily need 
to provide oversight to in less than perfect markets to prevent exorbitant accumulation of wealth, 
in general, its role in a market society was to be minimal. Neoliberalism, itself, actually began to 
take shape after the Great Depression in response to Keynesian economic approaches. It 
emphasized strong private property rights and the expansion of free-markets and began to gain 
dominance in policy circles during the second half of the 21st century. Unlike their liberal 
predecessors, neoliberals, however, used Smith’s ideas to call for an ultra-minimalist state.  
As Molnar (1996) explains, according to neoliberalism the proper role for the 
government is to provide opportunities for investment, then gets out of the way. As a 
generalization, it sees the government as corrupt, wasteful, and inefficient, and as a result, calls 
for the application of the worldview of the private sector to all things public (Kohn 2002). In the 
context of globalization, it has aided neocolonialism through policies that weaken the power of 
nation-states, allowing for the domination of world economies by western corporate entities. 
According to Giroux (2002), it has also transformed the relationship between individuals and 
society by altering the language we use to represent and evaluate human behavior. It has led civil 
discourse to give way “to the language of commercialization, privatization, and deregulation [in 
which] citizenship is portrayed as an utterly privatized affair” (Giroux, 2002; p. 425).  In short, 
neoliberals have re-conceptualized citizens as autonomous entrepreneurs responsible for their 
own success or failure, effectively freeing society from liability for inequities by relocating fault 
for injustice to within the individual (Hursh, 2008). From this perspective, nation-states and any 
progressive function they serve are subordinate to an individual’s demand for capital and public 
services become commodities for American businesses and private individuals (Mahiri, 2005). 
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As it relates to RttT and teacher evaluation policy, as well as these educators’ perceptions 
of these things, the rise of the neoliberal ideology is important for several reasons. First, by 
condemning public education, as President Reagan did, through its association with government 
bureaucracy, neoliberals have successfully grown calls for private influence over schools. As we 
will see in the next section, high stakes accountability policies, like those that were being 
implemented in the schools in this study, reflect this influence as they try to mimic corporate 
management principles within the public sector. Second, as a result of this private influence, 
neoliberalism has often led to the expansion of policies that draw resources away from public 
schools themselves and to a privatized educational services sector. Kevin refers to this, for 
example, both when he discusses the money that Charlotte Danielson is likely making from 
selling schools her training materials and in a separate instance that was not shared earlier where 
he talks about the “weird, excessive overlap” between all of the technologies (e.g. state mandated 
training programs, cloud-based data management systems etc…) that school districts needed to 
purchase to fully implement RttT’s policies. Finally, by pushing schools towards higher-stakes 
and more comparative/more competitive evaluation frameworks, these reforms have aided in the 
some of the reconceptualization that Giroux and other have expressed concern about. The 
teachers at Lamar, especially, pushed against this. They also explicitly discussed their awareness 
of the tendency of high-stakes policies to contribute to this process through ranking schools and 
teachers, providing a basis of comparison on which families can compete and choose.   
Economism and new public management. At a more practical level of analysis, 
neoliberalism has also had an impact of the day-to-day practices within schools, about which my 
participants were also aware. They often pushed back against this in our conversations through 
referring to something akin to what Robert’s quote, at the beginning of this chapter, calls the 
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“business model” of doing school. Ball (2012) has termed this the “commodifying” of education, 
which he says occurs through selling schools various policy ‘solutions’ that are grounded in the 
notion that educational outcomes can best be improved by bringing schools closer to the 
marketplace (Angus, 1994; Ball, 2012; Naidu, 2012). Others, more endearingly, refer to it as 
New Public Management (NPM).  
In short, NPM aims to improve public services by more closely aligning them with the 
principles believed to direct the private sector. As Knights and Morgan (1991) explain, it seeks 
to establish a ‘planned relationship’ between the market and a public organization’s internal 
character. Often, this has resulted in the perhaps odd pairing of greater bureaucratic control with 
market-informed approaches to school improvement. NPM, for example, has led to the large-
scale policy borrowing exemplified by the recent proliferation of outcomes-based accountability 
policies (Marsh, 1978; Ball, 2012; Naidu, 2012). In also typically involves the coupling of this 
focus with incentives meant to lead educators to adopt more enterprising values and practices 
(Dutewiler, 1988; Hanushek 2011; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). NPM, for example, might 
be understood as having informed the bureaucratic supervision and sanctions of NCLB. More 
recently, it ties to teacher evaluation reform through this reform’s emphasis on the quantification 
of student performance and the connection of this to the concept of teacher quality (Hursh, 2007; 
Naidu, 2012).  
In all these cases, the underlying idea is that the economizing of educational practices 
will direct educators’ attention and efforts in a way that will increase schools’ efficiency. While a 
perfectly reasonable as a goal, this approach has not only had but also retains the potential to 
have more deleterious effects. For one thing, as Nick reminds, it has brought with it increased 
involvement of business icons in education. Bill Gates is just the most well known of these, and 
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over the last several decades a whole host of “educational entrepreneurs” have funded numerous 
initiatives, studies, and lobbying efforts related to reform. What seems to concern Nick about this 
is that these individuals have wrongly and undeservedly become the “experts” on schools. 
Likewise, Courtney makes a similar reference when she discusses her administrators looking to 
those outside the district for direction—Whose’s going to tell me what to do? Who’s the expert? 
None of us are the expert. In other words, one risk of this economizing is that it may be both 
misguided and debilitating.  
For another, such policies may be de-professionalizing and dehumanizing in other ways. 
Robert, for example, worried about the implication of value-added models because he saw them 
as about “numbers” rather than his students’ more holistic development. This same concern can 
be raised about the effect of neoliberalism and economism on teachers. Value-added, 
specifically, moves beyond even earlier forms of NMP to position educators not even as 
technicians in the educational process but rather as inputs. Towards this end, some of its 
supporters have focused heavily on how a variety of school outcomes might be improved simply 
by rearranging configurations of teachers  (Hanushek 2011; Kennedy, Peters, & Thomas, 2012; 
Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). VAMs aside, accountability policies, more generally, have 
been said to work to normalize business-like behaviors and market-oriented values by making 
such activities and concerns part of teachers’ daily lives.  As Ball (2013) contends, by attaching 
high-stakes incentives to the narrow outcomes measured by standardized exams, they bring 
individual teachers more specifically into the gaze of judgment and condition them to make 
themselves “calculable rather than memorable” (p. 136). Lyotard (1984) refers to this as 
performativity, which he says works in two complementary ways—by transforming the sign 
systems that re-present education into a reified form for consumption and by establishing a 
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system against which teachers and schools can be appraised. In either case, accountability can 
shift priorities so that what is measureable and quantifiable is what becomes understood as 
having the most worth. (Ball, 2013; Codd, 2005).  
Chapter Summary 
I want to leave this chapter here. If it feels unfinished, this is intentional. Ultimately, what 
the data from this project demonstrated was that RttT and its teacher evaluation policies did not 
produce a singular set of effects. Rather, the impacts of these reforms were complex and still 
being worked out when I left these schools. As the educators at Lamar and Roosevelt enacted 
these policies, they did so within unique contexts and against the backdrops of their own 
experiences and histories. They also struggled, however, in some strikingly similar ways, with 
the narratives they perceived as driving these reforms.  
What I have tried to do throughout this text is present some of this complexity both as it 
might seem to outsiders and as these educators understood it. On both sides of this, I have 
attempted to lay out the basics of the empirical and theoretical arguments that underpin these 
perspectives. Taking my cue from Foucault as well as from the resistance that was apparent in 
these teachers’ interpretive activities, I have tried to make more apparent the specific history, 
context, and conflicts that have given way to the dispositif that exists both within and around us. 
My goal has not been to pass decisive judgment but rather to enable readers to think about how 
teachers inevitably use sense-making and agency to shape what happens to policies once they 
enter into schools as well as about the power structures that presently delimit possibilities for 
school change. I hope that in endeavoring to do this, I have opened a space for more honest 




Chapter 9: Author’s Afterword to Dissertation 
While I do believe that it is useful to leave this text, or at least my interpretations of my 
participants’ experiences, a bit open for discussion at the end, I realize there is also the need for 
me to provide some sense of closure to it. Especially since this is a dissertation, I do want to 
clearly delineate for readers what I understand to be the most important takeaways from this 
project as well as what I see as future research possibilities. 
With respect to the first objective, there are several major conclusions that can be draw 
from this study. The first, which really comes as no surprise, is that policy work is complex in 
ways that are easily overlooked by outcomes-based approaches to policy analysis. Although 
these currently have favor with politicians and reformers, as the data presented in chapters six 
and seven show, they may also mask significant variation in how reforms play out within schools 
and classrooms through their focus on quantitative data and/or most apparent commonalities. 
Had I left my analysis at what was in Chapter Six, for example, the intentional efforts by Lamar 
School District to undermine the student growth requirement in its evaluation tool would have 
reamined one of the most egregious examples of blatant undermining. But, as the analysis in 
Chapter Seven reveals, this allowed the teachers at Lamar to take more risks in their goal setting 
and become more collaborative. As a result, it is one of the few things that brought about 
meaningful changes in these same teachers’ classroom practices. That all of this could have 
easily gone unnoticed points to one of the problems with policymakers’ preference for a single 
approach to assessing the impact of reforms.  
Related to this, then, is that this study also demonstrates that from the point of view of 
enacted practices, it may be problematic to think of reform in action as reflective of a single set 
of outcomes. Of course, this, too, confirms what we already know, which is that context matters, 
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but additionally it reminds us that we still need to work to develop the theoretical frameworks 
and conceptual tools we use to understand processes of school change. As Chapter Seven 
indicates, policy enactment may be a good place to start with this endeavor. After all, the 
application of Ball et al.’s framework here, with its attention to the contextual, interpretive, and 
discursive aspects of reform, helped bring into focus nuanced differences between what 
happened in these two case schools. It also drew attention to something that outcomes-based 
approaches to policy analysis miss by their very nature, which is the sense-making activities that 
brought about and gave meaning to these policies’ enacted practices.  
In addition, this study also contributed to the policy-practice literature in new ways. 
Namely, I have argued from it that research and policymaking would benefit from a more 
complex conceptualization of teacher resistance. Resistance was something that was prevalent in 
my data, which is consistent with previous research; however, it was not, as these studies often 
position it, something that typically occurred as a result of educators’ outright obstinance to 
reform. Instead, it was a policy response that was frequently connected to principled objections 
either to the narratives that accompanied these mandates and/or to the assumptions about 
teachers and teaching embedded in the discourses they carried with them. Moreover, as with the 
aforementioned example from Lamar, it was also something that could sometimes bring about 
unexpected benefits that were not part of these policies intended consequences. Thus, by 
recognizing resistance as something that could be principled and/or productive, this text further 
encourages consideration of two things. The first is that resistance may not always produce 
something undesireable. The second is that if it is more complex than previously imagined, 
resistance is something we should want to better understand both as a general construct and as it 
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occurs in specific contextualized cases. Doing so would seem to be a prerequisite for moving 
forward, positively, with school change. 
Finally, this brings me to the second objective of this afterword, which is to lay out what 
I see as some possible avenues for future research that might be inspired by this project. While I 
have proposed that resistance might be considered principled and/or productive, I believe these 
classifications warrant further reflection. I also wonder if there may also be other useful ways of 
differentiating this concept. As a result, I would like to re-examine my data and perhaps produce 
a focused article dealing with this policy response more specficially. In addition, I want to delve 
more deeply into what I think my analysis in Chapter Seven hints at but does not broach head on, 
which is how principled resistance might be intertwined with teacher agency. It seems to me that 
in the instances where my participants were able to put evaluation reform within an historical 
and political context, especially when this context was one that they objected to, they acted more 
agentically. It also seems that this was when my participants’ resistance was the most productive. 
Of course, as I said, this warrants more attention and thinking. Lastly, I would like to take more 
time to think about the discursive element of policy enactment, as the language used by my 
participants was often quite fascinating. The “Charlotte never intended this to be an evaluation 
tool” is but one powerful example of this, and it evokes a sense of struggle that was reflected 
elsewhere in my data. Such struggle is at the heart of the discursive and is also something that 
must be, as I said earlier, part of the discussion if we want to truly open a space for more honest 
assessment of the reform movement’s problems and possibilities. It is also something that brings 
me back to the impact of neoliberalism, which is something I would like to weave more fully 
into this text, itself. In other words, I am finishing this project with the feeling that it has raised a 
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Appendix A: Methods 
In this appendix, I describe how I conducted this research project. This was not included 
in the main part of this text because I believe only some readers will be interested in it. For those 
that are, however, in what follows I describe my methodology, my specific research questions 
and the methods that I used, as well as my various sources of data and how I approached their 
analysis. 
Researcher’s Stance 
 In many ways, my curiosity about the impact of teacher evaluation reform began prior to 
the emergence of the specific policies that are central to this study. As a practitioner, I entered 
my career shortly after the onset of NCLB and experienced numerous accountability related 
reforms. I witnessed many of NLCB’s documented effects and felt its intensification of my work. 
Yet, few of the policies that emanated from it seemed to positively or significantly affect my 
classroom practice. Often, their most salient feature was a sense that my professional life existed 
within a seemingly perpetual state of change. Although I wanted to believe this reform’s 
sentiments, each round of accountability felt further removed from the ‘real’ work of teaching. 
As my responses to these initiatives became ceremonial, I became curious about why policies 
came to be disjointed from the classroom, the relationship between teachers and reform, and the 
nature of school change.  
It wasn’t until I returned to graduate school, however, that I began to see the web in 
which NCLB and the economistic logic that underlies many current education reforms existed. I 
became aware of the language of neoliberalism that was reflected in such reforms’ through their 
promotion of market-based and business-like policies that were supposed incentivize positive 
forms of change. Though this logic was appealing, my own experiences and reading of the 
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literature during this time contradicted its notions; nonetheless, for quite some time these policies 
seemed to receive unabashed support. It was against this backdrop that I became aware of efforts 
to revise teacher evaluation. Because these often relied heavily on incentivizing school 
improvement through the use of outcomes-based measures of student growth, they immediately 
connected to this framework.   
Perhaps despite my own experiences with accountability, such policies also piqued my 
curiosity. Although advocates claimed they could solve NCLB’s problems by instituting ‘better’ 
accountability, as states’ evaluation models took shape, the significance of this growth 
component, which had been their linchpin, was often downplayed both figuratively and literally. 
In the end many states’ models located significant discretion for policy development with their 
teachers. Given that I had come to realize that what I had initially perceived as teachers’ 
resistance to or compliance with policy was actually something much more complex, this aspect 
of these policies was intriguing, and I wondered about whether and how teachers would be able 
to shape the impact of evaluation reform through such apparent agency. Moreover, while I had 
begun to find ways to think about teachers’ responses economistic policies, I was still searching 
for a way of conceptualizing the mutually constitutive ways teachers interacted with reform- how 
it not only shaped their work but was also shaped by them in return. The latest changes to teacher 
evaluation seemed to provide a unique opportunity to think about these issues. 
Methodology 
The initial purpose of this study was to provide a context specific account of the impact 
that Race to the Top’s mandate for evaluation reform had on a case school. It began as a 
qualitative study and remained as such; however, throughout the course of collecting and 
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analyzing my data it eventually expanded to include a second site. Likewise, its focus shifted 
away from outcomes and towards process.  
To be clear, however, none of this is unexpected with qualitative inquiry. As Denzin and 
Lincoln (2011) explain, qualitative studies pursue the world of lived experience where culture 
intersects with beliefs and actions. They seek to answer questions that stress how social 
interactions get created and understood, and their goal is not to generalize but rather to focus on 
meaning in relation to the specific participants in a study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). Thus, to the extent that as these actions and their participants’ understandings point 
in new directions, qualitative researchers must remain open to such change. 
In this particular instance, a qualitative approach came to focus me on providing a 
context specific account of how the abstract principles embedded in Race to the Top’s teacher 
evaluation policies were brought into practice within two schools. Although the recent tendency 
amongst policymakers and reforms has been to favor quantitative studies when it comes to policy 
implementation, others argue that qualitative research is necessary as well because it can assist in 
documenting school reform in all of its “spatially variegated, institutionally specific, and 
historically changing forms” (Tickell & Peck, 2003; p. 179). Indeed, this approach helped 
illuminate the, as yet little understood, processes through which my teacher participants 
interacted with these policies. It also highlighted the “messy forms and impure hybridities” that 
emerged from these teachers’ policy work. While this will be less useful for those wanting a 
definitive assessment of the impact of the evaluation policies I studied, I agree with Ball (2012) 




More specifically, this project employed case study methods to investigate the following 
research questions: 
1.    How do teachers engage in interpretation and translation during the enactment of 
teacher evaluation reform? 
2.    What influences teachers’ interpretation and translation work? 
3.    How do teachers’ interpretations and translations shape the enacted forms and 
meanings these policies take on?  
Although as I stated earlier, this study expanded as its data collection occurred, these were 
always the questions that focused it.  
The case study approach I used was original to this project’s prospectus too. According to 
Flyvbjerg (2011), case studies are particularly appropriate for inquiries into human affairs, 
which, with its goal of understanding how teachers were impacted by and impacted the outcomes 
of these policies, was essentially what this project was. He further emphasizes that cases are 
useful in such instances because predictive theories and universals cannot be found (2011). This 
reality makes concrete case knowledge focused on an environment in context more valuable 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011). In addition, Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue that researchers can use cases to 
isolate target populations, identify constraints, or show the immediate effects of programs. 
Furthermore, Yin (1994) and Stake (2000) argue that cases can be instrumental in looking for 
insight into larger issues by being used collectively and with redundancy to build a compelling 
argument. Most importantly, Ball et al. assert that, without case specific research, there exists the 
danger of analyzing away the enacted complexities of a reform. 
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This project looked at two cases. Barone (2008) defines a case as a descriptive and non-
experimental study of a bounded system. In this specific instance, I considered the policy process 
for two such systems. The first, and initial case for this project, was Lamar Middle School. The 
second, which was added for comparison, was Roosevelt High. Adding this second case made 
sense given that this project’s research questions were largely informed by Ball et al. enactment 
framework, which places emphasis on the importance of not just the broader policy context but 
also the professional, material, and situated school-level environments in which policy 
realization occurs. By looking across these cases, I was better able to see where different levels 
of context came into play. In turn, this enabled me to more accurately understand the similarities 
and differences in teachers’ interpretation and translation work. 
Research Site and Participants 
To carry out this comparative case study I chose two schools whose national, state, and 
local level contexts were rather similar. Much of the similarities ended here, however, as these 
schools served quite different student communities. As I explained in the main text, Lamar and 
Roosevelt’s student bodies were sharply different as was their official data on student 
achievement. Roosevelt’s students were predominantly white, middle to upper class, and overall 
performed well on state assessments. Lamar’s students were, on average, the opposite, and as a 
result, these schools also faced somewhat different policy pressures and were in slightly different 
places with their reforms. 
Within these schools, I elicited involvement from 12 educators. With the help of a district 
official in each case, I was introduced to these school’s building principals. I was also able to 
send an email to all staff, inviting any who were interested to contact me to participate. Four 
classroom teachers at Lamar and five at Roosevelt responded. Overall, these teachers reflected a 
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broad cross-section of each schools staff. Additionally in both cases at least one of these teacher-
participants had been involved in their district’s development process. I also conducted 
interviews with each building administrator. This study was approved by the University’s 
Institutional Review Board (see Appendix B). The study was explained to each person 
interviewed, their questions were answered, and consent forms were signed. See Appendix A 
Table.1 for information about these participants at Lamar Middle Schools and Appendix A 
Table.2 for information about the participants at Roosevelt High School. Pseudonyms are used 
throughout. 
Data Collection 
In addition to these interviews, I also did some observation at one of my participant’s 
offering/requests. Along with this, I collected documents for analysis.  
 Interviews. My interviews followed a semi-structured format (See Appendix C) and took 
place in locations chosen by each participant. Most chose to meet with me in their buildings; 
however, in two cases, I conducted interviews off-site. Each of these was recorded with my 
participants’ permission and the transcripts from these interviews were shortly thereafter 
transcribed. Copies of these transcripts were then made available to each participant for member 
checking so that they could clarify and verify accuracy as they wished. 
Observations. In addition to these interviews, I attended and observed a few other 
evaluation reform related events at the invitation of one of my participants. One was a union 
meeting organized by this individual where the Lamar teachers had come together to discuss 
setting up building level teams to assist in the implementation of these policies. The other was 
one of Lamar’s after school walk-in work sessions. At both of these, I was introduced and my 
purpose there was explained. I did not audio record either; rather I listened and took handwritten 
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Appendix A Table.4 




Building/Position Background information/Illuminating Characteristics (principals & teachers only) 
   
Lamar Middle School 
 
Sarah Director of district and school 
improvement 
Former 8th grade teacher 
Responsible for overseeing all professional development 
within the district 
 
   Kevin Head principal 9 years middle school experience (7 as an administrator, 
5 as head principal) 
Served on all RttT committees (most involved with the 
professional practice side) 
Illuminating characteristics: graduate student, hyper-
aware of the neoliberal political context  
 
   Lisa Instructional coach/English 
teacher/department chair 
22 years experience 
Co-teacher, responsible for pre & post observation 
meetings 
Served on all RttT committees related to evaluation 
(growth, professional practice, sequence of dismissal 
Illuminating characteristics: Lamar union president, 
active in and aware of Illinois politics 
 
   Robert 8th grade language arts teacher 27 years experience (26 at middle school) 
Served on the committee for student growth 
Illuminating characteristics: nearing the end of career, 
union representative 
 




Professional development cadre member (planned 
professional development for the building) 
After-school program teacher, student mentor 
Served on union evaluation implementation committee 
Illuminating characteristics: non-tenured, beginning 
masters degree student 
 
Matt Special education teacher 5 years experience (1 year at Lamar) 
Professional development cadre member 
Served on RttT committee for professional practice 
Illuminating characteristics: served in co-teacher role, 






Appendix A Table.5 




Building/Position Background information/Illuminating Characteristics (principals & teachers only) 
      Roosevelt High School 
 
Ben Head principal 16 years experience in district 
Served on pre-joint committee panel 
Illuminating characteristics: had served in all levels of staffing 
in the building 
 
Rachelle English teacher 7 years experience 
After-school program teacher 
Positive reinforcement committee member 
Served on professional practice training team 
Illuminating characteristics: prioritized family identity, self-
described as unaware of political context 
 
Beth Social studies teacher Non-tenured (4th year) 
Illuminating characteristics: believed that she has “rocked the 
boat” too much in the last year 
 
Nick Social studies 
teacher/department head 
Second career teacher 
Illuminating characteristics: former lawyer with high degree of 
awareness of Illinois politics, corporate involvement in 
education 
 
Adam Industrial technology 
teacher 
4 years experience in district 
Illuminating characteristics: little knowledge of political 
context 
 
Kim Foreign language 
teacher 
Co-chair for a state-wide foreign language professional 
organization 
Illuminating characteristics: strongly identified her subject area 
as posing special challenges for both evaluation tools 
 
Courtney English teacher Illuminating characteristics: had taught in district, left and then 
returned, experienced a high degree of tension with 
administrators that was somewhat unique to her 
 
 
notes so as to minimize disruptions. These observations were useful in that they provided 
additional data to support my understanding of what this particular participant was doing.  
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Document analysis. Lastly, I collected documents for analysis. These were the second 
most major source of data for this project. More specifically, this document collection centered 
on both what was publicly available about these schools as well as what was provided to me by 
this study’s participants. This public data included things like district and school report card, 
state financial audits, school budgets, and school improvement plans, all of which were available 
either through the Illinois State Board of Education and/or school and district websites. 
Additionally, I asked my participants to share whatever documentation they were willing with 
me. I received copies of district training materials, including power points presented to staff, 
copies of both district’s evaluation plans, and access to several teachers’ professional practice 
materials, anonymized student growth data, and completed evaluation forms.  
Data for this study were collected from October 2014 to April 2015. See Appendix A 
Table.3 for a timeline of data collection activities. 
Appendix A Table.6 
Project timeline 
 
Timeline Data collection activities 
  
October 2014 Recruitment of participants 
Contact with participants 
 
  November-December 2014 Consent from participants 
Background interview conducted with district administrators 
Initial interview conducted with building administrators 
Initial interviews conducted with teacher participants 
Observation of union meeting 
Document collection begins 
 
  January-February 2015 Second interviews with teacher participants 
Follow up communication with administrative participants 
Observation of after school workshop 
Document collection continues 
 
  March-April 2015 Final interviews with administrative and teacher participants 
Document collection  






 As I collected my data, I coded each interview and audio transcription in a manner 
consistent with Denzin and Lincoln’s (2011) description of the analysis process for qualitative 
research.  I began by searching for regularities, patterns, and topics then developed a list of 
coding categories (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). When coding, I looked not only within but also 
across my sources of data. I actively tried to identify not just similarities but also aberrant cases 
or instances of difference. 
My examination of these data was largely informed by Ball et al.’s policy enactment 
framework. Though I regularly sought out other literature as I moved through this project, as I 
searched for meaningful pieces of data in my interviews, I looked, especially, for the contextual 
influences that shaped teachers’ policy responses, segments that elucidate how teachers and their 
work were constructed by these policies, and indications of teachers’ policy interpretations and 
translations. I also tried to identify critical incidents and to analyze moments of tension.  
While I approached document analysis in a similar manner, I used much of the available 
public information to provide context for these educators’ policy work. In these cases, I was 
often looking at test scores and financial data, which meant there was less need to look for some 
of the things I was watching for in my interview data. That said, the school improvement plans 
that were posted online and the school and teacher produced materials I gathered all required a 
greater degree of critical analysis. In addition to the above, I also needed to determine these 
document’s authenticity, credibility, accuracy, and representativeness in order to interpret and 
discover their social meaning (Bowen, 2009). I had to consider the original purposes of my 
documents, who created them, and for whom they were produced (Bowen, 2009). Such elements 
were especially useful as I sought to sort out the intended and enacted meanings that 
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accompanied the impact of these policy changes. They provide a tangible record that evidenced 
the shaping and reshaping of these policies through these teachers’ policy work. 
Finally, it’s worth noting that as this project continued my data analysis was ongoing. I 
employed the constant comparative method (Merriam, 2009). This means that I considered new 
data as they were collected in light of existing analyses. I compared new and old data to see if 
earlier coding schemas held up (Merriam, 2009). This helped me clarify my coding and maintain 
ongoing development of my participants’ perspectives and these policies’ enacted meanings. By 
employing this method, I was able to try out my analyses and generate new questions to ask in 














Teacher Agency and Teacher Evaluation Reform- Interview Protocol (Developer) 
 
Introduction: My name is Angela Masters. I am a graduate student in Curriculum and Instruction 
at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. I am currently working on independent research 
about teacher agency and teacher evaluation reform. In particular, I am interested in 
understanding how and why teachers exercise agency throughout the process of implementing 
the standards based and/or student-growth components of schools’ new evaluations. I believe 
that this research will help us better understand the benefits and challenges that will come along 
with this reform. I want to thank you for you willingness to participate and ask if you have any 
questions for me at this time?   
 
Before we begin, I would like to reassure you that this interview will be confidential and the 
recording and transcripts will be available only to research personnel. Excerpts from this 
interview may be used in my dissertation research and potentially in a journal article or 
conference presentation. All of the data I collect, however, will be stored under your chosen alias 
and under no circumstances will your name be included.   
 
If there is anything you don’t want me to record, just let me know and I will turn off the recorder. 
It is fine to stop the interview at any time or decline to answer any specific question. Is it all right 
for me to start recording now? 
 
Questions: 
1. Please tell me a bit about yourself and your role in the school district. 
2. Your district is actually on a slightly accelerated timeline for the implementation of 
teacher evaluation reform.  Can you tell me how that came to be and a bit about what 
kind of work has been/is being done around these policies? 
3. Who has been involved in this work? Have teachers been involved?  If so, in what 
capacity? (How were teachers selected for this work?) 
4. What do you recall being some of the most critical moments in this process? (for 
example, times of tension/celebration or disagreement/agreement) 
5. Can you describe what the new evaluation system will look like?  What are some of its 
key features and why has it been structured this way?  How is it similar to or different 
than the old process? 
6. Will teachers be able to shape this evaluation system to suit their needs or purposes?  If 
so, how and why have they been enabled to do so? 
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7. How do you/does the district envision that teachers and other school personnel will use 
the information gathered through this new evaluation processes?  
8. What do you expect will be some of the challenges and benefits? 
9.  (Switching gears a little bit) Can you tell me a bit about how teachers have or will be 
made aware of these changes?  (What has been the message to them and from your 
perspective, how have they responded?) 
10. Will any training occur?  If so, how will teachers and others be trained? 
11. What oversight, if any, will be put into place to monitor teachers’ work? 
12. (Switching to the context of the school) How does teacher evaluation system connect to 
the existing school/district philosophies/practices?  
13.  Does the school/district have an overarching philosophy?   
14. What would you say are some of its strengths (for example programs, curriculum, staff, 
culture etc...)?  How would you describe the culture in the building? What, if any 
challenges do you perceive the school/district to be facing?  
15. What other kinds of strategic goals are currently being worked towards? Initiatives 
undertaken in the school/district? 
16. Finally, what do you see as the purposes of teacher evaluation?  What would a system 
designed to meet these purposes ideally look like? 
17. Again, this goal of this research is to better understand the way teachers exercise agency 
during the process of implementing teacher evaluation reform. Is there anything else that 




Teacher Agency and Teacher Evaluation Reform- Interview Protocol (Administrator 
Initial) 
 
Introduction: My name is Angela Masters. I am a graduate student in Curriculum and Instruction 
at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. I am currently working on independent research 
about teacher agency and teacher evaluation reform. In particular, I am interested in 
understanding how and why teachers exercise agency throughout the process of implementing 
the standards based and/or student-growth components of schools’ new evaluations. I believe 
that this research will help us better understand the benefits and challenges that will come along 
with this reform. I want to thank you for you willingness to participate and ask if you have any 
questions for me at this time?   
 
Before we begin, I would like to reassure you that this interview will be confidential and the 
recording and transcripts will be available only to research personnel. Excerpts from this 
interview may be used in my dissertation research and potentially in a journal article or 
conference presentation. All of the data I collect, however, will be stored under your chosen alias 
and under no circumstances will your name be included.  
 
If there is anything you don’t want me to record, just let me know and I will turn off the recorder. 
It is fine to stop the interview at any time or decline to answer any specific question. Is it all right 
for me to start recording now? 
 
Questions: 
1. Please tell me a bit about yourself and your role in the school. 
2. Your school is on an accelerated timeline to implement its changes to teacher 
evaluation.  Can you tell me a little bit about the work that has been going on in your 
school with regards to these? 
3. Who from your building has been involved in this work and in what way? (How were 
these people chosen?) 
4. Can you describe what the new evaluation system will look like?  What are some of its 
key features and why has it been structured this way?  How is it similar to or different 
than the old process? 
5. Were you involved at all with the process of designing the new tools that your building 
will use?  If so, what do you recall being some of the most critical moments in this 
process? (for example, times of tension/celebration or disagreement/agreement) 
6. Can you tell me a bit about how teachers have or will be made aware of these 
changes?  Have you had any role in disseminating this information? (What has been the 
message to them and from your perspective, how have they responded?)  
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7. Based on your conversations with your staff, what are they hopeful/concerned about with 
regards to this process?  What has been your response, especially to their concerns? Have 
you had any conversations/stories that stand out in your mind that you could share? 
8. What kind of training has or will be provided to teachers? 
9. What oversight, if any, will be put into place to monitor teachers’ work? 
10. Will teachers be able to shape this evaluation system to suit their needs or purposes?  If 
so, how and why have they been enabled to do so? 
11. How do you envision that teachers and other school personnel will use the information 
gathered through this new evaluation processes?   
12. What do you expect will be some of the challenges and benefits?  
13. How does the teacher evaluation system connect to the existing school 
philosophies/practices?  
14. (Switching gears a bit) Does the school have an overarching philosophy?   
15. What would you say are some of its strengths (for example programs, curriculum, staff, 
culture etc...)?  How would you describe the culture in the building? What, if any 
challenges do you perceive the school to be facing? 
16. What other kinds of strategic goals are currently being worked towards? …Initiatives 
have been undertaken in the school/district? 
17. (Switching gears)  What do you see as the purposes of teacher evaluation?  What would a 
system designed to meet these purposes ideally look like? 
18. Finally, how would you explain the impetus for (or what is driving) the current changes 
to teacher evaluation both within your district and across the nation? 
19. Again, this goal of this research is to better understand the way teachers exercise agency 
during the process of implementing teacher evaluation reform. Is there anything else that 






Teacher Agency and Teacher Evaluation Reform- Interview Protocol (Administrator 
Final) 
Questions: 
1. How would you describe the process of enacting/implementing the new evaluation 
models in your school?  What has the experience been like? (Can you tell me about a few 
moments that stand out from this year?) 
2. What do you think most influenced the course of the realization/implementation of these 
changes?  How and why?  
3. From your perspective, when and how have the teachers been involved in actively 
shaping the outcome of the new evaluations?   
4. What impact do you believe that teacher evaluation reform has had on your school? (for 
example, its professional and academic culture, professional conversations with 
teachers/about student learning, teachers workloads, teacher satisfaction, instructional 
processes etc…specific examples/moments) 
5. How has your work or understanding of your role in the school changed as a result of 
these policies?  Similarly, has/how has your work and/or relationships with your staff 
changed? (specific examples or moments) 
6. Of these outcomes, which do you feel have been shaped mostly by teacher response? By 
the policies themselves?  
7. How has teacher involvement been expected?  Unexpected? What have been the benefits 
and challenges of having teachers involved as they were? (specific examples or moments) 
8. Overall, has the process had any other unexpected benefits? Obstacles?   
9. In our first interview I asked you what you thought the purposes of teacher evaluation 
were.  How would you answer this question now?  
10. Similarly, based on this experience, what ideal role(s) do you now envision teachers 
having in this process?   
11. I also asked you to what you would attribute these current policy changes. How would 
you answer this question now? 





Teacher Agency and Teacher Evaluation Reform- Interview Protocol (Teacher Initial) 
Introduction: My name is Angela Masters. I am a graduate student in Curriculum and Instruction 
at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. I am currently working on independent research 
about teacher agency and teacher evaluation reform. In particular, I am interested in 
understanding how and why teachers exercise agency throughout the process of implementing 
the standards based and/or student-growth components of schools’ new evaluations. I believe 
that this research will help us better understand the benefits and challenges that will come along 
with this reform. I want to thank you for you willingness to participate and ask if you have any 
questions for me at this time?   
 
Before we begin, I would like to reassure you that this interview will be confidential and the 
recording and transcripts will be available only to research personnel. Excerpts from this 
interview may be used in my dissertation research and potentially in a journal article or 
conference presentation. All of the data I collect, however, will be stored under your chosen alias 
and under no circumstances will your name be included.  
 
If there is anything you don’t want me to record, just let me know and I will turn off the recorder. 
It is fine to stop the interview at any time or decline to answer any specific question. Is it all right 
for me to start recording now? 
 
Questions: 
1. Please tell me a bit about yourself, what your career path been like, and what are your 
primary roles/responsibilities are in this school?  (for example, instructional positions, 
leadership and decision-making roles, curriculum responsibilities etc…) 
2. Do you have a professional or personal philosophy that guides your work here and with 
your students? How does it influence what you do? (story or moment in your classroom 
that captures this philosophy) 
3. What other kinds of things do you believe greatly impact your work in this 
schools?  (what kinds of initiatives are currently underway; material and professional 
culture; what is the context for these?) 
4. What role do teachers play in shaping this school?  When and how are teachers involved 
in the processes of decision-making or problems solving? 
5. What has been the impact of external reform on you and your work while at this school? 
What are some moments that stand out that define your experiences with reform/change? 
(benefits, challenges, problems etc…) 
6. Has any of this impacted the way you think about school reform? 
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7. Your school is currently implementing changes to teacher evaluation on an accelerated 
timeline.  Tell me about what role teacher evaluation has traditionally held in the school. 
(stories or moments that exemplify) 
8. What do you know about these changes?  (for example, what will your school be 
doing?  Why are these changes taking place? What has been communicated to you by 
district officials? What is the intended goal or purpose of these changes?  What has been 
your response to these? 
9. How do you anticipate these changes to teacher evaluation will impact you and your 
school?  (for example, its professional and academic culture, professional conversations 
with teachers/about student learning, teachers workloads, teacher satisfaction, your 
instructional processes etc…) (what does a successful teacher look like under each of 
these components?) 
10. How have/have you/others been involved in shaping these policies thus far? How do you 
anticipate you will be involved in shaping the impact of these policies? (what say will 
you have; what will you use the results for) 
11. Is there anything else that you think I should be aware of in light of our conversation and 
those goals?   
Thank you again for your time! 
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Teacher Agency and Teacher Evaluation Reform- Interview Protocol (Teacher Secondary) 
Questions: 
1. With respect to the changes currently underway with teacher evaluation, how would you 
describe your experience with these changes thus far? Can you walk me through what has 
been going on? (stories/moments) 
2. What has the experience of learning about these changes been like? (stories/moments esp. 
of tension) 
3. Have you been actively involved in the process of shaping what has been taking 
place?  Would you describe and share with me any documentation you have created 
throughout this process thus far?  Please tell me about these items? How has your 
involvement in the process shaped the impact of this reform? (tensions)  
4. Based on what you have experienced thus far, what impact do you think this new teacher 
evaluation system has had on the school?  Your work? (for example, its professional and 
academic culture, professional conversations with teachers/about student learning, 
teachers workloads, teacher satisfaction, instructional processes etc…tensions) 
5. What have been some of the benefits and challenges you have experienced? How have 
you handled these?  What have been some of the expected results of this process? 
Unexpected?  
6. How are the experiences and results you described above similar to or different than 
others you have experienced with reform in the past?   
7. How is has this process be similar to or different than what you have expected? (If 
someone from outside the school who had promoted these changes were to come see how 
they were being put into practice, what do you think would surprise them/be as they had 
hope/expected) 
8. Has your thinking about teacher evaluation, its purposes, or practices changed in any way 
since beginning this process?  If so, how? (what kind of teacher it constructs?) 
9. What will happen next in the process?  What do you believe some of the benefits and 
challenges of this phase will be? 
10. Is there anything else that you think I should be aware of in light of our conversation and 




Teacher Agency and Teacher Evaluation Reform- Interview Protocol (Teacher Final) 
 
Questions: 
1. How would you describe your experience with the implementation of your school’s 
teacher evaluation tools?  Can you walk me through the process of what has been going 
on since we last talked? (stories/key moments/tensions) 
2. Would you describe and share with me any documentation you have re-created 
throughout this process?  Please tell me about these items and any changes you have 
made to them. Why have you revised them as you did? 
3. What have been some of the benefits and challenges you have experienced since we last 
talked?  How have you handled these? What have been some of the expected results of 
this process? Unexpected? (moments/stories) 
4. How has your involvement in the process shaped the impact of this reform? How have 
you been able to shape the evaluation tools to suit your purposes or needs?  How have 
you not? (examples) 
5. What did you learn as a result of this evaluation process? How will you use this 
information moving forward? (tensions?) 
6. What do you see yourself doing differently in future evaluations?  What will you do the 
same? 
7. What impact do you think this new teacher evaluation system has had on the 
school?  Your work? (for example, its professional and academic culture, professional 
conversations with teachers and administrators about student learning, teachers 
workloads, teacher satisfaction, instructional processes etc…) 
8. If a promoter of these policy changes could see the end result of this years’ process, what 
would they notice, think, or be surprised/unsurprised by? If you could tell them one 
story/about one moment that exemplifies what the changes have been like, what would it 
be? 
9. What, if any, changes would you recommend to the process of teacher evaluation either 
as it has been implemented at this school or at large? What, if any, changes would you 
make to the role that teachers have been enabled to have during this process? 
10. Is there anything else that you think I should be aware of in light of our conversation and 
those goals?  Thank you again for your time! 
